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ist das Wesen des Menschen. Zqjý Trp=, c-Lxý -coü 16-Vov s"Xov-coc 
Der Mensch ist das Lebewesen, das gemäß seiner Seinsart die 
Möglichkeit hat, zu handeln. 
Heidegger, Die Grundbegriffe der antiken Philosophie. 
Wir vermeiden den Terminus 'Handeln' absichtlich. 
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HEIDEGGER'S READING OF ARISTOTLE: 11WIS AND THE ONTOLOGY OF NOVENENT 
Heidegger perceives a naivety at the heart of Greek metaphysics to 
which he believes philosophy has remained prey throughout its 
history. This consists in having taken the understanding of being 
appropriate to the activity and experience of production Inotgaiq] as 
the basis for understanding being in general. What such a 
interpretation lacks above all is a conception of human being as that 
which, distinct from the work, engages in productive activity. Only 
if such a conception were secured in contradistinction to the 
understanding of being derived from the work could, in Heidegger's 
view, ontology itself be placed on firm footing. By way of a 
response, Heidegger undertook a critical appropriation of Aristotle's 
practical philosophy and of the concept of npftiq in particular. This 
was to provide the basis of an account of Dasein. However, the 
outcome of the appropriation was problematic in two respects. 
First, Aristotle's own presentation of npftiq as the horizonal 
structure of teleological activity is dogged by incoherencies arising 
precisely from the influence exerted on the language of metaphysics 
by the experience of nofrlatr, Indeed, the extent of this influence 
renders the language of metaphysics intrinsically ill-suited to the 
articulation of np&ttr,. Heidegger's appropriation of the figure of 
the end-in-itself must therefore be accompanied by an attempt to 
wrest it from the dominant conceptual structures of production. 
Second, insofar as the terms in which Heidegger couches the 
ontological determination of Dasein are taken from the language of 
practical philosophy, there arises a formal parallel between the 
transcendence of Dasein and possible structures of activity. Such a 
parallel invites the supposition that Dasein's transcendence may be 
enacted or accomplished in its comportment in and towards the world. 
Although I shall be concerned primarily with the first of these 
problems, the second remains a constant consideration and recurs 
explicitly at several junctures. Drawing on Heidegger's reading of 
Metaphysics E), I argue that he sought to secure an ontological 
interpretation of xfvnaiq, 3,6v(xVtq and ev6pjetcy from which the 
influence of production had been displaced. Specifically, this hinges 
on the idea of finite appropriation as the essence of In 
addition, Heidegger emphasises the way in which each potentiality is 
related to the manner of its accomplishment. As an activity that is 
an end in itself, npftir, is therefore understood as an activity of 
finite appropriation whose end is the very movement of appropriation 
itself. As such, it constitutes a repetition of the essence of 
36v(xgiq and of the transcendence of Dasein insofar as it is 
understood to be constituted by 36v(xgtq. 
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NAIVE ONTOLOGY AND THE QUESTION OF PRAXIS 
We not only wish to but must understand the 
Greeks better than they understand 
themselves. 
Heideggerl 
Blanchot once described Heidegger as a thinker "bereft of naivety. "2 
If, as Heidegger supposed, all genuine questions harbour a challenge 
to the one who poses them, naivety may be said to consist in 
withholding oneself from such a challenge, or in a failure even to 
recognize that such evasion has occurred. One forgets oneself, loses 
oneself, precisely insofar as one is beyond question. However, it is 
not simply a matter of self-understanding. For such naivety will have 
wider repercussions, curtailing the scope and radicality of the 
question posed. When Descartes, for example, neglected to supplement 
the cogito with a consideration of what it means to say 'I am, ' he 
left the very basis of his philosophy uninterrogated. However, in 
passing over the connection between his own existence and the 
question of being, Descartes was, in Heidegger's view, simply 
reiterating a naivety that had already dominated philosophy for a 
long time. 
1 
In The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, Heidegger considers the 
extent to which modern philosophy has remained uncritically bound by 
the distinction between essence and existence as it was formulated in 
medieval philosophy EGA24 9§10-111. Essence was expressed in several 
ways, each corresponding to a different aspect of the basic 
experience of a thing as such. 3 A clue as to how this experience 
itself was framed is given by the concept of existence, which on its 
part was understood in terms of actualitas, that is, on the basis of 
a working, effecting or operating EGA24 122-123: 871. This reference 
back to an acting on the part of an indefinite subject already 
suggests that the concepts of essence and existence 
sind einer Interpretation des Seienden mit Rücksicht auf das 
herstellende Verhalten entwachsen. IGA24 147: 1051 
are an outgrowth from an interpretation of beings with 
regard to productive comportment. 
Yet is also clear that medieval philosophy was unable to make this 
interpretation explicit. For within the context of medieval 
philosophy, finite existence was of course understood as the 
condition of the ens creatum, whereupon the agent responsible for 
such existence was identified as God and the character of a thing, 
its essence, was understood to lie primarily in its createdness. 
However, the appeal to a divine origin effectively sent the medieval 
interpretation into a "blind alley, " halting any further 
investigation into a series of sacrosanct metaphysical terms and 
concepts. As a result, the source of metaphysical language in human 
experience was covered over. Moreover, since all things were thought 
2 
PýF 
to have been created by God, the concepts of essence and existence 
were understood to apply without discrimination to human beings, 
animals and inanimate things alike. This thesis was never explicitly 
questioned in medieval philosophy; nor could it be, given that it 
follows from the belief in a creator God. 
Without the constraints of scholastic theology, Heidegger proposes a 
form of genealogical analysis in which the traditional content of 
ontology is gradually pared back to reveal the source experiences 
from which our initial determinations of being arose. This 
"destruction of the history of ontology" leads him back to the Greeks 
and to the terms from which medieval philosophy drew its 
inspiration. 4 Here, Heidegger offers an interpretation of the way the 
concepts of essence and existence, and all the terms in which they 
are expressed, arose as formalisations of the experience of 
production and of handling the work thus made. EiSor,, igLy, Aop(pý, 
Url, unoxcigevov, optaji6q, -yiEvoq and ol)CTi(x are all shown to have 
their basis in such an experience. 5 In addition, the kind of sight 
constitutive of Oewpi(x is itself shown to have evolved from the way 
one looks towards the end, conceives the image of what has yet to be 
made or regards the work in its completed form. 6 The importance of 
this can hardly be overstated: the basic concepts of metaphysics, the 
determination of a thing and manner of its apprehension, the sense 
attributed to being and the very structure of metaphysical thinking 
itself are all fundamentally informed by the experience of 
production. 7 
3 
If the conception of a finite being is linked to human rather than 
divine artifice, it fOllOW5 that the necessity and basis of such a 
perspective will be made accessible to questioning. Taking up this 
possibility, one will be able to establish the extent of the domain 
in which the concepts of essence and existence are applicable; for it 
is by no means obvious that language inspired by the work will be 
appropriate to nature or indeed to the 'worker. ' At issue, then, are 
precisely the foundation and limits of the concepts and forms of 
thought habitually used to account for all being5. 
Even ancient ontology left the matter unexplored and did not address 
these questions in a systematic way EGA24 155: 1101. It seems, 
therefore, that it too was naive inasmuch as it did not engage in an 
explicit reflection on the source of its conceptuality in a specific 
region of its own experience. However, Heidegger warns against 
supposing that the absence of an explicitly (self-) reflective moment 
means that there is no reflection whatsoever. On the contrary, even 
naive ontology is always and necessarily reflective insofar as "it 
seeks to conceive beings with respect to their being by having regard 
to the Dasein (TuXý, votc, X6yor, )" EGA24 155: 1101. Nonetheless, 
reference to the comportment of Dasein may be implicit, beyond the 
declared scope of the question. 
Die Ontologie ist dann nicht insofern naiv, als sie 
überhaupt nicht auf das Dasein zurückblickt, überhaupt nicht 
reflektiert - das ist ausgeschlossen -, sondern insofern, 
als dieses notwendige Zurückblicken auf das Dasein über eine 
vulgäre Auffassung des Daseins und seiner Verhaltungen nicht 
hinauskommt und somit diese - weil sie zur Alltäglichkeit 
des Daseins überhaupt gehört - nicht eigens betont, Die 
4 
Reflexion verbleibt in den Bahnen der vorphilosophischen 
Erkenntnis. IGA24 156: 1101 
Ontology is naive, then, not because it does not look back 
at all to the Dasein, not because it does no reflecting at 
all - this is excluded - but because this necessary looking 
back toward the Dasein does not get beyond a common 
conception of the Dasein and its comportments and thus - 
because they belong to the Dasein's general everydayness - 
does not expressly emphasize them. Reflection here remains 
within the rut of pre-philosophical knowledge. 
The pre-philosophical knowledge in question is the understanding of 
being derived from the experience of making. For insofar as this is 
uncritically applied to the being of Dasein, not only will Dasein 
itself be inadequately conceived, but the very experience of making 
in which Dasein engages is also set on a partial basis. And as long 
as reflection is allowed to remain in this "rut, " ontological enquiry 
will, for all the virtues of naivety, be incomplete and ill-founded. 
The task, as Heidegger sees it, is therefore to remove the blind spot 
he perceives at the heart of Greek ontology by placing the productive 
comportment of Dasein itself under scrutiny. 
Es muß gefragt werden: Welche Funktion hat das herstellend- 
gebrauchende Verhalten im weitesten Sinne innerhalb des 
Daseins selbst? Die Antwort darauf ist nur möglich, wenn 
zuvor die Seinsverfassung des Daseins überhaupt in den 
Grundzügen ans Licht gestellt, d. h. die Ontologie des 
Daseins gesichert ist. IGA24 165: 1171 
We must ask, What function does the action of producing and 
using in the broadest sense have within the Dasein itself? 
The answer is possible only if the constitution of the 
Dasein's being is first brought to light in its general 
basic features, that is, if the ontology of Dasein is made 
secure. 8 
Heidegger found the basis for the ontology of Dasein he was looking 
for in the Micomachean Ethics, where Aristotle describes five 
5 
distinct ways in which the soul attains truth, that is, ways in which 
beings are disclosed in and through Dasein's comportment towards them 
11139bl5-161. In the light of this account, Oewpia and noirjcri(; are 
thrown into relief as possibilities that exist alongside others. 
Here, then, we are presented with an account in which productive 
comportment is, if not explicitly placed in question, certainly 
thematised in such a way as to demonstrate its limits. For Troiqcyi(;, 
as a form of activity whose end lies beyond itself, is shown by 
Aristotle to be incapable of securing its own basis [Ch. 1.1 & V1. 
Rather, it is dependent upon, and indeed governed by, np&ýic, i. e. 
activity that is an end in itself. Moreover, in addition to denoting 
a specific form of comportment alongside others, np&ýi4; emerges as a 
fundamental determination of human life. Accordingly, it seems to 
challenge the hold that the experience of production exerted over the 
Greek conception of being, offering instead a determination of Dasein 
that seeks to articulate itself otherwise than in terms taken over 
from the work. The central concern of this thesis will be the manner 
in which such a determination of Dasein as np&tiq enters Heidegger's 
thinking. 
* 
The importance of Aristotle for Heidegger has been well known for a 
long time. However, it is only with the publication of many of 
Heidegger's early lecture courses in the last ten or twelve years 
tha ta more considered understanding of the Auseinandersetzung 
between them has begun to emerge. It is probably Franco Volpi who has 
6 
done more than anyone to document Heidegger's reading of Aristotle. 9 
His book, Heidegger e Aristotele (to my knowledge the only book that 
expressly deals with the presence of Aristotle in Heidegger's work) 
is a comprehensive account of Heidegger's reading of Aristotle from 
his earliest encounter with Brentano's work on the manifold senses of 
being through the Marburg years to the interpretation of q6atq 
offered in his final essay on Aristotle (written in 1939). In 
addition, Volpi has since published a series of papers developing a 
broad and finely argued account of Heidegger's critical appropriation 
of Aristotelian practical philosophy. 10 In particular, he shows how 
Heidegger assimilated the conception of np&ýiq as a fundamental 
determination of human existence as a whole into his own account of 
the ontological structure of Dasein and goes on to detail a series of 
direct correspondences between the terms in which Aristotle 
elaborates np&tlq and those which Heidegger adopts in his 
presentation of Dasein in Being and Time. 11 Although such unequivocal 
translations may sometimes be hard to defend, there is no doubt that 
the high profile accorded to Aristotle's practical philosophy in the 
development of Heidegger's interpretation of Dasein is wholly 
justified. 12 Whilst we remain indebted to Volpi for the extent to 
which Heidegger's proximity to Aristotle is understood, we may wish 
to build upon Volpi's achievement by concentrating further on those 
points at which Heidegger's interpretation appears most problematic. 
For not only is it the case that his interpretation stirs problems 
that had hitherto lain dormant in Aristotle's text, but the nature of 
the translation from Aristotle's discourse into Heidegger's own 
7 
itself generates profound difficulties. This translation is 
essentially from the register of practical philosophy to that of 
ontology. What is involved in such a change? 
Volpi describes Heidegger's interest in Aristotle's practical 
philosophy as stemming from a desire to counter the excessively 
theoretical bias of modern philosophy in general and the 
phenomenology of Husserl in particular. 13 At the same time, he adds, 
there was a need to free the fundamental intuitions of Aristotelian 
practical philosophy from their "metaphysico-anthropological" 
trappings. Expanding on this theme, Volpi notes that whereas 
Aristotle's conception of np&t-L(; was articulated in a well-defined 
metaphysical and anthropological frame, Heidegger eschews such 
support: 
ogn-z sostegno sostanziale, in vigore nella tradizione 
metafisica, 6 considerato ormai come derivato e difettivo 
rispetto a quell 'agire originario che 6 ]a irp&tic, e che 
constituisce Vessere dell'esserci; quest'ultimo deve essere 
compreso a partire da se stesso, a] di fuori di ogni 
prefigurazione e predeterminazione, di qualsiasi tipo essa 
sia. IECP 2381 
every substantial point of support in the metaphysical 
tradition is now considered to be derivative and defective 
with respect to that originary activity that is upRiq and 
which is constitutive of the being of Dasein [being-there]; 
the latter must be understood from itself, independently of 
any prefigurement and predetermination whatsoever. 
Two fundamental problems emerge from this. 1. What consequences does 
the translation of np&tir, into the ontological register have for 
Heidegger's understanding of activity? 2. What difficulties for the 
articulation of np&ti(; are created by Heidegger's own recognition of 
8 
the determinative influence of production on the conceptuality of 
metaphysics? These questions will serve as the basis for a survey of 
the way Heidegger's appropriation of np&kir, has been understood by 
some of those who have written most perceptively on the matter, 
namely, in addition to Volpi himself, Jacques Taminiaux, Robert 
Bernasconi and Giuseppe Nicolaci. 14 At the same time, I shall situate 
the approach taken in this thesis vis-A-vis their respective 
readings. 
As a result of its translation into the ontological register, np&ýiq 
no longer designates a possibility that Dasein can take up or set 
aside at will, but acquires the status of a fundamental determination 
of Dasein: it is no longer a matter of what Dasein can do, but of 
what or how Dasein is. A parallel is thereby created between the 
language of activity and the language of being that remains a point 
of uncertainty in Heidegger's thought. For whilst the distinction 
between the ontological determination of Da5ein and its existentiell 
possibilities is a necessary one, at times it seems hard to 
sustain. 15 And these are the times when Heidegger's ontological 
discourse seems closest to forgetting itself in a programme of 
political action. I say 'closest' in order not to protect Heidegger's 
discourse behind its own veil of naivety. For fixed deeply in 
Heidegger's thinking at this time, there is an alignment between 
ontology and activity that found its expression in Heidegger's 
engagement with National SocialiSM. 16 
9 
Volpi himself does not pursue the issue of the relation between 
Heidegger's ontological reading of npat-tq and his political 
interventions further than noting its contribution to "a kind of 
heroic solipsism" IECP 2391. As he recalls, Hannah Arendt saw in 
Heidegger's interpretation of np&4iq an inversion of the Aristotelian 
conception of an essentially public form of activity. More recently, 
this critique has been taken up by Jacques Taminiaux. He argues that 
Heidegger's distinction between authenticity [Eigentlichkeitl and 
inauthenticity I Uneigen tIi chkei tI represents a recovery of the 
Aristotelian distinction between np&ýiq and nolqcriq- However, he goes 
on to suggest that Heidegger's account of authentic Dasein uproots 
np&tiq from its characteristic dimension of Sot(x, ambiguity and 
pluralism; that is, from the dimension of politics ILOF 174,182, 
1861. He thereby regards Heidegger's recovery of Aristotle as 
counterbalanced, if not outweighed, by a Platonic bias in favour of 
the Plo4; Ocopecixoq. In my view, however, simply to oppose the 
Aristotelian and Platonic elements - good and bad respectively - 
within Heidegger's work to one another is to oversimplify the matter. 
For such a gesture assumes that what belongs to Aristotle or to Plato 
in Heidegger's text can be easily identified. Yet the identity of a 
thinker is rarely so well-defined. Moreover, to interpret the loss of 
the overtly public or political dimension of np&tiq as its eclipse by 
a Platonic conception of activity is to suppress the possibility that 
Heidegger's understanding of the term may proceed directly from his 
reading of Aristotle. Ultimately, as we shall see, it is to 
10 
underestimate the transformation that the concept of Trp&tiq undergoes 
on its passage into Heidegger's text. 
We have already seen that this passage takes the form of a 
translation from the register of practical philosophy to that of 
ontology. In addition, if the naivety of Greek ontology is to be 
dispelled, not only must Dasein be interpreted explicitly in terms of 
Tip&ý, Lq, but, as Volpi put it, both concepts "must be understood from 
themselves, independently of any prefigurement and predetermination 
whatsoever. " Insofar as the language of metaphysics has been 
fundamentally determined by the experience of making, one is 
therefore required to understand Dasein and np&tiq independently of 
this experience. Yet precisely insofar as the language of metaphysics 
has been thus determined, there seems little possibility of framing a 
fresh interpretation of np&tiq that does not revert to the idiom of 
production. We owe our understanding of this predicament above all to 
Bernasconi, whose sensitivity to the radical implications of 
Heidegger's genealogy of metaphysical language leads him to suggest 
that the eclipse of np&tir, lamented by Arendt and Taminiaux is a fate 
inscribed in the very origin of metaphysics itself, and not a merely 
contingent feature of modernity. 17 The translation of np&ýi4; into the 
ontological register is clearly rendered more complex by this. For in 
addition to the changes forced upon it by its newly acquired 
ontological role, the very terms in which it is to be conceived must 
themselves be recovered from the experience of production - an 
experience whose terms are inappropriate to the determination of 
Dasein as np&tiq precisely insofar as production is itself delimited 
11 
by np&ýiq. Whilst Taminiaux is right, therefore, to be concerned over 
a loss of the public and pluralistic elements of np&ýiq, his account 
is not sufficiently responsive to the predicament brought to light by 
Heidegger's destruction of the history of ontology and to the kind of 
response for which it calls. A straightforward recovery of np&ýiq in 
its earlier form - even at the ontological level - will inevitably 
precipitate a repetition of the very problem one sought to remedy. 
Bernasconi presents Heidegger as having realized the impasse in which 
any 'recovery' of np&ýic ., as such will 
inevitably be caught. He goes 
on to suggest that, in response to this predicament, Heidegger sought 
to develop an interpretation of activity indifferent to the 
distinction between noiqcTiq ., and np&tic, precisely 
insofar as it 
represented their common root. As he points out, the difficulty lies 
in sustaining such an interpretation without falling back into a 
generalized modern idea of activity that would of course reinstate 
to nolqcytc,. To avoid this, writes the subordination of np&tir 
Bernasconi, one must continue to think "in remembrance of the 
distinction" EFDP 1301. His reading of Heidegger's 'Building, 
Dwelling, Thinking' and the 'Letter on Humanism' shows Heidegger 
engaged in just such a commemoration of noigaiq and irp&tiq. By moving 
directly to these later texts, Bernasconi delineates a response from 
a period in Heidegger's work subsequent to that in which the problem 
itself was first articulated. Yet if, as Bernasconi rightly insists, 
any conception of np&tiq recovered from the hegemony of noinuiq wi II 
be radically altered, we know that Heidegger announced such a 
radicalization at least as early as 1928 in the guise of thinking the 
12 
transcendence of Dasein Ipp. 81-861. In the present study, I shall 
concentrate on this earlier stage of Heidegger's work with the aim of 
showing that a recovery was already underway. Furthermore, as such a 
recovery was contemporaneous with the project of fundamental 
ontology, the relevance of Heidegger's interpretation of Trp&ttq to 
that project will emerge as a recurrent theme throughout the work. 
Giuseppe Nicolaci has written one of the most acute and stimulating 
analy5es of Heidegger's appropriation of np&ýiq to have appeared to 
date. 18 He too is aware of the danger of np&ýiq ., 
being eclipsed by the 
conceptual structures of noincytq, but differs from Bernasconi in the 
way he frames the problem. For the focal point of his account is 
primarily the aporia Aristotle faces in the attempt to present 
(ppovrlcriq and np&ti(; in the context of a theoretical treatise when 
they are by definition not amenable to theory. The language of 
notrjaiq offers no such resistance, for reasons we have already 
touched upon Epp. 1-21. To expand upon what was said earlier, however, 
the problem turns on the issue of sight and representation. For 
whilst there is a noetic moment within np&tiq (no form of activity is 
blind), the kind of sight involved is inseparable from the act and 
from its situation, and therefore does not acquire a purely 
theoretical form [Ch. 3.111. In spite of acknowledging the conformity 
of np&tiq and its end, however, Aristotle's ethical discourse finds 
itself trying to set out 
13 
]a struttura e le condizioni della &pc-cý, i momenti del 
percorso attraverso il quale si raggiunge una tale 
conformi t6; cosi, esso riproduce as tra t tamen te I 'i t inerario 
di svillupo della Tp6vgcriq e guarda ]a np&ýiq dalla 
prospettiva del movimento immanente per il quale es5a 
perviene a se stessa. ILHP 2471 
the structure and the conditions of &pzTý, the stages along 
the route by which it reaches such a conformity; in this 
way, it gives an abstract reproduction of the line of 
development of (Ppovn<yl q and regards np&kiq from the 
perspective of the immanent movement by which it comes to 
itself. 
The pressure to represent the unrepresentable prises open what 
Nicolaci calls a "virtual space" in Aristotle's discourse - the space 
in which np&tiq is thematically articulated. He adds that Heidegger 
was one of those who knew best how to interpret this space ILHP 250). 
It is my view that, in line with the proposed recovery of np&ýic 
Heidegger actually sought to expose this interior to the world, that 
is, to present it as the space or site of Dasein itself. Such an idea 
brings us to what Nicolaci calls the imrnanent movement by which 
np&kiq comes to itself. Although he notes the importance of the link 
between such a movement and X6voq, he does not elaborate on the form 
it could take Ep. 631. By contrast, the question of how Heidegger's 
discourse sought to understand such a movement will feature 
prominently in the present work. 
We know that from at least as early as 1921 Heidegger regarded 
Aristotle's Physics as the fundamental text of Western philosophy and 
that his interest was above all in Aristotle's account of movement. 19 
Indeed, Heidegger's early essays on the hermeneutics of facticity are 
directed towards securing an account of the fundamental movement 
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C Grundbewegthei t] of Dasein's factical life. Given Heidegger's 
ontological interpretation of Aristotle's practical philosophy, the 
form of movement in question could only be that which belongs to 
np&ýiq. 20 The scene of Heidegger's appropriation of Aristotelian 
practical philosophy thereby shifts to the problem of movement. But 
in order for the form of movement characteristic of np&tiq to provide 
an interpretation of Dasein adequate to what is required, it cannot 
proceed from the experience of production. On this reading, then, 
Heidegger is committed to framing a conception of movement that 
precedes the formalization of the experience of production that 
issues in the vocabulary of metaphysics. 21 Of course, this is not to 
say that such a conception need be entirely independent of the 
experience of production, as if one could simply switch ground 
altogether. Rather, it is a matter of arriving at a determination of 
the sense of movement that implicitly underlies the experience of 
production. Such a sense clearly cannot proceed from that experience, 
whereupon for the determination of Dasein as np&tiq to shake off the 
dominance of production, Heidegger must reach an interpretation of 
the movement by which Dasein comes to itself otherwise than as a 
linear progression towards an external end. 
Given this exigency, Heidegger'5 appropriation of Aristotle's 
practical philosophy cannot be understood in isolation from his 
reading of xivqcriq, &6vo%iq and ývtpVeia in Aristotle's Physics and 
Metaphysics. The account of movement Heidegger develops in this 
reading provides the basis for understanding Dasein as np&ýiq, 
in such 
a way as to displace the experience of production from 
its previously 
15 
unassailable position. Accordingly, Heidegger sets in train a 
recovery of np&tiq that takes into account its hitherto subordinate 
position with respect to noi9cric .,. 
As the reading I undertake shows, 
this recovery issues in an interpretation of Dasein's existence as 
that is distinct from the conceptuality of production not by 
virtue of being wholly other, but simply insofar as it denotes the 
form and movement of existence as such. 
* 
In this study, I shall present the problems inherent in Aristotle's 
formulation of np&tiq, Heidegger's inheritance of these problems as 
the conception of np&ýiq enters his own work, and the response he 
launches via his interpretation of xivqcriq, Sbv(xgiq, and ýviEpyci(x. The 
resulting determination of np&tiq will be seen to consist in a 
movement of finite appropriation. 
Chapter One deals with the place of np&tir, in Aristotle's Micomachean 
Ethics, beginning with an outline of the problems implicit in 
understanding np&ý'Lq in a teleological framework (1). The sense in 
which the final end bestows cohesion on human activity is then 
considered in the light of the np6(; Fv relation and the question of 
the unity of being Having shown, via the "ep-yov argument. ' 
that the final end must take the form of -np&tiq, this is seen to be a 
designation of activity as such (IV). However, in spite of the gains 
made, the question raised earlier regarding the relation between 
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activity and the final end remains unresolved M. At bottom, the 
difficulty stems from the fact that the relation between activity and 
the final end is dominated by the language of production. As such, 
the figure of np&tiq is necessarily translated into an inappropriate 
idiom. 
Chapter Two is concerned with Heidegger's appropriation of np&tiq and 
with marking out the direction it will take. As a preliminary 
consideration, it is argued that the term np&Ztq, where it appears as 
such, may be read as a formal-ontological designation (1). However, 
Heidegger'5 appropriation of np&tiq i5 often too di5creet to 
advertise itself so directly. Thus, the Aristotelian distinction 
between nolqcriq and np&ý,. q is shown to underlie the analysis of 
equipmentality and world in Being and Time (11). But insofar as 
Heidegger adopts this distinction, he is seen to inherit the 
incoherencies that dog the articulation of itp&ýiq in Aristotle (111). 
Moreover, Heidegger'5 concern with the constitution of world as a 
totality is a transcendental problem. Turning to The Metaphysical 
Foundations of Logic, we pursue the connection between np&ýiq and 
transcendence and encounter the first indication of how Heidegger 
will seek to develop a reading of np&tiq by radicalizing the unity of 
vol3r, and o'petiq as they are understood to constitute human being as 
I an (YpXý of activity (IV). In Aristotle, this unity is seen to depend 
on the conception of Citic, as a dispositional relation to virtue 
[03(pc, cýl M. 
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Chapter Three takes a step to one side in order to introduce 
Heidegger's reading of movement and to place it in relation to his 
interpretation of Dasein. It opens with a look at Heidegger'5 
conception of a hermeneutics of facticity, showing that this is 
linked from very early on to the destruction of the history of 
ontology (1). Moreover, not only is it directed towards securing a 
better grasp of the Greek understanding of being in terms of 
production, but Heidegger states that the fundamental text for 
achieving this is Aristotle's Physics. Before pursuing this clue any 
further, the ground is prepared for a more thorough appreciation of 
the relation between np&ýiq and the conception of movement Heidegger 
will develop in his interpretation of Aristotle's Physics and 
Metaphysics. This is achieved by approaching the hermeneutics of 
facticity in terms of the Nicomachean Ethics VI and entails above all 
an apprai5al of the relative importance of (pp6vrlcriq and cyogia in 
Heidegger's reading (11). At this stage, the charge that Heidegger 
undermines his appropriation of np&tiq by passing on a Platonic bias 
towards Octapi(x is rebutted, primarily by noting that access to the 
Good via cyo(pi(y is seen to be fundamentally inseparable from Dasein's 
existence as np&tiq. However, there is also a marked connection 
between cro(pi(x and Guapi(x and the Aristotelian conception of divine 
being (111) and the radicalization required to make this connection 
s essentially a radicalization in the conception of ýVIýPJCI(x 
informed by the experience of the work (IV). A preliminary 
consideration of Aristotle's account of 66votgiq and ývtpVci(x reveals 
the importance of avoiding such a radicalization if one is to achieve 
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a satisfactory interpretation of movement. Moreover, by insisting on 
an interpretation of Sbvcxgtq and cv6pyci(x that remains fundamentally 
rooted in the experience of xivqcrtq from which the terms arise, 
Heidegger opens the possibility of displacing both the ontology and 
the philosophical anthropology arising from the establishment of the 
fI awed interpretation of 8 lbv(xg Iq and eviýPICI(x in scholastic 
philosophy. 
Chapter Four turns to Heidegger's 1931 lectures on Aristotle's 
Metaphysics 0 (1-3) and traces his interpretation of Slbv(xgir, and 
ývitp-yci(x. Heidegger's approach to reading Metaphysics E) as a whole is 
seen to confer upon it a coherence missing from Ross's more customary 
interpretation (1). A consideration of the danger of allowing an 
established theory of causality to inform the account of movement in 
terms of 5ý6v(xg-tc, and ýviý-pyciu is followed by Heidegger's reading of 
, in terms of Met. G. l and the determination of the essence of 8-6v%Lic 
appropriation and loss (11). With this, the thematic development of 
the thesis begins to wheel back to the end of Chapter Two and the 
importance of a cognate of 'C'-Xclv, the verb for 'have. ' 
Heidegger's reading of Met. 0.2 deals with &6vo(giq gcT& X61ou as the 
form of potentiality specific to human being (III). The relation of 
the X6yoq, to the end is described in terms of desire 10'petiq], which 
is in turn understood in terms of having [S'Xc-Lvl. It follows that the 
soul comes to be understood as itself a dynamic play of appropriation 
and loss- Finally, Heidegger's reading of Met. 8.3 focusses on the way 
in which the actual existence of SibvoqLiq depends on an individual's 
having potentiality. The preceding account of the essence of HvaViq 
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in terms of 'C'Xc-Lv is thereby carried forward and Heidegger goes on to 
interpret Cvitp-Vci(x as the being of movement, where this is itself 
understood in terms of appropriation. In this way, the fundamental 
movement characteristic of the existence of Dasein as npRiq is seen 
to be that of finite appropriation (IV). 
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Chapter One 
PRAXIS AND THE STRUCTURE OF TELEOLOGICAL ACTIVITY 
I 
Aristotle's Micomachean Ethics begins with the inscription of human 
activity within what seems to be a plainly teleological framework: 
Every art and every investigation, and similarly every 
action and pursuit, is considered to aim at some good. Hence 
the Good has been rightly defined as 'that at which all 
things aim. ' [1094al-311 
This opening gives form and direction to the whole of Aristotle's 
text. Yet, as we shal I see, the framework of teleology it sets in 
place is never entirely satisfactory. Indeed, the limitations and 
problems to which it is subject are woven into the fabric of the text 
to such an extent that it would be unrecognizable were they somehow 
to be eradicated. Moreover, they are assembled in the very first 
chapter of Book 1. 
Having announced the teleological form of human activity in the very 
first lines of the text, Aristotle immediately adds the following 
qualification: 
Clearly, however, there is some difference between the ends 
at which they [every action and pursuit] aim: some are 
activities and others results distinct from the activities. 
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Where there are ends distinct from the actions, the results 
are by nature superior to the activities. [1094a5-71 
A distinction is made between activities whose ends are external and 
activities whose ends are inseparable from the activities themselves. 
Although Aristotle refrains from naming these two kinds of activity, 
I one can already recognize the distinction between notrIcric 
., 
[making] 
and np&ýiq [doing] that is not formulated explicitly until much 
later, in Book VI 11140alffl. The fact that Aristotle anticipates 
this distinction so early on testifies to its importance not only for 
the determination of the structure of human activity set out in Book 
but for the treatise as a whole- Moreover, the textual proximity 
between the specific form of np&tiq presented in the second passage 
and that of teleology announced in the first emphasises the thematic 
inter-relation between the two motifs: the uneasy alliance between 
teleology and the figure of np&tir is a recurrent feature of 
Aristotle's account. 
In the first paragraph of Chapter Two, Aristotle returns to the 
necessity that there be a single end to all activity: 
If, then, our activities have some end which we want for its 
own sake, and for the sake of which we want all the other 
ends - if we do not choose everything for the sake of 
something else (for this will involve an infinite 
progression, so that our aim 15petiv] will be pointless and 
ineffectual) - it is clear that this must be the Good, that 
it is the supreme good. 11094al9-231 
It is often said that this is a poorly constructed argument for the 
existence of a 5ingle end, for it seems that Aristotle proceeds 
from 
the point (in the second part of the protasis) that any chain of 
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choice must stop somewhere to the claim (in the first part of the 
protasis) that there must be a single end to all such chains. 
However, the supposed fallacy depends on the 'single end' being 
understood as a determinate point or conclusion. In my view this is 
mistaken and masks the true significance of the passage, which is to 
spell out the implicit conditions of the nature of 'choice' itself 
ITEPO(Xipccrl(; ] 
. 
Hpoulpcaiq, a combination of vobq and 8pekic, 11139b5-71 rooted in the 
X6-yoc, 11139a32-361, must be directed, that is, must have a 
determinate end. The error is in a55UMing the same determinacy to be 
reproduced in the f irst part of the protasis. In this respect, I am 
in agreement with Engberg-Pedersen's reading. He understands the 
notion of 'final end' at this stage of Aristotle's text, and even 
after its identification as clAocigovi(x, to be quite indeterminate. 2 
It is, so to speak, a formal specification whose detail has yet to be 
filled in by the activities that are eventually chosen. A single, 
indeterminate, point of all choice is required, Engberg-Pedersen 
argues, "in order to make sufficiently rational sense of the idea of 
stopping particular chains of choice each at its own particular 
place" [ATM 311. If choices are to be rational, it must be possible 
at least in principle to identify the specific ends they have in 
view. In itself, however, this is not enough to head off the threat 
of futility and arbitrariness that accompanies an endless regression, 
for one must still account for why any particular end was chosen. In 
other words, there must be a stage at which there is no prospect of 
further justification, at which there is no longer even the 
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Possibility of seeking an ulterior end. The final end, though still 
indeterminate, must be inaccessible to interrogation. 
This may be clarified by taking the argument a step further: if the 
rationale for stopping any particular chain of activity at any 
particular place depends on there being a final end, and if 
npo(yipecriq must in each case have a specific end in view, the very 
possibility of npoalpeaiq as such depends on there being a final end 
of the kind just described, which then becomes the horizonal 
condition for the possibility of particular aCtS. 3 Understood 
formally, that is, as still indeterminate, it is the condition for 
the possibility of all activity, that is, of activity as such. 
The fact that the final end can be treated as formal and 
indeterminate distinguishes it from specific ends (and defuses the 
objection that 'all roads lead somewhere' does not imply that they 
all lead to the same place). However, the precise sense of this 
indeterminacy is still unclear. Engberg-Pedersen sees it as a 
requirement of Aristotle's theory, but also as essentially 
provisional, since it will receive full determination with the 
choices made. The reading I am proposing treats the indeterminacy of 
the final end as every bit as necessary, but as more problematic. 
Perhaps the principal difficulty introduced by the notion of 
indeterminacy is that of unity: what sense of unity is appropriate to 
the indeterminacy of the final end and how is it established? In 
essaying a response to this problem, I shall go on to explore the 
extent to which the formal character of the final end and its 
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foundational role with regard to human activity are linked to an 
understanding of human existence as such. Initially, however, one can 
see that the question of the form taken by the final end is 
inseparable from the further question of the nature of the 
hierarchical totality of different pursuits and ends and of the 
relations obtaiLng between its different elements, for these factors 
will be decisive for the understanding of human life that emerges 
from the account as a whole. This is brought sharply into focus by 
Aristotle's acknowledgment that, although the ends of the directive 
arts are to be preferred in each case to the ends of the subordinate 
art5: 
it makes no difference whether the ends of the actions are 
the activities themselves or something apart from them... 
[1094al6-181 
Contained in this passage are the seeds of many of the most obstinate 
problems that Aristotle's text presents to the reader. However, a 
full discussion of it would be premature at this stage [cf. Ch. I. V1, 
and I shall merely point out that it is far from obvious how 
activities that are ends in themselves and carried out for- their- own 
sake may be ordered hierarchically. 
From this preliminary survey, it is already clear that two problems 
are outstanding. The first regards the formal determination of the 
final end and the second that of the apparently hierarchical 
relations obtaining between the totality of different ends 
constituted by that final end. They are brought together in 
Aristotle's identification of the final end as the Good Cory(x66v]. 
25 
II 
Aristotle reports that "the word 'good' is used in as many senses as 
the word 'is'" 11096a241. Given this correspondence between the 
various senses of 'good' and those of 'being, ' let us conjecture that 
the nature of both the final end and the relations giving cohesion to 
the totality it underpins may be informed by or parallel to the form 
of unity understood to exist amongst the significations of being. 
Some insight is therefore required into the conflicting demands of 
unity and multiplicity that traverse Aristotle's Metaphysics and the 
problems to which this conflict gives rise. 
If being is said in many ways [TroXX(xX6q XvV6jicvov1, how can it be the 
object of a single science? Wherein does its unity lie? This is the 
problem that Aristotle poses in the Metaphysics. The most promising 
response comes at the beginning of Book F, where he declares that: 
There is a science which investigates being as being and the 
attributes which belong to this in virtue of its own nature. 
[1003a2l]4 
To the objection that a single science could not satisfactorily deal 
with the entire range of being, Aristotle responds here that whilst 
such a science would address all regions of being, it would deal 
solely with the question of being "as being. " The perspective is 
thereby shifted from the being of a thing qua thing of a particular 
kind, to the being of a thing qua being, and it is by virtue of this 
shift that Aristotle can go on to say that such a science "is not the 
same as any of the so-called special sciences; for none of these 
others treats universally of being as being. "S By this change in the 
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perspective of the enquiry, he provides an initial indication of how 
the science of being may have a coherent object without necessarily 
compromising its plurality. However, the indication is far from 
comprehensive. If being is to be investigated qua being, the meaning 
of 'qua' must be determined before anything is gained. In other 
words, to the declaration that the attributes of being are 
investigated only "in virtue of its own nature" must be added an 
understanding of this nature. 
Different usages of the term 'being' are manifestly not synonymous. 
Yet the only alternative to synonomy recognized by philosophy prior 
to Aristotle was homonymy, which describes the accidental conjunction 
of distinct senses in the same word (e. g. the word xXciq denotes both 
'key' and 'clavicle' 11129a301). Steering a course between the 
necessity of synonomy (which demands a univocal sense) and the 
contigency of homonymy (which allows for plurality of senses at the 
expense of any relation between them), Aristotle draws attention to 
the case where a term may have a variety of senses that are linked by 
a single sense to which they each bear a different relation 
11003a33ff 1. He cites the case of different things that are healthy 
being related to one another insofar as they are all related to 
health: thus medical treatment, diet, exercise, a body etc., may all 
be called healthy without insisting that one is thereby saying 
exactlY the same thing in each case. This is what Aristotle names 
the 
npOq Ev relation and elements linked by it are said to be np6q 
'ev 
Xey6lievov. 6 Applying this structure to the question of the unity of 
being, Aristotle then writes: 
27 
there are many senses in which a thing is said to be, but 
all refer to one starting point; some things are said to be 
because they are substances, others because they are 
affections of substances, others because they are a process 
towards substance, or destructions or privations or 
qualities of substance, or productive or generative of 
substance, or of things which are relative to substance, or 
negations of these things or of substance itself. 11003b5f] 
Having identified substance [oj)crj(X]7 as the focal point to which all 
other senses of being refer, Aristotle is confident that it is the 
proper object of the science of being: 
everywhere science deals chiefly with that which is primary, 
and on which the other things depend, and in virtue of which 
they get their names. If, then, this is substance [oi)cri(x1 , 
it will be of substances that the philosopher must grasp the 
principles and the causes. " 11003bl6f] 
But if the np6q, 'Ev structure shows a way forward, the unity of the 
science of being is still far from secure. Although Aristotle's 
examples of health and the art of medicine present a model for 
understanding the study of being qua being as a single science, some 
doubt remains over whether ol)cyi(x is suited to the part it is required 
to play. First, if otkyto( is itself multiple (in terms of variety of 
kind and number), the problem of the unity of a study of being is 
effectively repeated with regard to oi)cF! cx 1997a34ff, 1089a32ffl. 
Aristotle contains the multiplicity of o'U'cri<x by dovetailing a series 
1 11 of orders of priority within the general structure of the npoq ev 
relation. 8 First, ot)cr"t(x emerges as the primary characteristic of 
things and therefore most properly the object of the science of being 
qua being. Having identified three basic kinds of 
oi)cFi(Y, 9 actuality 
given priority over potentiality, thereby leading to a priority of 
28 
ouai(x in the sense of form, insofar as it corresponds to actuality as 
opposed to potentiality and actuality is said to be prior to 
potentiality 11049b4f]. Finally, obaiu as the eternal, immovable 
first mover, or divine being rises above the rest to a position of 
overall preeminence 11071bl2f]. 
In effect, the problem of identifying the object of ontology, and 
thereby establishing the form of the science of being qua being, 
leads to an increasingly detailed determination of this object, with 
a new hierarchy emerging at each stage. However, rather than simply 
narrowing the field of study at each turn, as one might expect, this 
is understood to extend its scope toward the universality necessary 
in a science of being. This twist receives its most forceful 
expression in a passage from Book E. 
If there is an immovable substance [oikri(x], the science of 
this must be prior and must be first philosophy, and 
universal in this way, because it is first. 11026a29f] 
Although Aristotle claims that first philosophy so understood 
corresponds to the study of being qua being announced at the 
beginning of Book r, it bears scant resemblance to the earlier 
formulation. Where Book I' rejected those sciences which "cut off a 
part of being and investigate the attribute of this part, " Book E 
sees precisely such a delimitation as the key to universality. How is 
this possible? 
To respond to this question adequately would require a comprehensive 
study of the whole of the Metaphysics, with particular reference 
to 
the ontological and theological currents that oppose and, some 
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believe, complement one another throughout the work. Commentators 
have sought by various means to defuse the tension of this 
opposition. Some have ascribed each branch of the theory to different 
periods in Aristotle's development, 10 others have achieved a coherent 
interpretation at the expense of recalcitrant parts of the text, 11 a 
few have eschewed the reductive techniques of biography and surgery 
in an attempt to preserve the dynamic tension of the whole, 12 and 
many have seen the theological commitment of Book E as the inevitable 
conclusion to the application of the TEp6q Sv structure to the 
ontological problem outlined at the beginning of Book I' (as though 
Aristotle were deceived by his method into following a path not of 
his own choosing). 13 Leaving aside the first two reading strategies 
(which are patently motivated more by the fear of inconsistency than 
the challenge of thinking), the third regard5 the two currents as 
incompatible yet complementary and the final one regards the 
accomplishment of ontology to lie in its own eclipse. Common to all 
these readings is the view that 'universal ' in Book r' does not mean 
the same as 'universal' in Book E and that the two meanings are 
incompatible with one another. (This is true even of the final 
reading, which regards the introduction of the np6q 'Cv structure in 
E. 2 as correcting the provisional formulation of ontology in 17.1 and 
precipitating a change in the sense of 'universal' from that in FA 
to that found in Book E. ) But is this necessarily so? The key to the 
issue is the equation in E. 1 of universality and priority: how is it 
that what is first is therefore universal? This question directs us 
back to the np6q 'Ev relation and calls for clarification of the 
manner in which the first element is related to each of the remaining 
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elements. In the context established in Book E, this could easily 
become a question of the relation between the sublunar and divine 
worlds, and indeed the theory of analogy was expanded in scholastic 
philosophy to address precisely this problem. However, such an 
approach already asssumes too much, in the sense that it begins by 
conceding the conversion of ontology into theology. Yet this occurs 
only on the basis of a certain understanding of priority. At this 
point, however, it would be wrong to concede any determinate sense of 
priority, for it is precisely the relation between the first element 
and the remaining elements that is in question. Without accepting 
Aristotle's own solution to this problem (which could barely be 
considered satisfactory, as the range of interpretations we have just 
outlined suggest), one is led rather to the quite formal question: 
what does 'prior' mean? Aristotle defines what he understands by 
'prior' at 1018b8ff and develops the notion with regard to actuality 
at 1049b4ff. However, I shall not rely on these accounts as such. 
Instead, the enquiry shall be led by formal demands of the np6c, 'ev 
relation, whose logic is by no means obviously compatible with 
Aristotle's declared understanding of priority. In this way, the 
enquiry intends less to 'reconstruct' Aristotle's reading than to 
probe its limits. Above all, then, what conception of priority is 
implied by the np6r, 'Cv relation? 
Pierre Aubenque has grave misgivings about the introduction of the 
-ap6q 'Cv relation as a response to the problem of unity (and hence 
universality): "cette reponse, " he asks, "est-elle autre chose qu'un 
nouvelle forme de ]a question?: Is this response anything more than a 
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new form of the question? " [PEA 1941.14 Of the problems Aubenque 
raises, perhaps the most signficant for the issue of the 'good' which 
prompted this discussion of the Metaphysics concerns the 
compatibility of Aristotle's example with the case it was intended to 
inform. 01ýai(x, the term by relation to which the other categories 
signify being, is accorded priority because it is recognized as being 
par excellence, the highest form of being, as I have already noted. 
Yet it is itself a category. 
Elle est le pr6mier terme dune serie, cest-h-dire dun 
ensemble o& il ya de I 'anterieur et du posterieur et auquel 
elle appartient elle-m6me: le fondement est ici invnanent 6 
]a serie. [PEA 1951 
It is the first term of a series, that is, an ensemble where 
there is a prior and posterior and to which it itself 
belongs: the foundation here is immanent to the series. 
If oi')crio( is itself one of categories of being whose unity it is 
supposed to explain, the same cannot be said of health. 
il est clair que la sant6, terme de ref6rence, nest pas 
lui-m6me lune des significations du 'sain': le fondement 
est ici transcendent & une serie qui n'est autre que ]a 
serie de ses propres modalit6s. [PEA 1961 
It is clear that health, the focal term, is not itself one 
of the significations of 'healthy': the foundation here is 
transcendent to the series, which is nothing but the series 
of its own modalities. 
Whilst ot)(3-io( is different from other categories insofar as it has 
priority over them, it is no less distinct from being qua being by 
virtue of the fact that it is a category. If the case of being were 
to follow faithfully the example of health, the sense of being to 
which all the categories refer should not itself be a category. 
This 
would leave the question of the meaning of priority wide open. 
Yet 
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this is not what happens. Instead, olkri<x is accorded priority in such 
a way as to suggest its conf lation of being 11028b4l, and this is 
sanctioned by what is strictly speaking the misapplication of the 
np6c, *Cv structure. 15 
II The orthodox reading of the npoq ev relation focuses upon oiýo-i(y as 
the term which confers unity on the multiplicity of being. Yet in 
doing so it exposes the further problem: how can what is apparently a 
special region of being unify being as a whole through its 
identification as being qua being. In other words, an explanation of 
'priority' has been given at the expense of an understanding of 
'universality. ' One is bound to ask how oikr! <x can be both a category 
of being and being as such without entailing a reduction of being to 
the status of a category. An adequate response to this question must 
first clarify the meaning of 'category, ' and it is to this question 
that I shall turn now. 
For the remainder of this section, I shall concentrate on Heidegger's 
reading of this problem, distinguishing wherever possible between 
Heidegger's reading of Aristotle and his response to the Aristotelian 
problematic in his own work. 
At the beginning of Book 19, Aristotle writes: 
We have treated of that which is primarily and to which all 
the other categories of being are referred- i. e., o, 
6ai(x. 
For it is in virtue of the concept of o'UCYi(y that the others 
are said to be - quantity, quality and the like; 
for all 
will be found to involve the concept of oLcri(x, as we said 
in 
the first part of our work. [1045b27-321 
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In his 1931 lecture course on Aristotle's Metaphysics () 1-3, 
Heidegger comments on this passage at some length. 16 Referring to the 
second sentence in particular, he writes: 
Wir finden in diesem Satz 11045b27-3,21 dreimal: 'k6-yo(;, 
VL-yc, con, Xe-y6gevov. Die Hin- und Rdckbeziehung der Ubrigen 
Kategorien auf die erste, von der Aristoteles spricht, 
spielt sich ab im X6yoq. EGA33 51 
In this phrase 11045b27-321 we find thrice over: X6, io(;, 
Xiý-yc, uxi, Xcy6gcvov The reference to which Aristotle refers 
of the remaining categories back and forth to the first 
takes place in the logos. 
Heidegger describes the categories as 'rooted' [beheimatet] in Xo-yor-, 
EGA33 71, which articulates the relation between oL(TI(x and the 
remaining categories. The fact that the X6-Voq plays this fundamental 
role, he writes, has facilitated a simplification of the matter in 
question whose consequences extend well beyond the theory of 
categories itself into the heart of modern philosophy. 
So far, I have referred only to the problems that attend Aristotle's 
attempt to bring unity to the several categorial senses of being. 
However, to appreciate Heidegger's complaint over this matter, it is 
important to remember that there is a further sense in which being is 
noXX(xX6q Xey6lievov, one that includes the more specific multiplicity 
articulated by the categories. In Met. E. 2, Aristotle names four 
senses in which something is said to be; i) as accidental Ixovc& 
at)ýLPCPqx6c. I: ii) as true faI se [6'3r, 6'ArIO iLq. I: iii) according to the 
I categories Excxc& c& crXrIIL(xca -cqc. xacrj-yopi(xq1 iv) as potential and 
actual I)c(xc& Sf)vof)iLv il' F'-vtp-yF-i(xv1 [1026a33-1026b2l. Over and above 
its several categorial significations, being is noXX<xX&Sq in this 
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wider sense, that is, as TcTpcxXar. - Most interpretations of Aristotle 
treat the four senses of being mentioned above as themselves 
dependent upon the categories. Because oLaioc is the primary category, 
it is therefore understood to unify the wider sense of multiplicity 
of being, as well as the categorial sense. Such a reading will 
clearly tend to view the conflation of oU'GI(x and being 
. sympathetically- Heidegger certainly opposed a reading of this kind. 
Without disputing the singular place of ol)CFic( within the categories 
of being, he rejected the view that all the senses of being should be 
drawn back to it as the primary category (in the way this is 
customarily understood). In his opinion, such a reading, already 
prevalent in medieval commentaries, encouraged the modern reduction 
of being, possibility and actuality to the level of categories, 
culminating in the Kantian theory of categories. In basing the 
categories of logic on the table of judgements, Kant delivered the 
fundamental structure of Aristotelian metaphysics over to a typology 
of linguistic forms and, in Heidegger's view, this represented an 
impoverishment of the X6-yo4;. He regarded such a reading as blind to 
an ambiguity by virtue of which the categories also play a 
foundational role with regard to what can be said about beings 
Man übersieht vor allem einen Grundcharakter der Kategorien, 
wie Aristoteles sie versteht. Und dieser Grundcharakter der 
Kategorien ist gerade an unserer Stelle eigens genannt: 
x(x, url-Vopio(1, Toý5 "v-cog, 'kategorien des Seienden. ' Was ist 0 
damit gemeint: Kategorien, die sich auf das Seiende als ihr 
'Objekt' beziehen (genitivus objectivus), oder Kategorien, 
die dem Seienden als 'Subjek t' angehören (genitivus 
subjectivus)? Oder ist beides gemeint? Oder keines von 
beiden? Wir müssen das offenlassen. [GA33 71 
Above all, one overlooks a fundamental characteristic of the 
categories, as Aristotle understands them. And this 
fundamental characteristic is named deliberately at the very 
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point under discussion: xcxTqVop! cxi -coý) o'vco(;, 'categories of 
beings. ' What is meant by this: categories that relate to 
the being as their object (genitivus objectivus), or 
categories that belong to the being as their subject 
(genitivus subjectiVU5)? Or are both meant? Or neither of 
them? We must leave this open. 
Although Heidegger's emphasis on the double genitive is unusual 
amongst readers of Aristotle, he is not alone in attributing two 
senses to 'category. ' Aubenque draws attention to the problem as 
well, suggesting that it arises from Aristotle's equivocal use of the 
term 'O'v' - being: passages where 'O'v' is presented as a noun promote 
a view of the categories as 'objective' divisions, whilst passages 
where 'o'v' functions as the infinitive 'to be' suggest that 
les categories sonts moins les divisions de I '6tant que les 
modalit6s lnc6cyc IqI selon lesquelles 1 '6 tre signi fie 
I '6tant. Elles ne r6pondent pas 6 ]a question: En combien de 
parties se divise I '6tant? mais 6 cette autre: Comment 
I'6tre signifie-t-il? [PEA 1841 
the categories are not so much divisions of beings as 
modalities 1nT6acrci(; l according to which being signifies 
beings. The question to which they respond is not 'in how 
many parts is the being divided?, ' but rather 'how does 
being signify? ' 
Aubenque rejects the first alternative, embracing the reading of the 
categories as modalities of the signification of being (subjective 
genitive). 17 Heidegger, on the other hand, insists on preserving both 
possibilities alongside one another (though not without conceding the 
obscurity to which one is committed by their co-existencel8). In 
fact, Heidegger's double reading of 'category' corresponds to his 
presentation of the ontological difference, inasmuch as he describes 
the objective genitive reading as an ontic use of the term and the 
subjective Senitive reading as an ontological use of the term. In 
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spite of his insistence that both senses be retained, the emphasis 
Heidegger placed on what he regarded as the neglected ontological 
significance of the categories is reflected in his translation of 
ot)alu, the primary category, by Seiendheit and Anwesenheit, which 
denote ways of being, not regions of being. 19 Heidegger draws 
attention to the fact that ox, XY 1 (X was an everyday term for 
possessions, property, things at one's disposal (like the modern 
German 'Anwesen' ), and understands the ontological sense of oi)cTio( as 
the 'presentness' of things which are extant to be derived from this 
pre-philosophical sense. In support of this interpretation, he quotes 
a passage from Plato's Theaetetus: 
There are those who believe nothing exists Evorhanden) 
unless they can grasp it with their hands; everything else 
does not belong in the realm of oU'aloc, of being objectively 
present [Vorhandense-in]. 1155e4ff] IGA26 145: 1831. 
As the primary category, o1kri(y denotes that which distinguishes a 
being not as any particular kind, but simply as such. Understood in 
the strictest possible sense, oikyioc determines neither what a thing 
is nor the mariner in which a thing is, but simply that it is: or 
rather, it names that kind of being which the Greeks took as the 
reference point for saying merely that a thing is. 
Elucidating the repercussions of Heidegger's translation of oU'Cri(x as 
Seiendheit on his approach to the unity of being, Volpi implies that 
Heidegger's ontological interpretion of oi)cr't(x as the character that 
an entity has simply qua entity means that even if 
the plurality of 
being is taken in the sense of the Te-Ep(xX(, jq, oi)ai(y could still serve 
as the primary point of reference without entailing 
that the three 
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other senses of being are reduced via the categories to an ousiology 
as customarily understood. 20 As the first category, oL')crI(x names that 
which a being - any being - is simply ina5much as it is a being. This 
peculiar form of primacy confers a sense of universality upon oiýalcx 
that distinguishes it from other categories: it is 'first' yet 
insofar as it is not identified with a specific region of being it 
cannot be the object of a special science. Described in this way, it 
seems indeed to provide the proper focus of the science of ontology 
as Aristotle presents it in Book r. 1- 
What conclusions can be drawn from all this? In order to prevent the 
many senses of being splintering into an aggregate of terms related 
by accident alone, Aristotle sought the key to their unity in a 
single primary sense to which each remaining sense referred back. 
However, the np6c ' ., E: v structure which 
he described is faced with a 
dilemma- If the primary sense is identified as one of the categories 
whose unity is at stake, then it seems that it can no longer be 
recognized as the determination of being qua being that Aristotle has 
declared to be the proper object of ontology (ontology having been 
traduced into theology). On the other hand, if it is allowed to be a 
sense of being transcendent to the remaining individual senses, it is 
by no means clear what sense it could have (given that it cannot take 
the form of a genus to which the remaining senses belong). The 
problem is focussed on the issue of priority and, echoing the end of 
Section 1, leads to two basic questions: i) how is that which is 
prior to be understood?; ii) how are the remaining senses related to 
this prior term? 
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Although I have been able to do no more than raise these issues in 
the most perfunctory manner, a provisional response may be made to 
each of the questions. First, the primary term is not a specific 
sense at the head of a series of similar terms. For a being to have 
the determinate form which it in each case possesses, it is necessary 
simply that it be. In this sense, oU'CTI(x, beingness, is a condition of 
possibility for the existence of determinate beings. Yet beingness 
cannot precede the articulation and dissemination of being into 
specific forms (not only throughout the categories, but also 
throughout the other three principal forms of being). The rival 
demands of universality and primacy are thereby reconciled without 
sacrificing the original multiplicity of being. 
Second, the question of what is meant by 'priority, ' which amounts to 
the question of how each of the categories and forms of being are 
grounded, is itself still open. To be sure, oLcri(x is not prior in any 
naive temporal sense. To say that it is logically prior would be more 
accurate, since the reference of each of the subordinate categories 
,. However, one back to ou'criof is rooted in and articulated by the X6-yoc 
would first have to reconsider the meaning of 'logical, ' since its 
form and its place in modern metaphysics depend upon what has emerged 
as a questionable reading of the very matter which one would have it 
determine. Whatever form this relation is eventually understood to 
take, it is not one that is readily described by language generally 
at our disposal. 
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To return now to the Aficomachean Ethics, Aristotle addresses himself 
initially to the meaning of the term 'good' in general. If the 
meaning of 'good' were encapsulated in a single idea, those things 
customarily regarded as good in themselves (wisdom, sight and certain 
pleasures and honours), would be emptied of any significance. Yet if, 
on the contrary, the idea of the good were internal to those classes 
of things, it would iMP05e a single universal sense upon all classes, 
destroying the manifest multiplicity of senses attributed to the term 
'good. ' Aristotle therefore rejects the possibility that 'good' 
corresponds to a single idea 11096al2-1096b261. Instead, the remark 
that "things are called good in as many senses as they are said to 
exist" 11096a241 I eads directly to the conclusion tha t the 
multiplicity of 'good' is translated via the doctrine of categories 
from that of being. However, we should refrain from any precipitous 
assumptions about the nature of this translation, since the manner in 
which the inf Iuence of the problems and analyses of the Metaphysics 
is transmitted to the Nicomachean Ethics is by no means clear. 
In the wake of Aristotle's opening declaration 11094al-4, p. 211, the 
multiplicity of senses belonging to the term 'good' would appear to 
present a serious problem. Surprisingly, perhaps, Aristotle does not 
seem to be overly concerned, speculating only briefly on the unity of 
the good in general before dismissing the problem as irrelevant to 
the present enquiry: 
even if the goodness predicated in common is some one thing 
or has a separate existence of its own, clearly it cannot be 
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realized in action or acquired by man. Yet it is precisely that sort of good that we are looking for now. 11096b3O-381 
Aristotle recal Is that the investigation is not aimed at knowledge of 
an abstract ideal. But what is meant by the appeal to the 
'practicable good'? It may be that Aristotle intends nothing more 
than to restrict the scope of the discussion to human activity as 
such and as a whole. In this case, the form of the question would be 
the same as that of the 'good in general, ' but on a slightly smaller 
scale. In addition, however, it seems likely that Ari5tOtle's 
rejection of the 'absolute' reading of the good, is linked to his 
insistence that "the end of this science is not knowledge but action" 
11095a6l. One could understand this to mean that although the 
immediate end of the enquiry is knowledge of the practicable good, 
its ultimate end is the application of this knowledge to the field of 
human action. Alternatively, the two passages could, and indeed 
should in my view, be read as more intimately complementary, such 
that the practicable good is itself one with the action that 
constitutes the end of the enquiry. 21 The inherent unity of the 
different senses of the good therefore concerns the unity of human 
activity, and not subsequently or by way of its application. Insofar 
as it deals with the relation of each individual sense of good to the 
unity inherent in activity, it concern5 what might be called the 
'logic' of human activity, that is, the manner in which it is 
grounded. Consequently, the problem of unity by no means disappears 
when the notion of an ideal Good is set aside in favour of the 
practicable good or the "Good of man" [1094b8l. Rather, it is 
repeated as the question of how the field of human activity is 
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-L- ,: 
constituted as a unity: ultimately, at stake is nothing less than the 
determination of human being. 
In view of this, the hypothetical solutions that Aristotle offers to 
the problem of unity with regard to all significations of the term 
good, like the attempts at a solution to the problem of the unity of 
being, will indeed be relevant, although a note of caution should be 
sounded: it is nonetheless possible that the form of unity proper to 
the practicable good and human activity will differ from that which 
belongs to the solutions mooted to the other theor-etical problems. 
This can only be settled after an examination of the practicable 
good, which follows in Sections IV and V. 
Aristotle's speculation on the manner in which all senses of 'good' 
are constituted as a unity is brief: 
But in what sense, then, are ... [different] 
things called 
good? Because they do not seem to be accidental homonyms. Is 
it that all goods derive from or contribute to one good? Or 
is it rather than they are good by analogy: as sight is good 
in the body, so is intuition in the mind, and so on? 
[1096b26-301 
The first possible explanation of the homonymic character of the term 
'good, namely that it is simply accidental, may be satisfactory for 
other examples of homonymy, but it can explain neither 
that of 
'good. nor that of 'being. ' The second is a more serious candidate. 
Aristotle considers the idea of a np6(; Ev relation similar 
to that 
which is presumed to obtain in the case of 
being. The third 
hypothesis is that of analogy, 22 and its origin lies in mathematics: 
a is to b as c is to d, etc.. Reversing 
the form of the previous 
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explanation, the many senses ascribed to the term 'good' are unified 
not by referring them to a single 'good, ' but rather by identifying a 
single invariant relation holding between each 'good' and a 
corresponding signification of being. 
Opinion is divided over which of these views is Aristotle's own. 
Burnet sees no alternative to the analogical argument. 23 Aubenque, 
too, is confident that the homonomy of 'good' may only be explained 
by analogy with the multiple significations of being. 24 Gauthier and 
Jolif, however, are less convinced by the case for the analogical 
argument. 25 
In considering the rival claims of the Trp6r, Ev and analogical 
hypotheses, one is struck by the fact that they emphasise different 
usages of the term 'good. ' The analogical explanation, focussing upon 
the invariant relation between categories of being and determinations 
of the good, empha5i5es the relational character of the term: as 
Aubenque writes, "Ie Bien en tant que bien est pr6cis6ment ce qu'il y 
a d6gal entre ces diff6rents rapports: the Good as such is precisely 
that which is constant amongst the different relations" [PEA 2031. By 
contrast, if unity is established by the np6q Fv relation, then 
different th-ings which are good are all related to a single good 
thing: thus, Aristotle refers to "the Good of man, " "the practicable 
good" etc.. 
The two alternatives clearly deploy the term 'good' in different 
ways, but the difference seems to be primarily grammatical . There is 
an equivocation between an adjectival usage, which relies on a 
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correspondence between examples of good things and the categories of 
being to which they belong, and a substantive usage, where what 'is 
good' corresponds to the recipient of the predicate in the analogical 
explanation. Of course, grammatical differences may articulate 
profound metaphysical disjunctions. However, they may also create the 
illusion of differences that have little or no basis outside the 
entrenched expediency of grammatical form. In the present case, the 
different usages of 'good' employed by the alternative theories of 
unity may be more compatible than is generally supposed. 
It seems reasonable to assume that, as the analogical explanation has 
it, 'good' only signifies insofar as on each occasion it names the 
relation between a category of being and its preeminent 
instantiation. Those who defend the analogical explanation stop 
there. But if there is a direct correspondence between things 
1 11 identified as 'good' and the categories of being, then the npoq ev 
structure which unifies the multiple senses of being should be 
reflected in the order of things identified as 'good. ' The np6q 'ev 
structure holds with regard to the good because of the analogy with 
being, not in place of it. 
Consequently, there should also a substantive sense of 'good' 
corresponding to the primary signification anchoring the np6q, 'ev 
structure in the case of being. Is this the case, and if so, why have 
the two alternatives been pitted against one another as rivals? 
The two approaches have been regarded as incompatible because the 
theory appealing to the np6r, Ev relation has relied upon a reading of 
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the problem of unity with regard to being that reduces being to oiýaia 
understood as one of the categories in the most traditional sense. 
Consequently, the highest good, corresponding to the highest 
category, is the highest form of oibuiof: in general this is divine 
being, and in the case of humanity it is vobq. 26 By contrast, the 
analogical theory of unity with regard to good is compelled to take 
into consideration all instances of the term, drawing unity from the 
form of the common relation to which they give a name. Rather than 
isolating a single region of human being, the notion of the human 
good arising from the analogical reading is therefore more likely to 
conform to the so called 'inclusive' reading, which regards all human 
activity as contributing (in some uncertain fashion) to the final end 
of ciýS(Y-Lgovi(x. But if the primary term of the iTp6q Z'v relation with 
regard to being is understood to be ol)aloc not as ordinarily 
understood, but rather as outlined in Section 11, then the influence 
IN of the npoc, ev relation on the problem of the good will not result in 
the privilege of one region of being over the rest and may leave open 
the possibility of an inclusive reading not unlike that which emerges 
from the analogical account. 
If the primary sense of being is oikriof understood as Seiendheit or 
Anwesenheit, as the minimal condition of beingness that somehow (for 
precisely how is still obscure) precedes the further determination of 
the being in question, then what is the corresponding sense of good? 
Although mindful of the difficulty of this matter and of the caution 
it demands, one might venture that, just as oýkrio( denotes that which 
a being has insofar as it is, regardless of what it is, so the good 
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will be that which characterises a good simply insofar as it is good. 
Whilst the primary sense of good is that in virtue of which a 
specific good is good, this does not entail its independence from 
that which it grounds: if it is to correspond to the primary sense of 
being, it will be an immanent condition. 27 
IV 
The narrative now returns to the end of Section 1, where two problems 
were identified with regard to activity and the final end: the formal 
determination of the final end and the nature of the apparently 
hierarchical relations obtaining between the totality of different 
ends constituted by that final end. However, the points raised in 
Sections 11 and III also insist upon a hearing. The proximity that 
emerged there between Aristotle's conception of the good and the 
intepretation of being as irreducible to a single category implies 
the possibility of a similar link between such a conception of being 
and the practical or human good. If this were indeed the case, we 
should find a conception of cI)S(xtgovf<x, the final end, that is not 
distinct from the referential teleology it makes possible. 
Aristotle presents his definition of 'ct')8(xigovf(x' in the passage 
known as the 'e'p-yov argument. ' The standard English translation of 
9F 
ep-yov is 'function, ' but this only captures part of what is intended. 
Although the primary sense of Epyov may be that of 'product' or 
'work, ' it is not linked solely with the purpo5e or end of an 
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activity, but also connotes the activity by which something comes to 
be, and this is the predominant sense here. Above all, C'pjov is 
intended to convey the activity by which something or someone may be 
defined, e. g. a flautist plays the flute, a builder builds, the eye 
sees etc. . Hence some have argued for alternative translations, such 
as "characteristic activity, "28 "that which we do which makes us what 
we are"29 and "defining capacity or activity. "30 The good of human 
kind, Aristotle argues, may be established by identifying the c-p-yov 
of human kind [1097b26-291. For just as the good of afI autist or 
carpenter resides in the felicitous practice of their own vocation, 
50 the good of human kind will be associated with the activity proper 
to it. Aristotle then allows himself to express the slightest of 
doubts: "assuming that man has an cip-yov. " The possibility that 
humanity may lack a definitive activity, that is, lack a definition, 
an identity, a form, is dismissed on the strength of a brace of 
analogies. The first likens human life as such to the activity of 
carpenters and shoemakers, arguing from their possession of an E-pyov 
to the existence of an 'Cp-yov of human kind in general. The second 
makes a similar step from the activities proper to the various parts 
of the human body to the activity proper to the human being as a 
who I e. 
Even if one leaves aside certain features that complicate the 
examples to which he appeals here, 31 Aristotle's reasoning still 
appears somewhat exorbitant. Is there any justification 
for arguing 
from the existence of a form of activity proper to a craftsman to 
the 
existence of a form of activity proper to humanity as such? 
Does the 
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fact that a part of the human body performs a specific role entail 
that the whole person, body and soul, is similarly well directed? In 
spite of the suspicion such a claim may arouse at f irst, Aristotle's 
reasoning here is both clear and consistent with the basic framework 
of the text as a whole. 
A spurious reading of the passage might run like this. To be a 
carpenter is to have the capacity to work wood. To be a shoemaker is 
to have the capacity to make shoes. What does one have to be able to 
do to be human? Its mistake would lie in the assumption that the 
if ep-yov of human being will be of the same order as those of the 
carpenter and the shoemaker. But just as 'human being' is of a 
different order from 'artisan, ' so the activity definitive of human 
being is not of the same order as carpentry and shoemaking. Aristotle 
asks whether it is not right to assume that human being has an c'p-yov 
Olover and above" those of individual people or the groups to which 
they belong. 32 This "over and above" announces a shift to a new level 
of questioning. Just as in Metaphysics r Aristotle rejected those 
sciences that study being in virtue of one or other of its 
attributes, calling rather for an enquiry into being qua being, so 
here he sets aside considerations of human beings qua workers of 
wood, sighted animals, etc., and questions the nature of human being 
qua human being- 'Over and above' specific forms of activity, the 
activity definitive of human being is activity in general or as such. 
Aristotle proceeds towards such a determination by excluding those 
activities common to plant and animal life in order to delimit the 
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I ep-yov of humanity as the active exercise of the soul 's faculties in 
accordance with X6-yo(; ['Epyov (3)(v0p6nou qil-)Xq(; Cvtpycm x(x-r& X6yov] . 
Definitively human activity is thus an evepVctoc. But is this a 
determination of activity per se or of that which is most human in 
all that humans do? Elsewhere, Aristotle identifies human life as an 
evepyci(x 11175al2-13 and 11048b25-291, and this seems to favour the 
former view. Yet the passage to which we are referring here implies 
that the definitively human evitp-ycioc is no more than a region of 
possible activity. The characteristically human relation to X6-yoc 
seems to be presented as the crowning glory of an otherwise animal 
existence. Indeed, one could regard this view as supported by the 
well known definition of the human being as the ýyov X6-yov 'SXcav, the 
animal endowed with X6Voq. However, one need not regard X6yoq a5 an 
additional property. Aristotle argues that since human beings share 
the capacity for (xicTOrjo-i(; [perception] with animals, uiuOrjuiq cannot 
11 feature in a determination of human being 11098al-31. Yet (xicrOrIcriq 
may not be the same in the cases of both animal and human life. Might 
not the relation to X6yoq lead to a modification in the very nature 
of (xY(3-OrjcT-Lq.? Is seeing something to which X6-yo(; is added, or is it 
not always suffused and mediated by X6yoq? Certainly, Heidegger took 
the latter view, insisting that "Das Wahrnehmen loclar6TIcriq] des Tieres 
ist --- von Grund aus anders als 
das des Menschen: Animal perception 
( (XVcrO r1cr IqIis... fundamentally different from that of man. "33 
Heidegger's reasons for taking this view concern the relations 
between (xlaOqcri4;, vobr, and ultimately &XýOc-t(x. Although we cannot 
enter into this matter fully here, the implications of such a reading 
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are important for our own enquiry and are worth noting. It suggests 
that the cipyov of human being should not be regarded as a piecemeal 
addition to a residual or substantial animality, but should be seen 
rather as a comprehensive determination embracing regions of human 
life beyond those ordinarily associated with reasoning or the 
expression of ideas through language. On this reading, the 
determination of human life does not have a biological basis. Remi 
Brague draws our attention to a precedent for such a reading in 
Aristotle himself, remarking upon his surprising tendency to "[fair-el 
passer le qualifi6 avant ]a substance, ce qui n'est pas de bonne 
logique: give priority to the qualified case over the substance, 
which is not good logic. "34 Commenting specifically on the reference 
to life as an cvitpycm found in Met. G. 6: 1048b25-29, he adds: 
Faire pr6ceder le simple 'vivre' d'un 'vivre qualifi6, c'est 
montrer quil n'est pas question ici d'une vie biologique, 
mais de ]a vie que nous vivons effectivement et qui, comme 
telle, est toujours v6-cue dans des conditions d6termin6es 
qui ]a rendent plus ou moins bonne, plus ou moins heureuse. 
EAQM 474-4751 
To allow a qualified 'to live' to precede a straightforward 
'to live' is to show that it is not a matter of biological 
life, but rather of the life that we actually live and that, 
as such, is always lived under determinate conditions that 
render it more or less good, more or less happy. 
Like XO-Voq, 'good' does not remain extrinsic to the form of life that 
it qualifies, but rather determines it from the very beginning. 
If 
this seems surprising, let us remember that the whole of the 
'cp-yov 
argument is premissed on the existence of an intrinsic 
link between 
the good of an activity and that activity itself. 
Having established 
I the epyov of human being, Aristotle invokes 
this link in order to 
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derive a determination of cbgorfýLovL(Y. The argument is simply this: 
the 'Cp-yov of an individual and that of a good individual are 
generically the same. Thus, for example, if the Epyov of a harper is 
to play the harp, that of a good harper is to play the harp well 
11098a8-131: 
if we assume that the Sp-yov of man is a kind of life, viz., 
an activity or series of actions of the soul, implying a 
rational principle 18: ý 4fi)Xq(; evep-yei(xv x(xi np&ksiq gcT& 
X&Voul; and if the 'cp-yov of a good man is to perform these 
well and rightly; and if every sp-yov is performed well when 
performed in accordance with its proper excellence: if all 
this is so, the conclusion is that the good for man is an 
activity of soul in accordance with virtue I-c6 dXvGpwnivov 
7 a-y(x96v W'uXqq Cviýp-yet<x -yiveT(xi xaT'03(pcTývl. 11098al3-171 
Aristotle's argument hinges on the intrinsic link between the 
performance of an activity and the performance of that activity well, 
that is, between an activity and its virtue. In the context of the 
argument, the link allows Aristotle to pass from 'S'P-vov' to 
1 i&xiýLovi(x. ' Yet the direction may also be reversed. One could have CI) 
no conception of playing the harp without some idea of what it is to 
play the harp well. Similarly, to take the important intellectual 
virtues outlined in Book VI of the Micomachean Ethics, one could not 
engage in 7EOincrl(; [making] without TiLXvq [know-how] or perform 
ethico-political np&ýeiq without the ability of (pp6vrlcyiq to disclose 
the situation aright. The formal determinations of activity would 
have no sense independently of or prior to their alliance with virtue 
and thereby a sense of what it would be to perform them well. An 
activity performed badly may not display the virtue with which it is 
associated, but it is not without relation to that virtue: 
it is 
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precisely lacking the virtue it requires for the activity to be 
performed well. Even before virtue is acquired, then, the activity in 
question will be characterized negatively with regard to that virtue, 
a5 a deficient mode. 
Two points of particular significance for our present -study emerge 
from all of this. First, is the fact that the 'p-p-yov of human life is 
not confined to a particular region or identified as a specific 
activity. What Aristotle calls the qmXýr. ýviLpycioc x<YT& X6-yov is not 
what human beings do at times, in contrast to other possibilities or 
in addition to their animal existence: it is simply what they do do, 
inescapably and at all times, prior to or irrespective of any 
determination or choice. Second, even if one fails to realize one's 
potential to act in conformity with virtue, that is, even if one 
fails to live well, the Cvtp-yc-Lo( of one's faculties in connection 
with X6-yoc is nonetheless determined with a view towards the good 
Ii 
* 
Let us conclude by returning to the question that has served as a 
refrain for the whole of this chapter: what is the relation between 
activity and its end - above all the final end identified as 
sl6sa I J10via? 
We have seen that Aristotle's conception of human activity 
is 
governed by the sense of the good conveyed by the pref 
ix et')-. And we 
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have seen that the activity definitive of human being is an cvtpycia. 
If we grant the formal equivalence of ýW: pyctot and np&tiq in the 
context of practical philosophy, these two indications are brought 
together in a vital passage in Book VI (to which we shall return in 
Section V): 
whoever makes something always has some further end in view: 
that which is made is not an end itself, it is relative and 
for someone. Whereas that which is done IT6 np(xxT6v] is an 
end in itself, since doing well 1eI'Mp(xti<x1 is the end, and 
what desire aims at. [1139b2-5]35 
This is the point at which Aristotle first makes explicit the 
distinction between noirlcyiq [making] and np&tiq [action] to which he 
alluded in the opening paragraphs of Book 1. From the beginning it 
seemed that the distinction had been introduced to delimit human 
activity and thereby avert the threat of an infinite regress. The 
role of Trp&tiq in such a delimitation is nOW stated plainly; if the 
end of noiqcyiq , is in each case converted into the means towards some 
further end, then the form of activity a5SOCiated with the final end, 
S1ý)S(xtgovi(x, can only take the form of np&tiq. Clearly, this is not to 
suggest that the final end of all activity is a specific act. Rather, 
np&tiq should be understood here as describing the motif of the whole 
of life, not only in the sense that it must embrace all forms of act, 
but also in the sense that it is congruent with the whole of a life 
(this follows directly from Aristotle's stipulation that the Sivitpyci(x 
associated with cuS(xigovi(x must last a complete lifetime 11098al8l). 
Moreover, the good at which all things aim does not lie beyond life, 
or properly speaking even at the end of life. For life is an activity 
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which is an end in itself; as np&ttq., it is one with its end -a 
conjunction conveyed succinctly by the term equivalent to cuS(xigov! (x, 
namely, si)-jrp6rti(x 11098b2l-221). 
Looking back over the ground covered so far, Section III raised the 
possibility of a parallel between the good and the sense of being 
outlined in Section 11. Such a parallel would require the good 
operative in the account of human activity to be that in virtue of 
which a specific good is good, yet not such as to be independent of 
the order it grounds. The convergence of zt')S(xtgov! 4x and activity in 
general or as such in the figure of np&ýir , seems to promise precisely 
this. 
V 
On first inspection, there is a marked discrepancy between the 
alternative forms of unity to which Aristotle refers, albeit briefly, 
at 1096b26-30 and the apparently teleological structure announced in 
the opening lines of the text. Despite calling for some comment, this 
matter is seldom addressed directly. Of course, Aristotle himself 
sets a most respectable precedent in this respect, making little or 
no attempt to demonstrate the relevance to human activity of the np6r, 
TN 
ev relation (or any of the other alternatives). Strictly speaking, 
however, to characterize the problem as a discrepancy between the 
91 np6q ev relation as it is said to apply 
to the good and the 
teleological relation in terms of which human activity is described 
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is to misrepresent the issue. For, as I stated at the beginning of 
this chapter, the teleological terms in which the account is 
apparently lodged are themselves never satisfactory. This has now 
been brought into relief by the determination of the final end as 
up&ý-Lr, and as co-extensive with the whole of a life. In the light of 
this, we must seek to clarify the apparent discrepancy between the 
np6r, 'Ev and teleological structures, that is, we must return again to 
the question of the relation between individual activities and the 
final end by which they are constituted as a totality. 
At the end of Section I, I referred to Aristotle's declaration that 
the subordinate ends pursued for the sake of the final end may be 
either ends distinct from the activity which produced them or 
activities that are ends in themselves 11094al6-181. As a preliminary 
indication of the issues at the heart of the sections to fol low, I 
then drew attention to the difficulty in understanding how activities 
that are ends in themselves may also be for the sake of the final 
end. For Gauthier and Jolif, the suggestion that activities which are 
ends in themselves are also for the sake of a further end marks a 
"fundamental incoherency" in Aristotle's account which arises from 
the failure of Aristotle's analyses to match the originality of his 
insight into the distinctive form of ethical activity [ENT 71. Whilst 
Aristotle recognizes the distinctively absolute form of ethical 
activity as that which is an end in itself, 
il applique hI 'action morale des analyses con§ýues pour 
rendre compte de ]a production, et s'il se trouve par 16 
amen6 hI 'expliquer en terms de relativit6: au lieu d', &tre 
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sa fin & el le-m6me, I 'action morale devient un moyen de 
faire autre chose qu'elle-m6me, le bonheur. CENT 71 
he applies to ethical action the analyses conceived in order 
account for production, and is thereby led to explain it in 
relative terms. Instead of being an end in itself, ethical 
action becomes a means to make something other than itself, 
namely, cA)S(Yigov! (Y. 
Yet cIA(xigovIo( itself has the form of np&ýiq and cannot be the 
product of an anterior activity. If Gauthier and Jolif are right, the 
terms in which Aristotle's discourse is couched will prejudice the 
articulation not only of the specificity of ethical activity and the 
relation of such activity to the final end, but also of the form of 
the final end itself. (As the analyses in Section IV have shown, this 
in turn will place doubts over the conception of human being that 
arises out of Aristotle's account. ) Ackrill, commenting on Gauthier's 
and Jolif's reading of this passage, suggests that the sentence in 
question be taken as an invitation 
to think of a kind of subordination which makes it perfectly 
possible to say that moral action is for the sake of 
eudaimonia without implying that it is a means of producing 
("faire") something other than itseff. EAE 201 
In itself, this is an entirely laudable proposal. Indeed, as we shall 
see shortly, far more hangs on it than Ackrill seems to realize. 
However, if activities that are ends in themselves are also to be for 
the sake of the final end, and if the final end is not to be a thing 
made, then coherency alone demands that the relation of activities to 
the final end must be understood otherwise than in terms of 
production - whereupon the apparent teleology announced at the outset 
will be released from its narrow linear track. Ackrill himself is 
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unconvincing in his response to the invitation, understandably 
proving more adept at saying what is not the case than of giving a 
positive account. Rightly, he insists that ciýSa-tgovl(x is not the 
result of a lifetime's effort. Correctly, he adds that various bits 
of a life must be complete in themselves and not "just means for 
bringing about subsequent bits. " But his own offering is less 
surefooted: 
That the primary ingredients of eudaimonia are for the sake 
of eudaimonia is not incompatible with their being ends in 
themselves; for eudaimonia is constituted by activities that 
are ends in themselves. CAE 191 
This is clearly of help only insofar as the meaning of 'constitution' 
is shown to be distinct from that of production. Similarly, 
ingredients are customarily understood to be used in making compounds 
of some kind. Yet later in the same essay, Ackrill remarks that the 
very idea of constructing a compound end may arouse suspicion: yet if 
the compound is not to be a mere aggregate of subordinate ends, what 
is the "unifying plan"? Setting aside for another time the task of a 
full response to this question (the question which has occupied us 
throughout this chapter), Ackrill suggests that the manner in which 
subordinate ends are related to the final end should be understood in 
the light of Aristotle's discussion of the 5elf-sufficiency of the 
final end [1097b8-201. Like Burnet and Gauthier and Jolif, he 
understands the self-sufficiency of el')S(xigovioc to mean that it 
"includes" all other good things. However, little is gained thereby, 
since no attempt is made to elaborate an alternative to the language 
of parts and wholes which is expressly ruled out by Aristotle in the 
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very same passage and which actually conforms to the model of 
production 11097bl7-201. Indeed, Ackrill quotes Gauthier and Jolif 
approvingly; "j] est en effet lui-m6me la somme qui inclut tous les 
biens: in effect, it is the sum that includes all goods" CAE 22: ENT 
53 My emphasis). This merely veils the question of how 'inclusion' is 
to be understood. 36 When 'includes' is used with the subject 'sum, ' 
it is difficult to avoid the idea of aggregation that has already 
been declared inadequate. 
The ease with which Ackrill and Gauthier and Jolif inadvertantly 
deploy the very structure they proposed to avoid testifies, perhaps, 
less to their negligence than to the pervasiveness of this trope, 
which seems to confront one at every turn. Aristotle's own 
articulation of the relation of -nolquic, and np&ýir, suffers from the 
same problem. In the previous section, I quoted the following passage 
from Book VI: 
Thought alone moves nothing, but only thought for-the-sake- 
of something and concerned with action. This indeed governs 
noi9criq also, since whoever makes something always has some 
further end in view: that which is made is not an end in 
itself, but it is relative and for someone. Whereas that 
which is done (T6 npcxxT6v] is an end in itself, since doing 
well IsiMpocti(y] is the end, and what desire aims at. 
[1139a35f] 
As I noted before, this tells us that the final end has the form of 
np&ttq, whereby np&tt(; is elevated to a position of priority over 
noirlcri(;, in its capacity as the form of the final end which grounds 
the totality of all activities and pursuits. However, the priority is 
neither clear cut nor conclusive. Commenting on 
this passage, 
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Bernasconi asks what is meant by the claim that productive activity 
is governed by purposive and practical thought, that is, thought 'for 
the sake of' something. Aristotle uses the term &pXý to describe this 
relation, which is to be understood in reference to his doctrine of 
the four causes. More precisely, writes Bernasconi, "the practical is 
construed as the final cause of noiricy-tc, " IFDP 1161. This helps to 
explain the foundational role of np&ýiq, but in so doing it raises a 
profound problem. 
rlp&ý-Lq may bear its own end in itself, but how can it be the 
cause of noiricy-ic. without being conceived as an external 
goal? And if we grant to Heidegger that the doctrine of the 
four causes has its source in the experience of making, then 
Aristotle's reference of np&ýiq to causality ... places it 
within the referential teleology of TEoIrlaric. In this way 
np&ýiq - at the very time it is privileged over TEoiricriq - 
comes to be interpreted in the light of noiqatq. IFDP 117]37 
If np&ki(; is the final cause and external goal of all activity, then 
it is cemented in a structure determined by production, the very form 
of activity over which it is ostensibly accorded priority. The 
distinction between itoigaiq and np&ýiq is not an original axis about 
which Aristotle's text turns, since it is made within a framework 
that belongs entirely to one of the terms of the opposition, namely, 
noiqcriq. The hegemony this guarantees to noigaiq ensures that np&tiq 
can never be articulated in its own terms and is always subordinate 
to noiricrIC 38 As Bernasconi concludes, "the transformation np&t-L(; 
undergoes in being assimilated into the language of Aristotle's 
metaphysics, and the distortion it suffers when it is integrated 
into 
a structure which postpones it in favor of nolqatq, 
better shows the 
problem of sustaining a recognition of np&ýiq 
than it shows np&t,, q 
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itself" [FDP 1171. Moreover, the subordination of Trp&ti(; to noirjcriq 
has not been without effects. Its legacy has been the gradual eclipse 
of the specificity of practical reason and action by instrumental 
reason and activity, culminating in the impoverishment of both 
activity and reason which Horkheimer and Arendt, amongst others, 
identify as a malaise of the modern age. 39 As Arendt writes, "The 
issue at stake is, of course, not instrumentality, the use of means 
to achieve an end, as such, but rather the generalization of the 
fabrication experience in which usefulness and utility are 
established as the ultimate standards for life and the world of men" 
[HC 1571. The danger inherent in such a generalization stems from the 
fact that "utility established as meaning generates meaninglessness" 
CHC 1541. Aristotle detected the 5ame danger in the infinite 
procession of means and ends that threatened to render all desires 
futile and sought to avert this procession by appealing to the figure 
of an end in itself, articulated as -mp&ti(;. However, its capacity to 
do this remains compromised by its dependence upon the structure of 
productive activity it ostensibly grounds. The drift of productive 
activity into meaninglessness can only be checked by the articulation 
of np&tir, at the limits of production. 
Can np&ýtq be understood otherwise than as the external goal of all 
activity, and would this be sufficient to wrest it free from the 
influence of production? Our association of Trp&ýiq with the C'p-yov of 
human being understood as activity in general or as such seems 
promising in this respect, insofar as the final end as ciýnpcxti(x is 
thereby understood not as something to be attained only at the end. 
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For np&t-Lq, is the form of the totality of activity as such, and 
whilst it is determined from the very beginning by the possibility of 
its accomplishment as cb'nputioc, this is a necessarily intrinsic 
moment of activity itself and not a future goal. As a result, we can 
say that for np&ýiq to be understood otherwise than as an external 
end, it is less a matter of breaking with its determination as a 
final caU5e than of understanding the final caU5e otherwise than as 
an external end. Of course, its success in sidestepping the condition 
of externality depends on its ability to disengage from the format 
of production - in favour of a form of relation modelled on that 
which emerged from our treatment of the problem of unity with regard 
to being in the Metaphysics. 
The tendency to impute a referential teleology to an activity which 
is an end in itself bears witness to a lacuna in the very conception 
of npOfýiq. This is expressed succinctly by Nicolaci, who warns 
against the reading for which: 
]a np&ýic solo perch6 sarebbe, in , non sarebbe noigcriq 
realth, quella noigaiq che non rinvia a nessun altra. 
ELHP 2451 
np&ýiq would not be noirlcri(; only because, in reality, it 
would be that noiricriq which does not refer on to any other. 
Such an understanding commits a travesty of TEp&t'Lc,, 
delivering the 
relation of activities to the final end into the terms of production. 
Accordingly, the key to any advance in understanding the manner in 
which individual acts are related to activity 
in general or as such 
lies in avoiding this travesty of np&ýi, (;, that 
is, as I have said 
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before, in articulating the form of np&tiq otherwise than in terms 
derived from the experience of production. 
On his part, Nicolaci begins by referring back to the passage where 
Aristotle rejects the prospect of an infinite procession of means and 
ends. The end that is desired for its own sake cannot, he writes, be 
understood as the final term in a linear series of actions wished for 
the sake of something else. 
A] contrario, esso definisce I 'ambito a partire dal quale ]a 
ser-ie stessa puo essere pensata nelle sue condizioni di 
possibilitd e ricompresa secondo un ordine piCj interno: 
quello secondo cui si schiude, si rende originariamente 
possibile la divaricazione del bene-strumento e, cosf, ]a 
dimensione del rinvio. ILHP 2441 
On the contrary, it defines the region on the basis of which 
the series itself may be thought with regard to its 
conditions of possibility and understood according to a more 
internal order: that which makes possible the original 
opening out of the instrument-good and thereby the dimension 
of referral. 
In recognizing the role of Trp&tiq - as the form of that which is 
wished for its own sake alone - in making the whole series possible, 
Nicolaci's reading recalls what was sketched out initially in Section 
1. And insofar as np&ti,; is said to open the dimension in which 
productive activity takes place, it is situated on a different level 
to that which it grounds. Emphasising this separation, Nicolaci goes 
some way towards withdrawing np&tic, from no'Lricriq, if only into the 
"virtual space" in which he situates the articulation of np&tiq 
Ep. 16-17 1. 
Solo perch6 ]a sua condizione specifica di esistenza si 
colloca, su quel livello nel quale si definisce in Senerale 
]a possibilith del noitiv e non gi6 sullo sfondo di una tale 
62 
possibilit6, ]a Tcp&ýiq pu6 essere pensata come qualcosa di 
diverso per genere dalla noiqaiq e non gia come una sorta di 
noincFiq 5uprema. ILHP 2441 
Only because its specific condition of existence is situated 
on the level where the possibility of noii: iv in general is 
defined, and not against the background of such a 
possibility, can np&tiq be thought as something generically 
different to noiTI(xiq and not merely as a kind of supreme 
noina1q. 
Nicolaci's reading strikes a chord with the interpretation explored 
in Section IV in the light of the preceding account of oU'aice and its 
role in securing the unity of being. Just as Trp&ttq was understood 
there to denote activity in general or as such, so Nicolaci rightly 
objects to np&ýiq, being treated "as though it were an alternative 
possibility of human comportment" and proposes, in the light of the 
I epyov argument 11097blffl, that it be understood as the activity 
"proper to man qua human being" ILHP 2511. Nicolaci describes this as 
essentially the capacity to comport oneself in and with regard to the 
world by virtue of one's possession of the X6-yoq. It is important to 
see, however, that X6-yoq is the "manner and not only the object of 
r eXetv" ELHP 2531, that is, it fundamentally determines the nature of 
the relation between the elements in question: 
X6-yov 'cXciv per I 'uomo, non significa appropriarsi del la 
parola come modo di rapportarsi a se stesso bensi 
rapportarsi a se stesso a] modo proprio del X6-yoq, della 
parola. ILHP 2561 
for human being, X6yov 'cXeiv does not mean appropriating the 
word as a way of relating to oneself, but rather relating 
to 
oneself in the way proper to the 16yog, the word. 
If the np&ttc characteristic of human being is 
determined by the 
possession of the X6Voq, then the form of np&tiq 
itself will depend 
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directly on the nature of the relatedness "proper to the X&Vor,. " 
Nicolaci goes on to give an insightful account of this problem, 
taking as his point of departure Heidegger's reading of the X6yor, as 
Kundschaft and Kundgabe. 40 However, his description of the form of 
np(Xt, Lq to which this gives rise runs into difficulty when trying to 
express the form of self -relatedness at issue. In the passage quoted 
above, Nicolaci distinguishes between two such forms. The first, 
according to which human being deploys the X6Voq in order to achieve 
a relation to itself, corresponds to a view determined by production, 
insofar as it describes an intentional and linear progression from 
beginning to end by means of an intermediary. The second, according 
to which the relation of human being to itself occurs by virtue and 
in the manner of the X6-yoq, describes a form of self -relatedness that 
seems to break with the model of production, since the relata do not 
precede the relation between them. Exploring this P05Sibility, 
however, Nicolaci is compelled to resort again and again to 
terminology more appropriate to the unfavoured alternative and uses 
the expressions "rapportarsi a se stesso" (relate to oneself I and 
11 raggi ungersi" I reach or come to onese IfI indi ff erent Iy wi th regard 
to the mode of relatedness specific to the X6-yoc, and the mode of 
relatedness based upon productive comportment. 41 The distinction has 
once more been announced, but not carried through and articulated. 
The task of setting out the relation to the final end otherwise than 
in terms of production is constantly frustrated in general by the 
dominance of conceptual form5 belonging to production and in 
particular by the fact that the conception of 'end' is itself drawn 
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from the discourse of production. All the efforts made in this 
chapter to expose the incoherencies attendent upon the hegemony of 
the language of production and to trace the po5sibility of an 
alternative approach ultimately founder on this point and exhaust 
themselves in a series of negative determinations. A positive 
characterization of the structure and relation in question remains 
out of reach. 
* 
The two problems highlighted at the end of Section I have been 
addressed, directly or obliquely, throughout the subsequent four 
sections of the chapter. Whilst this has led to a better appreciation 
of the significance and complexity of the matter, it has done little 
to resolve it. In short, the two problems are still outstanding. The 
first of these is the relation of activity to the final end. If 
noirlaic. is not to preserve the dominance of the discourse of activity 
that leads to the incoherency of np&ýir, the 'for the sake of' 
relation must be articulated without reference to the general 
framework of production. Acting 'for the sake of' the final end 
cannot be the same as acting 'in order to produce' the final end. 
This problem was given a new twist in Section IV with the association 
of the final end with activity in general or as such. 
This itself is 
enough to prevent np&ýiq being treated as the external goal 
for all 
activity and goes some way towards demonstrating 
the inapplicability 
of relations of production. However, the 
form of relation which 
actually obtains still remains obscure. 
In turn, and here we come to 
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the second problem, this points to the difficulty in articulating the 
form of np&tuc; itself, whether in the sense of a specific act or in 
the sense of activity in general or as such. Until these problems can 
be resolved, the recovery of a conception of np&tiq that might secure 
the basis of an ontology that is not naive -a recovery that requires 
a determination of the specificity of Dasein - will fail insofar as 
such a conception will continue to be determined by the experience of 
nolquir, in ways over which it has no control. 
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Chapter Two 
TRANSCENDENCE AND THE RADICALIZATION OF PRAXIS 
We saw in the Introduction that Aristotle's practical philosophy 
presented Heidegger with a means of dispelling a perceived naivety in 
Greek ontology. In setting out to assess the impact of Aristotle's 
conception of wp&ýiq on Heidegger's understanding of Dasein, my point 
of departure will be the account in Being and Time 9915-18 of 
Dasein's everyday concern. The view Heidegger is concerned to resist 
in this account is that which regards things primarily as 'mere 
things' that are only subsequently invested with value and purpose. 
As we have already seen, the understanding of being presupposed by 
such a view, now firmly enshrined in the metaphysical tradition and 
exemplified above all in the interpretation of substance as matter 
(and arguably reflected even in the Kantian Ding-an-sich), grew 
initially out of the experience of production and above all of the 
work. It is, however, not only a highly one-sided view of the work 
that suppresses the important fact that works are only ever made and 
handled in a pre-constituted context of needs and possibilities, but 
it is also an incomplete reflection of production as a whole, pas5ing 
over the movement of disclosure to the fixed point of its concIU5ion 
in the work. 
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The problem arises with the elevation of theoretical intuition to a 
position of unwarranted priority over other forms of comportment 
towards things. Whilst this tendency may have manifested itself first 
in Greek thought, it was nowhere more evident than in the 
phenomenological theory of Heidegger's contemporary and teacher 
Husserl. Yet Heidegger also found in Husserl the insights he required 
to counter the problem. Turning Husserl's suspicion of the 
naturalistic standpoint on its head, Heidegger eschewed the reduction 
of human experience to a supposedly presuppositionless basis in 
cognitive consciousness and extended the structures of intentionality 
developed by Husserl himself beyond consciousness to the everyday 
activity of Dasein. 1 The fundamental connection between Dasein's 
comportment towards things in the world and their ontological 
determination means that Heidegger's account of Dasein's everyday 
concern is considerably more than a typology of human activity. 
Equally, it goes far beyond a superficial revision of the existing 
order of priority between practical and theoretical activity (for 
which reason, the term 'pragmatism' may only be applied to Heidegger 
with the utmost caution). As Heidegger explains in the Introduction 
to Being and Time, Dasein is ontically distinct in that it has a pre- 
ontological understanding of being which provides the possibility of 
access to the question of being and ultimately of its elevation to a 
thematic level. The phenomenological description of Dasein as being- 
in-the-world and as for the most part absorbed in everyday concern 
amounts, therefore, to a preliminary delineation of the structural 
features of this pre-ontological understanding of being. In view of 
these considerations alone, it is clear that the analyses offered by 
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Heidegger in these sections cannot be understood in isolation. Yet 
their renown sometimes so far precedes an acquaintance with Being and 
Time as a whole that they are taken out of context, as though their 
phenomenological character were a license to treat them as somehow 
self-contained empirical descriptions. Any such reading of these 
sections is destined to misconstrue them, for, as we shall see, they 
must be understood not only with reference to the form of ontological 
enquiry set out in the Introduction to Being and Time, but above all 
in connection with the ontological character of Dasein as 
transcendence developed in the second division of the text. 2 Indeed, 
it is only in the light of its influence on Heidegger's ontology that 
we can begin to gauge the significance of Aristotle's practical 
philosophy on the question of activity in Heidegger. Of course, it is 
not enough simply to trace positive similarities with Aristotle's 
presentation of lrp&ý Iq in the Nicomachean Ethics. Insofar as 
Heidegger appropriates this conception of np&tiq, he risks inheriting 
also the difficulties attendant upon Aristotle's presentation of the 
concept. We shall therefore ask whether Heidegger's analyses succumb 
to the same problems and what response he has in store. 
Dasein is described as for the most part absorbed in its everyday 
dealings. Amongst the many paths of concern [Besorgen] in which such 
dealings are always dispersed, the "closest to us" is "that 
kind of 
concern which manipulates things and puts 
them to use" ISZ 67: 951- 
69 
The preliminary theme of the enquiry is therefore "what gets used, 
what gets produced, and so forth" ISZ 67: 951. Recalling Aristotle's 
observation that what is produced lic6 noir)-c6v] itself becomes the 
means towards a further end 11139blf, p. 237 n. 35.1, one might suspect 
that Heidegger has T6 noiqT6v in mind, but this is not so. 
Die Greichen hatten einen angemessenen Terminus fUr die 
))Dinge((: np6tVj. L(xc(x, d. i. das, womi t man es im besorgenden 
Umgang (7Ep&ti. (; ) zu tun hat. ISZ 68: 96-971 
The Greeks had an appropriate term for 'Things': pragmata - 
that is to say, that which one has to do with in one's 
concernful dealings (praxis). 
In fact, np&-Vg(xc(x is the usual Greek term for things and not a 
deliberate philosophical choice on Heidegger's part. Accordingly, one 
should be wary drawing any quick conclusions about Heidegger's 
understanding of np&tiq from this passage alone. Provided that one 
proceeds with caution, however, it can serve as a helpful guide. Two 
possible interpretations immediately suggest themselves, both of 
which fail to recognize what is at issue. According to the first, 
Heidegger's endorsement of np&yg(xTo( as a term for things in general 
would attest to his so-called pragmatism, which on its part amounts 
to a demonstration that knowledge is founded on everyday practice. 
Whilst it is true that Heidegger integrates the determination of 
things in the world with our comportment towards them, there is more 
to this than the first reading appreciates. To begin with, the 
reading is indifferent to the distinction between noiquic and np&ýiq, 
repeating the reduction of the latter to the former symptomatic of 
the very naivety Heidegger is engaging. Instead, it takes 
the main 
issue in Heidegger's analyses to be the relation between theory and 
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practice. This is mistaken. For the theory-practice distinction 
belongs to the understanding of activity arising from the very 
dominance of nolgaiq that is in question. Insofar as its horizons are 
restricted to this distinction, such a reading therefore fails to 
broach the question of np&ýiq at all. By contrast, raising the more 
fundamental question of the relation between notguic ., and np&ýiq will 
implicitly demand a reconsideration of the significance attached to 
theory and practice. 3 
The second such reading approaches Heidegger's text with the 
distinction between noirlair, and np&tiq very much in mind, but regards 
the broad and inclusive sense in which Heidegger apparently refers to 
nP&ýiq in this passage as a reflection of his failure to address the 
issue of its specificity vis-6-vis -noIrIcriq. However, simply to 
., 
in opposition to noirlcyir, inevitably champion the cause of itp&ýiq 
underscores the existing demarcation between them and thereby 
restricts the scope for change. By tacitly endorsing the framework of 
the distinction, this reading commits itself to an unchanged 
conception of np&ýiq that remains in complicity with its own eclipse 
by a similarly unchanged conception of nojqCyjq. 4 
Alternatively, Heidegger's reference to np&tiq in the context of an 
account of goal-oriented activity might be read less as a repudiation 
of the specific sense of np(-Xtic, than as a discreet reminder of 
how 
far beyond its designated sphere of application the influence of 
production extended through Greek thought. Thus, in a veiled allusion 
to the naivety with regard to Dasein that he perceives 
in Greek 
ontology, Heidegger immediately adds: 
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Si e1i eßen aber ontologisch gerade den spezifisch 
»pragmatischen« Charakter der npotygo(z(x im Dunkeln und 
bestimmten sie »zunächst« als »bloße Dinge«. ESZ 68: 971 
But ontologically, the specifically 'pragmatic' character of 
pr-agmata is just what the Greeks left in obscurity; they 
thought of these 'proximally' as 'mere Things. ' 
What does Heidegger mean by "the specifically 'pragmatic' character 
of pragmata"? The temptation is to understand the meaning of np6cyýL(xT(x 
on the basis of the relatively familiar sense of 'pragmatic'. Indeed, 
Heidegger seems positively to encourage this view elsewhere. In Die 
Frage nach dem Ding (1936) he describes np6cVgo(T(x as 
die Dinge, sofern sie überhaupt solche sind, womit wir zu 
tun haben, sei es, daß wir bearbeiten, verwenden umgestalten 
oder nur betrachten und durchforschen - Tip6rygo(z(x auf lip&eic, 
bezogen, np&tir, hier ganz weit genommen weder in dem engen 
Sinne der praktischen Anwendung (vgl. XpficrOcKt) noch im Sinne 
der np&tig als Handlung im Sinne der sittlichen Handlung; 
np&tig ist alles Tun und Betreiben und Aushalten, was auch 
die noirjai(; einschlieflt. 
things insofar as we have to do with them at all, whether we 
work on them, transform them, or whether we only look at and 
examine them - pragmata with regard to praxis: here praxis 
is taken in a truly wide sense, neither in the narrow 
meaning of practical use (kresthai), nor in the sense of 
praxis as moral action: praxis is all doing, pursuing, and 
enduring, which also includes poiesis. "-s 
rlp6rVýL(x, Eo( are referred to np&ýiq, which is said to be activity in the 
widest sense, inclusive also of noirlo-iq. This may seem perfectly 
straightforward, but the matter is by no means as simple as the 
passage might suggest at first. Understanding np&, VýLorvx on the basis 
of pragmatism or activity " in a truly wide sense" is only 
satisfactory if one knows what is meant by pragmatism or activity. 
Yet this is precisely what is in question here. To assume that the 
meaning of np"ývvcoc could be settled in this fashion would 
be to 
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revert to a position much like the former of the two weak readings 
outlined above. If we are not to refer the character of np6ryA(YT(y to 
pragmatism, the meaning of 'pragmatic' must itself be seen to depend 
on the eventual determination of np&-VgcYT(x. Let us look more carefully 
at this term. It is presented as a name for "things insofar as we 
have to do with them at all. " Does this mean that it is a name for 
things in general? What would 'in general ' mean here? Similarly, 
np&tic, is said to 'be' all doing and to 'include' noigaiq. How are we 
to understand 'include' and can we be confident that Heidegger 
, as a generic term for activity? understands np&tic 
A clue as to how we might approach this problem arises later in the 
account of Dasein's everyday concern, in 917 on reference and signs. 
Heidegger introduces three designations, namely relation, reference 
and indication. Every indication is said to be a reference, but not 
every reference an indication; similarly, every reference is a 
relation, but not every relation a reference. One's initial 
expectation is therefore that relation is the genus to which 
reference and indication belong in order of increasing specificity. 
However, Heidegger explicitly rules out this interpretation, saying 
of relation that it "is something quite formal which may 
be read off 
directly by way of 'formalization' from any kind of context, whatever 
its subject matter or way of Being" ESZ 77: 1081. 
To support this 
view, a footnote directs us to Husserl's Ideas, where we 
find §13 
devoted to the difference between generalization and formalization. 
6 
In contrast to the gradual movement 
from the particular to the 
general, the process of formalization 
involves the reduction of what 
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has material content to a "purely logical" form. Thus, for example, 
the reduction of space to a Euclidean manifold or that of a specific 
inference to a logical form have nothing whatsoever to do with 
generalization. By way of illustration, Husserl appeals to the 
reader's intuition that, unlike the general term 'red' with regard to 
various possible shades of red, logical forms do not 'lie within' the 
material content with which they are associated. 7 
Heidegger, too, attached great importance to 'formal ' designations, 
which he drew initially from Husserl. Indeed, it would be interesting 
to trace the contribution of this notion to Heidegger's own 
understanding of ontology in more detail. Such a task, however, would 
require an account not only of Heidegger's reading of Husserl on this 
matter, but also of his response to Kant's presentation of 
transcendental logic and therefore lies beyond the scope of this 
work. 8 However, Heidegger's 1921-22 course on Aristotle includes a 
brief consideration of the meaning of formal definitions that shed 
some light on the matter at hand. Heidegger contrasts the meaning of 
'formal' sharply with that of 'abstract, ' on the basis that 
abstraction presupposes a grasp of what is concrete. On the contrary, 
he suggests, we cannot assume in advance to have understood either 
what is concrete (the object), nor even the sense of concreteness 
itself. 9 A 'formal' definition is therefore not a representation of a 
thing, but rather an as yet empty designation indicating the 
direction, manner and conditions of its own fulfillment. 
Der definitorische Gehalt ist so, daß er verweist zum Wie 
der eigentlichen Begegnung, Bestimmung, Formung, Bildung.... 
»Formal«, das »Formale« ist ein solcher Gehalt, daß es die 
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Anzeige in die Richtung verweist, den Weg vorzeichnet. 
IGA61 341 
The definitional content is such as to refer to the manner 
of the genuine encounter, determination, shaping, 
formation... 'Formal, ' the 'formal, ' has such content in 
that it gives direction to the indication, shows the way. 
When Heidegger describes np&VýLomo( as "things insofar as we have to do 
with them at all, " their "specifically 'pragmatic' character" may 
justifiably be understood as their purely logical form. In this way, 
it would designate not the genus of all objects indiscriminately, but 
rather the structural characteristics of what is to count as a thing. 
Indeed, Husserl understood the formal categories (as he described 
them) to contribute to an ontology of the object EID 61n]. In turn, 
reading np6cyj. L(xc(x as a formal definition leads directly to the issue 
of np&ýiq itself. Heidegger's identification in Being and Time 915 of 
np&ýtq with Dasein's concernful dealings is by no means incompatible 
with its reduction to a 'logical form' - not 'activity in general ' 
but the structure of activity as such. At the very least, then, we 
should be prepared for the apparently general determination of np&tiq 
to assume a formal significance. Indeed, in aiming at the disclosure 
of the ontologico-existential structures of Dasein, Heidegger's 
phenomenological analyses are bent towards the derivation of 
precisely such ' logical forms' (SZ 10-11: 30-311. Accordingly, when in 
Being and Time §15 Heidegger identifies np&ýiq with Dasein's 
concernful dealings tout court, this does not rule out the 
possibility of the motif recurring as an ontological determination of 
Dasein's comportment towards things. Moreover, on this reading, the 
manner in which np&ti(; 'includes' all forms of activity does not 
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depend on its being used in the general sense: the formal definition 
of activity as such could be based on the specific reading of np&tiq 
as an end in itself. 10 
Taken together these considerations lend credibility to the view 
that, far from representing a missed opportunity to address the 
problem of activity with regard to Trp&tiq, Heidegger's account of 
world and of Dasein as being-in-the-world may conceal a more studied 
interpretation of np&tiq than his somewhat cursory reference to the 
term might suggest. Having said this, it would nonetheless be a 
mistake to rely solely on those passages where the term actually 
appears. The translations and transmutations a term will undergo in 
the course of Heidegger's reading make it hard to determine with 
confidence whether it is being cited in its original guise or used in 
its modified form. 11 Indeed, the force of Heidegger's reading will 
often depend on there being some ambiguity in this respect, for in 
this way Heidegger's language remains at once continuous and 
discontinuous with its textual source. In addition, and we shall see 
this to be the case with np&kir, the motif may be uncoupled from the 
word itself and continue to appear in Heidegger's text unannounced. 
Accordingly, our insight into passages where the term np&tiq actually 
appears will for the most part only point the way forward, showing 
the path along which the less conspicuous traces left by its 
translation into the body of Heidegger's work may be discovered. 
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II 
Turning now to the analyses themselves, Heidegger links np6(lg(xTcx with 
the experience of instrumentality and production by calling those 
entities encountered in concern 'equipment' Idas Zeugl. Dasein's 
concern with equipment is not directed towards it a5 a thing in its 
own right, but only insofar as it is 'good' for something. 12 
Accordingly, its being is described by Heidegger as readiness-to-hand 
[Zuhandenheit], where this denotes the being of that which presents 
itself as essentially "'something in-order-to. .. ' letwas um-zu 
ISZ 68: 971. Equipment never occurs singly, but always in the context 
of a totality of equipment "constituted by various modalities of the 
'in-order-to, ' such as serviceability, conduciveness, usability, 
manipulability" (SZ 68: 971. By way of example, Heidegger describes 
the interconnection of ink-stand, pen, ink, paper, blotting pad, 
table, lamp, furniture, windows, doors, room. These items belong 
together and each is encountered only against the horizon of the 
total context, which is apprehended -in advance 
(by Dasein's pre- 
ontological understanding of being). In the case of the present 
example, this means that the room is discovered as a "totality of 
equipment" before any individual item of equipment shows itself. 
However, the room can serve only as a provisional horizon for such 
things to show themselves, since it is itself encountered as 
"equipment for residing" ISZ 68: 981, that is, in the same terms as 
that which is found in the context it frames. Accordingly, the 
question could be put again: to what totality of equipment does the 
room itself belong? As a first response, one might point to the way 
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that ready-to-hand equipment effaces itself for the most part, 
allowing Dasein's concern to devolve upon the work that is to be 
produced at the time, which is itself described as the "'towards 
which'" [Wozu]. In turn, the in-order-to character of each work 
refers beyond itself to a public world and ultimately a natural 
environment. However, even nature is thought to have "some definite 
direction": the covered platform of a railway station takes account 
of bad weather, street lights take account of darkness and thereby 
the passing cycles of the sun. The interpenetration of artefacts and 
the natural environment means that the latter shares the being of the 
former and is itself ready-to-hand and 'in-order-to' [SZ 71: 1011. 
Clearly, this re-admits the question of the horizon in view of which 
the natural environment, and everything else along with it, is 
discovered. Something is missing from the analysis. 
Welt haben wir bei der Interpretation dieses innerweltlich 
Seienden doch immer schon ))vorausgesetzt((. Di e 
ZusanxnenfUgung dieses Seienden ergibt doch nicht als die 
Summe so etwas wie hWeltff. ESZ 72: 1021 
In Interpreting these entities within-the-world, however, we 
have always 'presupposed' the world. Even if we join them 
together, we still do not get anything like the 'world' as 
their sum. 
Quite simply, an aggregate does not amount to a totality and the 
world is more than the sum of its parts. 13 In what sense more? How 
does world exceed the concerns of Dasein? Bearing in mind the 
problems we have already come across, if nested contexts of equipment 
are not to give way to an indefinite number of successively larger 
contexts (as in Heidegger's example of the writing material, the 
78 
desk, the room ... ), the ultimate referential totality, world, must be 
constituted in advance. 
Heidegger explains that to describe the ontological structure of what 
is ready-to-hand as reference or assignment [Ver-weisung] is to say 
that "it has in itself the character of having been assigned or 
referred [Verwiesenheit]" ISZ 83-84: 1151. This tells us that the 
referential character of equipment depends on a prior act or event. 
As though to explain the nature of such an act or event, Heidegger 
introduces the term 'involvement' [Bewandtnis] to describe the 
ontological character of a thing that has been referred, whereupon 
the prior act or event is said to consist in "letting something be 
involved" CSZ 84: 1151. Dasein is described as going beyond the world 
of its everyday concern to a possibility of its own being "for-the- 
sake-of-which" it acts and in the light of which involvements can 
take place. Heidegger expands on this crucial relation in the 
following passage, to which I shall return later. 
Die Bewandtnisganzheit selbst aber geht letzlich auf ein 
Wozu zurück, bei dem es keine Bewandtnis mehr hat, was 
selbst nicht Seiendes ist in der Seinsart des Zuhandenen 
innerhalb einer Weit, sondern Seiendes, dessen Sein als In- 
der-Wel t-sein bestimmt ist, zu dessen Seinsverfassung 
Weltlichkeit selbst gehört. Dieses primäre Wozu ist kein 
Dazu als mögliches Wobei einer Bewandtnis. Das primäre 
»Wozu« ist ein Worum-willen. Das »Umwillen« betrifft aber 
immer das Sein des Daseins, dem es in seinem Sein wesenhaft 
um dieses Sein selbst geht. ISZ 84: 116-1171 
[TIhe totality of involvements itself goes back ultimately 
to a 'towards-which' in which there is no further 
involvement: this 'towards-which' is not an entity with the 
kind of Being that belongs to what is ready-to-hand within a 
world; it is rather an entity whose Being is defined as 
Being-in-the-world, and to whose state of Being, worldhood 
itself belongs. This primary 'towards-which' is not just 
another 'towards-this' as something in which an involvement 
is possible. The primary 'towards-which' is a 'for-the-sake- 
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of-which' [Worum-willen]. But the 'for-the-sake-of' always 
pertains to the Being of Dasein, for which, in its Being, 
that very Being is essentially an issue. 
The parallel with Aristotle is striking from the first. Indeed, this 
passage seems to have been modelled on the first two chapters of 
Nicomachean Ethics 1, where purposeful activity is directed towards 
and grounded by a final end that does not refer beyond itself. The 
delimitation of the referential series in Heidegger follows precisely 
the same pattern, with the final 'link' being distinguished from the 
overtly referential structure (towards ... ) leading up to it. In 
Chapter One, however, we defended a reading of the Nicomachean Ethics 
that identified the activity characteristic of human being, and 
thereby associated with the final end, with Trp&ýiq. On the strength 
of the analogy, therefore, we might expect to find Dasein display a 
similar structure, above all here, where the question is one of 
grounding purposeful activity. And this is precisely what we find, 
for it is by virtue of Dasein's relation to a possibility of its own 
being that the referential totality is brought to an end and thus 
constituted as a totality. Accordingly, this constitutive ending is 
by no means a contingent breaking off and the referential series does 
not simply come to a stop with the for-the-sake-of -which. Rather, it 
is the relation of Dasein to a possibility of its own being that 
first 'lets-something-be-involved' and thereby opens the teleological 
dimension of its everyday concern. 14 Dasein, then, is fundamentally 
an activity that is for-the-sake-of-itself: a motif taken directly 




In Chapter One, however, we discovered the presentation of TEP&tiq in 
the Nicomachean Ethics to be shrouded in difficulty. A twofold 
problem remained outstanding. First, it was recognized that the 
relation of activity to the final end (which has the form of np&tiq) 
could not be presented in terms of production, yet no coherent 
alternative emerged. The difficulty was mitigated, though not 
V, removed, by drawing on the account of the npok, ev relation in the 
Metaphysics and linking the final end with np&tic, as activity in 
general or as such, over and above individual acts. FinallY, we saw 
that the difficulty penetrated to the heart of the formulation of 
irp&tir, itself, since the dominant influence of production on the 
language of metaphysics in general, and that of activity in 
particular, renders a determination of np&ýiq in terms that are not 
derived from its ostensible opposite elusive or impossible. If 
Heidegger has drawn heavily on the account of the fundamental 
structure of human activity given in the Micomachean Ethics 1, what 
has become of these problems? Has Heidegger resolved them in some 
way, or are they reproduced in his own text? 
Dasein's everyday concern is manifestly instrumental, that is, 
productive, in character and, as in the Nicomachean Ethics, the 
figure of np&tic is invoked in order to provide a basis for that 
activity. Dasein is for-the-sake-of-itself, and it is to the being of 
Dasein that the referential totality ultimately goes back. 
Consequently, it is the 'for-the-sake-of' relation that must be 
interrogated: is this relation thought on the same basis as the 
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relations that obtain in the referential totality itself, namely, 
relations characteristic of productive activity? Let us remind 
ourselves what is at stake in this matter for Heidegger. 
If Heidegger presents the for-the-sake-of relation in terms that are 
drawn from the referential teleology characteristic of production, 
then his appropriation of np&(ýtc or nothing to break ., will 
do little 
the dominance of production over ontological conceptuality; the 
understanding of being appropriate to the work will continue to 
permeate even the ontological determination of Dasein on which it 
should depend. As a result of such a failure to think Dasein in terms 
distinct from those applied to things, Heidegger would fail to secure 
adequate access to the question of being, since this access depends 
on the ontological specificity of Dasein. 
When Heidegger describes the chain of purpose that I inks the hammer 
to making something fast to the construction of shelter and 
ultimately to the protection which is a possibility of Dasein, he 
specifies that "this protection is for the sake of lum-willen] a 
possibility of Dasein" ESZ 84: 1161. Is this final and crucial link in 
any way distinctive? Earlier, I cited the following passage: 
Das primäre »Wozu« ist ein 
betrifft aber immer das Sein 
Sein wesenhaft um dieses Sein 
[Thel primary 'towards-which' 
But the 'for-the-sake-of' ah 
Dasein, for which, in its 
essentially an issue. 
Worum-willen. Das »Umwillen« 
des Daseins, dem es in seinem 
selbst geht. ISZ 84: 1161 
is a 'for-the-sake-of-which. ' 
ivays pertains to the Being of 
Being that very Being is 
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Up to this point in Heidegger's text, the towards-which has 
designated exclusively the being of a work which, as ready-to-hand, 
is in turn used as equipment for some further end. 15 By contrast, the 
"primary" towards-which is a for-the-sake-of -which "in which there is 
no further involvement-" In this way, the for-the-sake-of -which is 
presented as a form or modification of the towards-which, of the 
work, distinguished solely by virtue of its privileged position. This 
hardly represents a radical demarcation between the being of Dasein 
and that of the work. By the 5ame token, if the for-the-sake-of-which 
is described as the "primary" towards-which, then the relation 
designated by 'for-the-sake-of' appears to be 5iMply a special case 
of the 'towards' relation obtaining between items of equipment. To 
this extent, the relation to the final end will be distinguished 
solely by virtue of its having been extrapolated from its proper 
sphere of application - within a referential series - to a point 
where its usual significance has been suspended. 16 
The words themselves give no clear sign of how these two relations 
may be distinguished from one another, pointing rather to their 
inter-connectedness. The German zu is predominantly a preposition of 
direction and movement and the appearance of IWOZU, here in 
connection with the 'in-order-to' structure suggests that it can 
safely be understood in this sense. 17 The preposition 'um' is more 
problematic. Its primary meaning is 'around' or 'about' [cf. Umsicht, 
Umwe I t, Umgangl. In addition, however, it frequently signifies 
'towards, ' although this connotation is generally boosted by the very 
term to which it is contrasted here; as in Heidegger's own use of um- 
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zu. It thereby remains ambiguously placed between an overtly kinetic 
or directional sense and a more diffuse spatial sense. Such ambiguity 
might be regarded as particularly apt in the case of the umwillen 
relation, since it allows a sense of purpose to be conveyed whilst 
halting short of plain instrumentality. 18 The difference between um- 
zu and um-willen, though fixed in everyday usage, is nonetheless 
slight. Moreover, Heidegger makes little or no attempt to accentuate 
the distinction, in spite of its importance for him. On the contrary, 
we find the lum-willen' [for-the-sake-of] relation paraphrased 
throughout Being and Time by expressions containing the preposition 
'zu' [towards]. Thus, for example, Dasein's being for-the-sake-of- 
itself is glossed as its "being towards itself. "19 
All this suggests that the problems inherent in Aristotle's 
presentation of the relation between individual acts and np&tir, as 
the final end are indeed repeated in Heidegger's text. Still as 
potentially disruptive, they pose a threat to Heidegger's account of 
the basis of the referential totality in the being of Dasein. 
Moreover, Heidegger's appropriation of np&ttq as the formal basis of 
the ontological structure of Dasein also seems to have inherited the 
problems that surround the coherence of np&tiq itself as a form of 
activity. Heidegger insists on the ontological specificity of Dasein. 
Yet the description of Dasein in terms so narrowly distinguished from 
those used to describe the being of equipment not only admits the 
incoherencies noted in Chapter One, but on Heidegger's own terms 
jeopardizes the distinctiveness of Dasein that is crucial to the 
project of fundamental ontology. 
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IV 
With the recognition that Dasein exceeds the instrumental world of 
its own concerns and in so doing somehow participates in the 
constitution of that world, the account makes an important advance. 
From an analysis of the work-world of Dasein and the natural 
environment insofar as it is implicated in that world it broaches the 
question of how that world is constituted. As I suggested at the 
outset of this chapter, this is an aspect of Heidegger's account of 
everyday concern that is sometimes set aside, as though it were 
simply a theoretical frame to the real message contained in these 
sections. Yet nothing could be further from the truth. Perhaps the 
most telling rebuttal of readings that fail to engage this question 
is to be found in a footnote to 'On the Essence of Grounds': 
Wenn man gar den ontischen Zusammenhang der Gebrauchsdinge, 
des Zeugs, mit der Welt identifiziert und das In-der-Welt- 
sein als Umgang mit den Gebrauchsdingen ausgelegt, dann ist 
freilich ein Verst, 9ndnis der Transzendenz als In-der-Welt- 
sein im Sinne einer ))Grundverfassung des Daseins(( 
aussichtlos. EVWG-WM 155n: 81n] 
If we somehow equate the ontical system of useful things (of 
tools) with the world and explain Being-in-the-world as 
traffic with useful things, we then abandon any 
understanding of transcendence as Being-in-the-world in the 
sense of a 'basic constitutive feature of Dasein. '20 
It is therefore not simply 'world' that must be addressed, it is 
above all the transcendental problem of world. Indeed, Heidegger goes 
so far as to insist that "the sole intention" of 
the analysis 
contained in Being and Time §914-22 is to prepare 
the way for the 
transcendental analysis of world. However, whilst this declaration 
should be taken with the utmost seriousness, 
it should not be 
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understood to mean that the account of Dasein's everyday concern can 
be set aside once it has served its purpose. If we are to discover 
the locus of Heidegger's thinking, we must attend to the manner in 
which the transcendental problem of world and Dasein's everyday 
concern border upon, and indeed implicate, one another- This is a 
complex matter, and one that must be allowed to resurface gradually 
over the course of the rest of the present work. 21 
* 
In The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic Heidegger de5cribe5 the 
principa sense of world in essentially the same terms as in Being 
and Time ISZ 65: 931, but then links this indication of "the 
metaphysical essence of Dasein as such" EGA26 232-1801 directly to 
the theme of transcendence. 22 In order to elucidate this connection, 
Heidegger returns to Plato's doctrine of ideas and the sense of 
transcendence contained therein. However, in spite of the thematic 
link he discerns between the doctrine of ideas and transcendence, and 
from transcendence to world, he recognizes that the doctrine of ideas 
itself could never attain the concept of world as he intends it, 
since the relation to ideas is entirely dominated by theoretical 
intuition. Moreover, this correlation of the idea and intuition led 
to transcendence being conceptualized in terms of looking and 
ultimately as the relation between subject and object. It was in 
order to avert the consequent reduction of the problem of 
transcendence to a matter of epistemology that Heidegger sought in 
Aristotle's practical phiI05ophy a more broadly based account of the 
diversity of human activity. This is reflected in the following 
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passage - along with a warning that the impulse to arrive at a 
conception of transcendence via a formalization of everyday 
experience, of whatever kind, is a perilous one. 
So wenig man der Transzendenz, weil sie eben kein ontisches 
Verhalten ist, der Anschauung im theoretischen oder 
ästhetischen Sinne aufbürden kann, sowenig auch dem 
praktischen Verhalten, sei es im Sinne der handwerklich- 
gebrauchenden, sei es sonst eines. Die zentrale Aufgabe ist 
gerade, in der Ontologie des Daseins hin ter diese 
Scheidungen der Verhaltungen in die gemeinsame Wurzel 
zurückgehen; eine Aufgabe, die freilich nicht einfach zu 
sein braucht. Trenszendenz liegt vor jeder möglichen 
Verhaltensweise überhaupt, vor der v6qcytr aber auch vor der 
11 opet-Lq. IGA26 235-236: 1831 
One cannot pack transcendence into intuition, in either the 
theoretical or the aesthetic sense, because it is not even 
an ontic activity. Even less can it be packed into a 
practical comportment be it in an instrumental-utilitarian 
sense or in any other. The central task in the ontology of 
Dasein is to go back behind those divisions into 
comportments to find their common root, a task that need 
not, of course, be easy. Transcendence precedes every 
possible mode of activity in general, prior to voqcYiq, but 
also prior to 0'pcýi(; - 
The rejection of a Platonic emphasis on intuition is plain. What 
follows, however, is particularly interesting. Attentive to the ease 
with which one might turn from intuition to practical activity as an 
alternative basis for thinking transcendence, Heidegger immediately 
closes off that avenue, setting his sights on the common root of both 
intuition and practice. Is Heidegger's concern therefore to establish 
the connection between theory and practice? Yes, but there is more. 
Heidegger would have been well aware that one already finds in 
Aristotle an awareness that practical activity of whatever kind is in 
each case wedded to thought (113ga36-1139b2l. In looking for the 
common root of intuition and practice, Heidegger is not simply 
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seeking the common ground of distinct forms of activity. Above all, 
he is aiming to achieve a more radical understanding of the already 
complex structure constitutive of our practical comportment towards 
things. The key to the problem lies in the reference to v6rjcTir, and 
6pctiq in the final two lines of the passage, to which we shall 
return shortly. 
First, the fact that transcendence is to be the common root of both 
intuition and practice, of what ever kind, presents a formidable 
problem of access. In Heidegger's initial diagnosis of the naivety of 
Greek ontology, he criticized their inattendance to the everyday 
experience of activity that served as the basis for philosophical 
determinations. In order to place Greek ontology on a more secure 
footing, he proposed that enquiry reflect explicitly on the 
comportment of Dasein towards things in the world in order that the 
contribution of this comportment to the ontological determination of 
the things themselves may not pass unnoticed. Accordingly, it seems 
that the ontological determination of Dasein must pay heed to the 
manner of its comportment towards things in the world. Yet here 
Heidegger insist5 that neither theoretical nor practical activity can 
provide an adequate access to transcendence and unequivocally denies 
that transcendence can be situated in any form of ontic activity. But 
if the thought of transcendence cannot be modelled on an ontic form, 
how can it maintain a basis in Dasein's everyday activity? 
Following another explicit declaration that the problem is the common 
root of both OewpeTv and np&tiq, Heidegger adds an apparently 
surprising remark: 
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Obwoh I di e Transzendenz bei Plato nicht in ihrer 
eigentlichen Verwurzelung aufgesucht wurde, kommt unter dem 
unausweichlichen Zwang der Ph. 9nomene gleichwohl der 
Zusammenhang zwischen dem Mit der idea vermeinten 
Tr-anszendenten und der Wurzel der Transzendenz, der Trp&tic.. 
EGA26 237: 1841 
Though in Plato transcendence was not investigated down to 
its genuine roots, the inescapable pressure of the 
phenomenon nevertheless brought to light the connection 
between the transcendent intended by the idea and the root 
of transcendence, np&kiq. 
How is it that Heidegger can refer to Trp&ti(; as the root of 
transcendence, having just repudiated practical activity as an 
appropriate basis for such a determination? Does Heidegger mean 
something different by np&tiq here? The fact that Heidegger has 
already linked (however inadequately) transcendence to the Platonic 
conception of ideas and hence theoretical intuition suggests that 
np&tic as the root of transcendence should not be understood as a 
general signification of practical activity in opposition to 
theoretical intuition. Rather, it must somehow comprise theoretical 
intuition, no less than practical activity. Accordingly, when 
lnp&ttq' appears in the passage above, it does indeed have a 
different sense to that which Heidegger gave it a moment earlier in 
declaring the aim to be the common root of both OewpeTv and np&ýiq,. 
So what does np&ýiq mean here? In what sense is np&tiq the root of 
transcendence? 
With regard to Plato, Heidegger has so far referred only to 
transcendence in terms of ideas. But there is a more primordial 
transcendence, namely, that which occurs with regard to the idea of 
I the good beyond being Hlrtxciva -rqc, o1kriaq]. Rejecting the common 
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interpretation of the good in terms of value, Heidegger encourages us 
to see in the 18ta Tof) o'cv(xOob 
der Charakter, den Plato und vor allem Aristoteles als olý 01 Cvcxo( bezeichnen, das Umwillen, das worumwillen etwas ist 
bzw. nicht ist, so bzw. anders ist. IGA26 237: 184 Initial 
emphasis mine] 
the characteristic described by Plato and particularly 
Aristotle as the ob 'Cvcx(x, the for-the-sake-of -which [das 
Umwillenl, that on account of which something is or is not, 
is in this way or that. 
By alluding to the Aristotelian reading of the ot') 'Cvcx<x, Heidegger 
introduces an ambiguous new note to the account. Since he has already 
voiced clear reservations with the Platonic view of transcendence, 
one might suppose Aristotle's entry into the text to be the cue for 
Plato's departure. However, whilst there is some adverbial evidence 
in favour of Aristotle ("particularly"), the passage is understated 
to the point of equivocality. If, as it seems, therefore, Heidegger 
intends to divert the Platonic theory of the good beyond being 
through the Aristotelian reading of the o-u 'r-vsxo(, we should not 
assume that Plato has been wholly superseded. Indeed, references 
later in the same paragraph to the theory of ideas and the 
transcendental form of world speak against this. Rather, the 
uncertainty surrounding the preci5e source and target of Heidegger's 
thought here is an example of the way in which he deploys Aristotle 
not so much to counter as to supplement and problematize the Platonic 
transcendental discourse. 23 This can, of course, lead to ambiguity. 
Indeed, we shall come across a particularly significant case later 
in 
this chapter in connection with Heidegger'5 intepretation of 
the 
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&-ycx96v Ipp. 100-1021, a matter that will be considered in more detail 
in Chapter Three, Part 11. 
II The Aristotelian sense of 01') F-vex(x favoured by Heidegger in 
connection with the Platonic 186(y Tob 0'(-y(xOob implicitly re-introduces 
the theme of np&ýiq - albeit in a sense that remains almost entirely 
obscure at this stage. However, ambiguity over the fact of this 
reintroduction in The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic is mitigated 
by a parallel (and nearly contemporaneous) discussion in 'On the 
Essence of Grounds' CVWG-WM 160-161: 93-951 - In this text, Heidegger 
denies that the ('x-yo(06v - at least not as it appears in Plato - can be 
interpreted as the transcendence of Dasein. It cannot, because it 
represents merely the tip of a more profound and "concrete question 
regarding the basic possibility IGrundm&glichkeit) of the existence 
of Dasein in the n6Xiq" EVWG-WM 160: 931. The possibility that 
Heidegger regards as fundamental is not to be equated with specific 
possibilities open to Dasein. Rather, it comprises the elements of 
truth, understanding and being that, taken together, amount to the 
ursprtinglich-einigen Grunde der M&glichkeit der Wahrheit des 
Verstehens von Sein. EVWG-WM 160: 933 
the primordial, unified ground of the possibility of the 
truth of the understanding of Being. 
The concrete question concerning the basic possibility of the 
existence of Dasein in the n6Xiq is for Heidegger concerned precisely 
with transcendence. Moreover, Heidegger then explicitly links 
transcendence and np&tir, by describing this understanding as "die 
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Urhandlung menschlicher Existenz-. the primordial activity of human 
existence" IVWG-WM 160: 93 trans. modified). 
It seems, therefore, that Heidegger regarded Plato as having 
diminished the radicality of the question of transcendence by 
severing it from its roots in the concrete situation of Dasein's 
primordial activity and confining it within the realm of theoretical 
intuition: that is, by isolating transcendence from the n6Xiq as the 
site of historical being. 24 Opposed to such a withdrawal , Heidegger 
implies that the "concrete question" of transcendence should be 
traced wi thin the n6Xiq. We cannot enter here into a full 
con5ideration of what Heidegger under5tand by the n6Xiq. 25 But given 
that it is not self-evident, we should avoid the temptation of either 
simply allowing the customary sense to prevail or of suspending that 
sense entirely in order to refer Heidegger's understanding of the 
iT6Xiq to the eventual determination of transcendence. The link 
Heidegger proposes between transcendence and the n6Xiq is not an 
inference of any kind, for both terms are in question at once. 
Accordingly, if the sense attached to the n6Xiq will depend in part 
on the understanding Heidegger reaches of transcendence, it is also 
true that the very proposal of such a link already contributes to 
thinking the problem of transcendence by raising its political 
significance; that is, by signalling that the respective questions of 
transcendence and politics are essentially connected with one 
another. 
At this point, one might wish to pose a question that haunts 
the 
whole of Heidegger's implicit reading of np&ýiq: 
by linking np&tiq to 
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transcendence, does Heidegger not lapse into a confusion of 
registers, and moreover one that is dangerously compounded by the 
association of transcendence with the political realm? This is, in 
effect, the fundamental question of what it means for Heidegger to 
'translate' the language of Aristotelian practical philosophy into 
the idiom of ontology. 
The suspicion that Heidegger may have been seduced into pursuing an 
errant line of thinking by the deployment of language outside its 
proper sphere of application is credible and deserves to be taken 
seriously, even if, as I believe to be the case, it ultimately needs 
to be articulated in a more sophisticated manner. Everything depends 
on what is considered to be the situation of activity. If it were the 
ontic realm of Dasein's everyday concern, the suspicion would be well 
founded, since transcendence exceeds this region by definition. 
Similarly, there would be grounds for suspicion if it were the 
ontological realm, insofar as this is understood to provide the basis 
for Dasein's engagement with things in the world and so could not be 
susceptible to Dasein's initiative. However, each of these 
possibilities betray an essential conservatism in their tendency to 
regard the ontic and ontological as distinct 'realms, ' rather than as 
intrinsically linked ways of addressing the same situation (a 
tendency that reiterates the drift of Aristotelian metaphysics into 
theology as the enquiry into other-worldly divine being). But what if 
it is precisely the delimitation of these two 'realms' that is in 
question? This would point towards a more profound re-evaluation of 
the sense attached to 'activity' -a re-evaluation, it must be said, 
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that is a prerequisite for defusing the suspicion that activity (or 
np&t, Lr, ) is deployed in the 'wrong' register. Heidegger's warning 
against taking ontic activity as the model for understanding 
transcendence might be taken as evidence of his being alert to this 
danger. However, the association of transcendence with language of 
activity, i. e. npo(ýiq, does comport a risk to which Heidegger is not 
wholly immune, namely, that of promoting the impres5ion that Dasein 
can simply enact the movement constitutive of its ground Ipp. 205- 
2061. 
To place this back in the context of the passage under consideration, 
how are we to understand the Urhandlung (np&tiq) that Heidegger 
associates with the transcendence of Dasein in the n6Xiq? In short, 
we still face the problem of how to gain access to a conception of 
up&(ýiq that is not modelled on an ontic form of activity - and indeed 
of understanding what such a conception could mean. Heidegger 
expressly rejected such an approach in the passage to which we 
referred earlier 1p. 871. As I suggested then, the key to what 
Heidegger is doing here lies in the final two lines. We are now in a 
position to appreciate their significance. 
Transzendenz liegt vor jeder möglichen Verhaltensweise 
überhaupt, vor der voqcric., aber auch vor der Opeeir.. 
EGA26 236: 1831 
Transcendence precedes every possible mode of activity in 
general, prior to v6gaiq, but also prior to O'pet-Lq. 
This remark seals the claim that Heidegger is addressing himself 
above all to Aristotle here, for it is an unmistakable reference 
to 
Aristotle's discussion of the nature of choice [npo(xipscr-, r, 1 in the 
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Micomachean Ethics 11139a32-1139b7l. Having described choice as "the 
II (xpXrl o action Enp&ýewql, " Aristotle concludes: 
St6 'rl' o'pcxcix6(; votq ý npouipea-Lq il' 6'pcýiq Siorvorjxixý, x(xi Ifil co'L(xl3-crl OfpXý (')'CvOp(A)no4;. 
Hence choice is either appetitive intellect or intellectual 
appetition; and man is a principle of this kind. 
Human being is understood here as an 6'(pXrj, a principle of change, 
defined by the conjunction of intellect and desire, of vobq and 
I opetIc 26 More precisely, human being is the oipXý of activity, which 
is to say, activity is born out of the union of vouq and o'pct'tq 
IDA. 111.10: 432b27-433a321. To understand activity, therefore, one 
must understand not only vobr ., and 
8petic, but also the nature of 
their conjunction. Heidegger, however, asks not 'how are vouq and 
11 
., 
to be of opcýiq united? ' but rather 'what is the source their 
belonging together such that they may be thought as a unity? '27 In 
his account of transcendence, then, Heidegger seeks to radicalize the 
understanding of human being as 6pexTix6q vobq [intellect related to 
desire] and/or o'pctLq Si(xvorju-txý [desire related to intellect] in 
order to arrive at a determination of the original unity of voZq and 
If opcýiq prior even to their separation. If we recall the problem of 
access outlined earlier, we can now see that there are in principle 
two possible senses in which np&tiq may be understood as the root of 
transcendence. First, there may be a conception of np&tiq that 
conveys the "concrete question concerning the basic possibility of 
the existence of Dasein in the n6X-Lq" in a more original manner. 
However, as we have seen, such a conception will be so di5torted by 
the tradition in which it is embedded that it may not be accessible 
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at all. (Indeed, if, as Bernasconi suggests, the language of 
metaphysics is fundamentally structured by its suppression of np&ttq, 
then such a conception will never have been accessible as such and 
will only ever have appeared as a trace 1FDP 1171-) Yet, and this is 
the second point, if Heidegger is to recover a more original sense of 
in connection with his thought of transcendence, then the 
point of departure must be - can only be - the conception np&tiq as 
it appears in the tradition. The radicalization of this conception 
will then lead back through the tradition, in the manner Heidegger 
describes as the "destruction [Destruktion] of the history of 
ontology" ISZ 96 & GA24 951. However, this does not mean that 
Heidegger's conception of transcendence will be modelled directly on 
an ontic form of activity. Rather, the 'ontic' conception of npRiq 
I is merely the point of departure for the radicalization of its (')(pXg, 
the conjunction of vou-q and O'pcýlq. 28 If we are to identify a 
conception of np&tiq proper to Heidegger's own thinking, it will 
therefore be associated with the outcome of this radicalization, that 
is, with transcendence, with what Heidegger describes as the 
"primordial activity [Urhandlung] of human existence" (P. 911. 
Clearly, everything will depend on the nature of the radicalization 
itself. Before turning to consider how it takes place in Heidegger's 
texts, however, let us look briefly at the point from which it must 




Although Aristotle defines human being as a conjunction of vouq and 
opckt(;, it is important to realize that they are by no means always 
in concordance with one another. On the contrary, for the most part 
they are not, if only because there generally co-exist conflicting 
desires whose joint realization would be impossible and only one of 
which will correspond with the course indicated by the rational part 
of the soul [DA. 111: 443b5; 433a26-281. With uncompromising disdain, 
Aristotle characterizes those who decline to bring vobq and 6'petiq 
into conformity with one another as slavishly "preferring what is 
only a life for cattle" ENE. 1: 1095bl9-221. To transcend a bovine 
existence, one must constantly strive to overcome this ongoing 
conflict, and what is more one must do so with some measure of 
success: being 'fully' human is a task that is before us at all 
times. Strictly speaking, however, one might prefer to say that for 
Aristotle being human is characterized by the capacity to accomplish 
one's existence in this way. Thus, even the most ruminative amongst 
us are potentially human in a sense entirely beyond even the most 
aspirant of our dumb companions. 29 This highlights the importance of 
avoiding a crude yet prevalent misconception, namely, that the 
., simply overlies a characteristically 
human relation to the X6-yor 
fundamental animality. The relation between vobq and O'pcýiq is 
altogether more intimate. 
In what does this intimacy consist? As Aristotle describes it, the 
soul is not simply split into two parts, one associated with X6-yoc. 
and the other not. In addition, Aristotle recognizes a 
third 
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possibility, which is initially introduced as a subdivision of the 
part that i5 independent of Xo-yo4;. 
But there seems to be another element of the soul which, 
(X while irrational ["X6'yo(; civcxil, is in a sense receptive of 
reason. 11102bl3-141 
This part of the soul is the seat of 6'psýiq, and it participates in 
), 6-yo4; inasmuch as it is not indifferent to X6yoq and can take account 
of it. Indeed, Aristotle declares himself prepared to allocate this 
faculty to the part of the soul that has X6yoq in the stronger sense. 
If, however, one should speak of the appetitive part of the 
soul as rational too, it will be the rational part that is 
divided in two: one rational in the proper sense of the word 
and in itself, the other in the sense that a child pays 
attention to its father. 11103al-4]30 
V, Opetiq is therefore an intermediate and indeed indeterminate faculty, 
defined primarily by its capacity to hear, follow or pay attention to 
X6yoq - but equally by its capacity to depart from or disregard X6Voq 
(for to be unresponsive to the X6-yoq is not the same as having no 
relation to it whatsoever). 31 It would undoubtedly be fruitful to 
explore further the various analogies of hearing and filial obedience 
by which Aristotle describes the co-ordination of voik, and O'pcý, Lr 
However, the fact of such co-ordination alone betokens a common 
formation or horizon. 
j in which the If we consider the example of choice Enpoulpsair 
conjunction of voZr, and o'petiq was initially articulated, it requires 
of course that each faculty affirm or pursue 
the same object 
11139a2l-321. The conjunction of vobq and O'pctiq therefore hinges 
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above all on their mutual object, namely, that which is to be done, 
the o'pcxu6v -np(YxT6v Xc-y6gevov IGA33 152). Ultimately, it is that for- 
the-sake-of -which one acts, the ou' 'cvcx(x, the final end. Yet this, of 
course, is el')Saigovia or clýwpcxtioc 11139a35-1139b5l, whereupon we 
strike the fundamental horizon. For TEp&ttq, and therefore lipoccipzcriq, 
in which voi5q and O'pst-tr, are united, is always to be understood from 
the perspective of doing well. The basis for the conjunction of vobq 
and o'psýiq lies in the ': Et')' of 'cimp(xti(x, ' that is, in virtue, &pc-Eý. 
Aristotle defines 6(pccý as a, a fixed di5po5ition by virtue of 
which one has the potential to act consistently in a particular 
manner, namely, well 11106a12 & 1106b36-1107a2l. The conjunction of 
vobq and o'pcttq whose principle we have been tracing is not brought 
about by the mere existence of &pcToei: rather, these must be 
cultivated and assimilated by the individual so that they come to 
form her character. Once the individual may be ascribed the various 
E: ýcir, the ethical okpp-, con will channel her desires towards whatever 
form the Good takes within the parameters of the situation disclosed 
by the intellectual ('xpeTo(!, and vobq and 6'peý-tq are thereby brought 
into conjunction with one another. 32 In this way, whilst the horizon 
for this conjunction remains the Good, the conjunction itself 
actually occurs by virtue of the e'tciq. 
It may be objected that the account so far has conspicuously 
neglected to consider how the conjunction of voi5q and o'pctiL(; is 
related to the final end. After all, our initial question concerned 
precisely the relation to the ou' 'e'vexof and is this not 
determined by 
., and o'pcýic, 
themselves relate to their the manner in which vobc 
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respective objects? Have we not therefore digressed unnecessarily? 
The question is indeed an important one that cannot be overlooked. 
However, there is good reason for having taken the route we have. 
Effectively, one could say that we have identified two forms of 
relation to the 'end' : that of the conjunction of vobq and O'pcýiq to 
the ob ievsx(x, and that of to the &-yo(06v. Having done so, runs 
the objection, we seem then to have neglected the former in favour of 
the latter. However, such a view fails to recognize two important 
points. First, the ob 'F-vz: x(x and the &-V(x@6v are equivalent to one 
another, and may both be defined as cA)Scxigov! (x or clýnpcxti(x. 
Consequently, the two relations are linked by their common end. 
Second, insofar as the conjunction of vobc, and o'pcýiq depends on 
ekiLq, the former relation is grounded in the latter. Accordingly, we 
have by no means gone astray. On the contrary, the account has moved 
towards a more profound grasp of the relation between activity and 
the final end. 
Given that the key to this conjunction lies in we should 
therefore be able to find reference to the term in Heidegger's own 
account of transcendence. Heidegger does indeed make such a reference 
- in the course of the very passage f rom 'On the Essence of Grounds' 
to which we have already referred 1p. 911. We found there that Plato's 
presentation of the &y(X06v led Heidegger to the question of the 
possibility of the truth of the understanding of being, which we 
associated with transcendence. This understanding was then described 
as the "Urhandlung of human existence" at the root of all existing in 
the midst of beings, on the basis of which we linked discerned a link 
too 
between transcendence and nPcitiq. At that point we broke off our 
reading of the passage. It concludes: 
Das oryocMv ist nun diejenige icýiq (MUchtiSkeit), die der 
M&glichkeit von Wahrheit, Verstehen und sogar des Seins 
m4chtig ist und zwar aller drei in Einheit zumal. EVWG-WM 
160: 931 
Thus the agathon is that hexis [M. Ychtigkeit] which is master 
of the possibility of truth, understanding, and even of 
being, indeed of all three together at once. 
By equating the (')(-Vo(06v directly with ieýiq, Heidegger condenses the 
Platonic formulation of the dryo(96v as "the most objective of objects" 
EVWG-WM 161: 951 to which one must then have a relation, and, taking 
his cue from Aristotle's practical philosophy, implies that the 
I (x, y(xO6v is essentially nothing but this relation: 
Das Wesen des o'(-Vo(06v IieSt in der M. 4chtigkei t Trans. I 
seiner selbst als oU ývzxc( - als das Umwillen von... ist es 
die Quelle von M&glichkeit als solcher. EVWG-WM 161: 951 
The essence of the agathon lies in its mastery [hexis: 
Trans. I of itself as hou heneka; as the for the sake of. 
it is the source Of Possibility as such. 
Perhaps nowhere else in Heidegger's writing do the Platonic and 
Aristotelian paths of thought meet one another in so crucial a 
fashion. The fact that this passage occurs in the course of a 
discussion of Plato's theory of ideas demands that we take &-y(x06v in 
its absolute sense and not as the o'(-y(x06v np(XXT6v. Ye t the 
reservations that Heidegger has already raised with respect to 
Plato's treatment of transcendence and moreover the role played by 
6pcý i c. in Aristotle's account of the conjunction of voZq and 
that lies at the root of Heidegger's own interpretation of 
transcendence strongly suggest that ('Y-y(x96v cannot be read in its 
101 
absolute sense, at least not unequivocally so. Rather, it would seem 
that the references to letir, and the ou 'evex(x add an Aristotelian 
perspective and &-VocMv must accordingly be taken as the &ya96v 
np(xx-c6v. Yet not only is this is too far removed from the context of 
the discussion to be plausible, but in addition the sense of 'Cýir, as 
mastery is not attributed to the individual but to the 6 (Y66v itself OCY 
and is therefore irreducible to the strictly Aristotelian notion of a 
human disposition. As the ob 'evex(x, the for-the-sake-of -which, the 
I cx-y(x86v consists in our relation to it. Yet at the same time, it is 
not something that is possessed in one's existence. Rather, the olý 
.r 
evexcx is the source of all possibility, that is, the source of all 
our possibilities, including the possibility of the truth of the 
understanding of being that we have called transcendence. Indeed, it 
is precisely because the o'(-yo(06v is that which lets beings appear that 
Heidegger, rejecting any construal of it as itself a being, idea or 
value, describes it in terms of mastery or power. Thus, in his 
1931/32 lectures on Plato, Heidegger writes: 
Das Gute, das 6'ryo(06v, is demnach die Erm6ýglichung von Sein 
als solchem und Unverborgenheit als solcher. Besser gesagt: 
was das Sein sowohl wie die Unverborgenheit zu ihrem eigenen 
Wesen erm&chtigt, dieses Erm&chtigende nennt Flaton das Gute 
(&-y(x06v). ... 
33 
The Good, the 6'rycx@6v, is therefore the making possible of 
being as such and of uncoveredness as such; in other words, 
what masters being, like uncoveredness, in their proper 
essence, and Plato names this mastering the Good 
(o'cy(3(66v) 
.... 
The interpretation of the &-ya06v with regard to 'Cýi(; thereby 
concerns neither simply a disposition of Dasein, nor simply a 
characteristic of the orV(xO6v as absolute. If anything, 
it would be 
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more correct to say that 'eýiq names not our acquisition of virtue, 
but rather our relation to ground. 
We have seen that Heidegger'5 interpretation of np&tiq as the root of 
transcendence depends on a radicalization of the manner in which vo-uq 
and o'petic, are united in the relation to the final end. Given that in 
Aristotle, this uni ty is cemented by 'etiq (as an ethical 
disposition), it is not surprising that the concept of ýýiq should 
itself become the focus of Heidegger's attention. However, the full 
meaning of Heidegger's interpretation is still somewhat obscure. We 
sha II return to the issue of 'Ctiq in Chapter Four, where its 
connection with potentiality or power will be traced in more detail. 
First however, we must pass by way of the radicalization of npRiq. 
Indeed, only once the course of that radicalization has been examined 
and carried through will the occurence of Eýiq in the passage we have 
just been discussing become clear. In the next chapter, therefore, we 
shall look at Heidegger's understanding of movement as a 
determination of the factical existence of Dasein. Moreover, our 
consideration there of the relative priority accorded to uo(pio( and 
ýpp6vrIcTiq will shed light on what appears to be a convergence of 




PIR? 0NESIS', SOPHIA AND TBE MOVEMENT OF FACTICAL EXISTENCE 
If one were to seek an Aristotelian precedent for the hermeneutics of 
facticity Heidegger presents in Division One of Being and Time, it 
would be tempting to suppose that one need look no further than the 
lVicomachean Ethics. Whilst in no way diminishing the importance of 
this text for Heidegger, it would, however, be more accurate to 
regard it as the focal point of an interpretation that also draws on 
resources from further afield. Indeed, and this is the implicit and 
generally neglected message of Heidegger's reading, Aristotelian 
practical philosophy can only be adequately understood if it is 
approached via the Physics and Metaphysics. We have already seen in 
Chapter One that themes from the Metaphysics can illuminate or 
problematize the Aficomachean Ethics. Moreover, we discovered in the 
previous chapter that Heidegger inherits a fundamental incoherency 
affecting the Aristotelian conception of np&tiq. In the present 
chapter I shall argue that the distinctiveness of Heidegger's 
response to this problem lies in the way his reading of the 
Micomachean Ethics approaches the text via Aristotle's account of 
movement and change in the Physics and Metaphysics. 
One of the most important questions raised by Heidegger's reading of 
NE. Vl is that of the relation between q)p6vqcriq and cyoTi(x. Readers who 
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have been led to Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotle by their 
interest in Gadamer or Arendt tend, with some justification, to be 
dismayed by the emphasis Heidegger places on cyoT! o( at the expense of 
(PPO V rjCF Iq. Does this not preclude the recovery of a radical 
understanding of ethical and political np&tiq by reinstating the 
primacy of theory? Clearly, given our own emphasis on the importance 
of np&tiq for the ontological determination of Da5ein, we cannot 
afford to ignore this problem and I shall devote Section 11 of this 
chapter to a review of the concerns aroused by Heidegger's apparent 
indifference to the claims of np&t-tq and (pp6vquiq. In response, 
shall try to distinguish the various impulses of Heidegger's reading 
and to show how a positive recovery of np(-Xtiq is not incompatible 
with the priority of ao(pio(. Indeed, Heidegger is led necessarily to 
repeat that priority by his own strategy of 'destructive' reading 
and, as we shall see in Sections III and IV, this reading of croýploc is 
of twofold significance for his overall recovery of np&tiq as a 
determination of Dasein. First, the relation of cro(pi(x to (pp6vncriq is 
given a new level of complexity, causing the form of priority enjoyed 
by aoýpi(x to be significantly qualified. In addition, the recovery of 
cro(pi(y provides a means of offsetting the influence of scholastic 
anthropology on later, modern, views of human being. 
I 
Heidegger's early (pre-1925) texts envisage philosophy as inseparable 
from a hermeneutics of facticity. 1 The expression 'facticity' denotes 
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the ontological character of Dasein as that being which "ist ihm 
selbst da im Wie seines eigensten Seins: is itself there in the 
manner of its ownmost being" EGA63 71. Dasein's relation to its own 
existence is encapsulated in the manner of its being-there, and this 
concerns the way in which factical life is actually lived; "Sein - 
transitiv: das faktische Leben sein!: being - transitive: being 
factical life! " EGA63 71. The task of the hermeneutics of facticity 
is thus to follow the articulation of factical life "im jeweiligen 
Wie des Angesprochen- und Ausgelegtseins: in the way it is in each 
case addressed and interpreted" and to trace existential categories 
according to which such an articulation takes place. 
Das hei, 6t, die Philosophie ist als Ontologie der Faktizitiyt 
zugleich kategoriale Interpretation des Ansprechens und 
Auslegens, das heifit Logik. EPIA 2471 
As an ontology of facticity, philosophy is thus the 
categorial interpretation of being-addressed and being- 
interpreted, i. e. logic. 
The ontology of facticity, logic, is directed towards working out the 
structures of factical life. Yet where, indeed how, is it to begin? 
The hermeneutic of facticity is every bit as circular as the question 
of being as Heidegger describes it in Being and Time ISZ 7-8: 27-281; 
for must it not have already reached an understanding of 'life' in 
order to begin deciphering its logic? Yes, indeed it must, although 
the understanding with which it begins is imprecise and unreliable. 
If it is to be improved, hermeneutic enquiry must remain vigilant to 
its presuppositions, and above all this means that it must maintain a 
critical relation to the history of its presuppositions. 
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To take the present case, the term 'life' has a long history 
embracing many variations of meaning. Indeed, so ramified and 
confused has that history become that we have all but lost track of 
the term's genealogy. Even, and perhaps especially, where it seems 
most obvious, the Lebensauslegung moves in a context of fundamental 
concepts, questions and explanations that we no longer fully 
understand EPIA 2491. However, if the sense attached to 'life' is 
today uncertain, in the 1922 'Introduction' Heidegger is clear at 
least about the formative influences that must be re-traced: 
Die Philosophie der heutigen Situation bewegt sich bei der 
Ansetzung der Idee des Menschen, der Lebensideale, der 
Seinsvorstellungen vom menschlichen Lebens in Auslgufern von 
Grunderfahrungen, die die greichische Ethik und vor allem 
die Christliche Idee des Menschen und des menschlichen 
Daseins gezeitigt haben. EPIA 2491 
With regard to the idea of man, the ideal of life and the 
representation of the being of human life, philosophy today 
stands at the fringes of fundamental experiences fostered by 
Greek ethics and above all the Christian idea of man and of 
human Dasein. 
Expanding on this, Heidegger goes on to say that the philosophical 
anthropologies of Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel all drew on a 
theology rooted in the reformation, which itself did scant justice to 
the "immanent possibilities" of Lutheran teaching. In turn, Luther 
was inspired by his reading of Paul and Augustine and his critique of 
late-scholastic theology (Duns Scotus, Occham, Gabriel Biel, Gregor 
von Rimini). Looking still further, late-scholastic theology deploys 
a conceptual vocabulary almost entirely inherited from Aquinas and 
Bonaventure and thus ultimately from Aristotle. In spelling out this 
history, Heidegger does not claim to be doing anything new. On the 
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contrary, he acknowledges that it is widely recognized. Yet in spite 
of the familiarity of this history, he adds, it has never been worked 
through with the care it deserves and, as a consequence, the 
problematic of facticity has been allowed to dwindle into that of a 
commonplace or worse. 2 In order to remedy this situation, Heidegger 
proposes that the hermeneutic of factical life be carried out in 
conjunction with the strategy of reading the history of philosophy he 
calls "de-construction" [Abbaul or "destruction" [Destruktion]. This 
strategy is presented most completely in Being and Time ESZ §61 and 
The Basic Problems of Phenomenology EGA24 951. Indeed, so firmly is 
it associated with these texts that readers sometimes neglect the 
fact that Heidegger outlined the strategy much earlier. Thus, in the 
1922 'Introduction' he proposes that the hermeneutic of factical life 
aim to break down or open up laufzulockern] 
die überkommene und herrschende Ausgelegtheit nach ihren 
verdeckten Motiven, unausdrücklichen Tendenzen und 
Aus 1 egungswegen... und im abbauenden Rückgang zu den 
ursprünglichen Motivquellen der Explikation vorzudringen. 
Die Hermeneutik bewerkstelligt ihre Aufgabe nur auf dem Wege 
der Destruktion. [PIA 249 My emphasisl 
the traditional and dominant interpretative form, releasing 
its hidden reasons, implicit tendencies and directions of 
interpretation ... and push forward de-constructively back to 
the original sources of the explication. The hermeneutic 
achieves its task only by way of destruction. 3 
As we have already discovered, Heidegger believed these sources to 
lie primarily in Aristotle, whose significance for the hermeneutic of 
factical life he regarded as overriding. 4 Yet, for Heidegger, the 
textual sources to which he intends to return are by no means openly 
accessible. Rather, they have been covered over by the very tradition 
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to which they gave rise and the task is one of recovery, an 
archeology of decisive moments in philosophical history that have 
remained unthought. 
The significance Heidegger attaches to Aristotle could therefore be 
said, somewhat schematically, to have a twofold basis. In the first 
place, Aristotle stands at the beginning of a long tradition of 
philosophical anthropology that has continued to move almost entirely 
within parameters set by his analyses and an adequate understanding 
of that tradition requires as firm a grasp of its sources as one can 
achieve. To this extent, it is simply a matter of returning to first 
principles. However, Heidegger is also prepared to challenge the 
customary understanding of those principles. At times this may even 
bring him into conflict with Aristotle's own text as he discovers 
resources within it left untapped or worse by other parts of the 
text. As regards our present problem, we shall see that Aristotle's 
influence on philosophical anthropology is not to be sought in his 
works on ethics, politics and the soul alone. 
In the 1922 ' Introduction' Heidegger includes an early statement of 
Heidegger's claim that the Greek understanding of being was 
established on the basis of the experience of production; "Sein 
besagt Hergestelltsein: being means being-produced" EPIA 2531. But on 
this occasion Heidegger also makes an additional and very important 
step. For if the fundamental structures of 'human life' are rooted in 
the experience of production, they arise 
auf dem Weg einer Forschung, die das durch eine 
Grunderfahrung in die bestimmte Vorhabe gebrachte Seinsfeld 
in bestimmte Hinsichten nimmt und es in diesen artikuliert. 
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Die Forchungen also, deren Gegenstand erfahren und vermeint 
ist im Charakter des Bewegtseins, in dessen Was im Vorhinein 
mitgegeben ist so etwas wie Bewegung, mUssen den m6glichen 
ZuSang zur eigentlichen Motivquelle der aristotelischen 
Ontologie vermitteln. Solche Forschung Liegt vor in der 
)Whysikff des Aristoteles. EPIA 253-2541 
in the course of an enquiry that takes and articulates in 
specific respects the field of being [Seinsfeld] brought to 
a particular fore-having [Vorhabel by way of a fundamental 
experience. The enquiries, whose object are intended and 
experienced as a being-moved [Bewegtseins] in which from the 
outset something like movement is also given, are therefore 
to provide the possibility of access to the motivational 
sources of Aristotelian ontology. Such an enquiry is to be 
found in Aristotle's Physics. 
Heidegger exposes the form and influence of the experience of 
production to criticism by referring the ontological structures of 
factical life directly back to the phenomenon of movement, or rather 
to the central phenomenon addressed by the Physics; "das Seiende im 
Wie seines Bewegtseins. the being in the manner of its being-moved" 
EPIA 2511. The significance of the phenomenon of movement for the 
history of philosophical anthropology, and thereby for the 
hermeneutics of facticity engaged by it, is in Heidegger's view 
enhanced by the fact that the phenomenon has never been thought 
through radically. We shall begin to assess the influence of the 
Physics and Metaphysics in Sections III and IV, but first let us turn 
to Heidegger's reading of Nicomachean Ethics VI and to questions 
arising from the place of Tp6vgcriq and croqI(x within that reading. 
Ito 
Factical life consists in the Angesprochenseins and Ausgelegfseins 
characteristic of the things with which Dasein is concerned, that is, 
in the way things are addressed and interpreted by Dasein. The 
ontological account of facticity therefore amounts in the first place 
to an explicit articulation of the modes of disclosure specific to 
Dasein. If we recall Heidegger's understanding of truth in its 
original sense as unconcealment, the problem of facticity thereby 
emerges as intimately bound up with the question of truth, and this 
brings us to Heidegger's reading of Nicomachean Ethics VI . In that 
book, Aristotle describes five intellectual dispositions [S'ýF-iql by 
which the mind attains truth (1139bl5-181. These are said to be 
distinct Verwahrungen, where the primary meaning of 'secural or 
taking into care' is supplemented by the connotation of truth 
conveyed by the stem 'wahr' to suggest ways of '. securing truth. ' 
Accordingly, the various intellectual dispositions are understood as 
distinct ways in which things are given to Dasein via Dasein's own 
disclosive comportment towards them. Heidegger translates the five 
dispositions as follows: 
, cexvrl - verrichtend-herstellendes Verfahren 
ýu1, cr, rýIin - hinsehend-besprechend-ausweisendes Bestimnen 
<pp6v9cr-L c. - fürsorgliches Sichumsehen (Umsicht) 
uo<p i 0( - eigentlich-sehendes Verstehen 
voucý - reines Vernehmen [PIA 2551.5 
Of particular interest here are the last three of these. 
Heidegger's 
reading of Nicomachean Ethics VI departs from 
the predominant 
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reading, initiated by Aquinas, according to which there are five 
intellectual virtues, identified with the five dispositions by which 
truth may be attained. Instead, Heidegger adheres to the less common 
view that there are only two virtues, Tp6vgcyi q and croT 1 (y, 
corresponding to the division of the rational part of the soul into 
the calculative or practical faculty (concerned with things that 
admit of variation) and the scientific faculty (concerned with things 
that are invariable) 11139a5-15,1143bl5-171.6 
cDp6vr)<T-tq is the disposition that ensures sound reasoning "in relation 
to things that are good and bad for human beings" 11140b7l. Moreover, 
it is concerned not with a single region of one's activity, but with 
the well-being of Dasein as a whole Ic6 cl') Cqv O'Xwql, that is, with 
S 1ý7E PO(t 1 (X 11140a281. In Heidegger's idiom, it denotes Dasein's 
relation to the totality of its existence. Though a form of self- 
relation, (pp6vqcriq is not reflexive in the manner that we have come 
to regard as usual and which is essentially a modification of one's 
relation to objects, that is, of the relation that obtains in the 
case of -rtxvn. The dxpXý of TtXvq is the image that is held in advance 
by the agent and which must then govern the formation of the raw 
material into the TýAoq, the actual result. One could therefore 
describe -ctXvr) as a form of knowledge that relates the individual 
agent to the work he or she sets out to produce. 
This model is 
adapted to the case of self-relation simply by treating oneself as at 
once the raw material and the finished article. Because Tý: Xvq 
treats 
its object primarily in 'so"t'on from its context, such an approach 
leads to a piecemeal and essentially exclusive relation (hence models 
112 
of consciousness that begin with a conception of self-consciousness 
based on this form of relation are inevitably dogged by the problem 
of solipsism). By contrast, (Ppovqaiq does not depend on the capacity 
to impose one's designs and, which amounts to the same thing, it does 
not begin with the agent as such. This is because both its 03(pXý and 
its -ciLXoq lie within the situation of activity itself 11140bI71 and 
(ppowlair, has in each case to be accomplished in and through the act 
of choice Enpo(x1pecriq] and its articulation in activity, in np&tlq_7 
Consequently, (pp6vrlcrLq does not have the distance from its object 
characteristic of the representational relation proper to -riýXwrj and 
above all does not precede activitY -a point worth bearing in mind 
when reading Heidegger's translation of Aristotle's definition of 
ýppovrjcrt(; 11140b201 
Die epovrlcrig ist eine -tic E: (X), ., 
des r10c1GE: Lv, »ein solches 
Gestelltsein des menschlichen Daseins, daß ich darin verfüge 
über die Durchsichtigkeit meiner selbst«. IGA19 521 
(Pp6vrlcyic, is a 'tig of "a having-been-set-in-place 
[Gestelltseinl of hurnan Dasein in which 1 hold sway over my 
self-transparency. "8 
Dasein's self -transparency arises only insofar as (ppow1cric, "eine 
Handlung in sich durchsichtig macht: makes an activity transparent in 
itself" EGA19 531 and the transparency of an activity itself depends 
upon the capacity of ýpp6vqcyir.., to make the situation of activity 
accessible by securing the ou' 'evevy or final end, which is of course 
the 'elP or the (x'-y(x96v npcxxr6v itself. 9 Securing the &pXý of activity 
in this way, Dasein sees how to accomplish the disclosure 10'AgOcibeiv] 
proper to Tp6vncriq, by which it is at the same time delivered over to 
itself in a moment of individuation EGA19 1501.10 (Dp6vrjci (;, 
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therefore, designates a relation to the totality of one's own 
existence that is not mediated so much as precipitated by the 
situation in which one finds oneself. 
Aristotle's most complete account of (70(pi(x is to be found not in the 
Nicomachean Ethics but in the Metaphysics, where it is introduced by 
way of comparison with experience and knowledge 1980b25ff]. Those 
whose acquaintance with a certain field of activity is restricted to 
theoretical knowledge alone will generally be at a disadvantage with 
respect to those whose ability derives instead from experience. This 
is because theoretical knowledge deals with universals, whereas the 
experienced eye picks out the individual cases, and "the physician 
does not cure man, except in an incidental way, but Callias or 
Socrates or some other such individual name, who happens to be a man" 
1981a17-20, cf . also NENI: 1141b18-221. ZO(P 1 (Y comprises both 
knowledge and experience. Accordingly, master craftsmen were commonly 
thought to be wise precisely because they could tell not only what 
was to be done but also why. 11 In effect, Aristotle extends the scope 
of this common conception from specific pursuits to the widest 
possible horizons, and this comprehensiveness serves as a point of 
departure from which Aristotle sets out four features that mark cro(pi(x 
off from the other forms of knowledge [982a8f 1; i) the ao<p6c knows 
all things, though without having a detailed acquaintance with each 
of them: ii) the cro(p6q can learn things that are difficult and does 
,, 
has a more fundamental not rely on the senses alone: iii) the cro(p6c 
grasp of things and is better able to teach their causes: iv) cro(pi(x 
is desirable on its own account and not on account of its results. 
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The f irst of these does not mean that the ao(p6r, apprehends things 
case by case in a feat of obstinate encyclopaedic passion (the 
Autodidact in Sartre's Nausea is not a paragon of Aristotelian 
sagacity). Apart from the somewhat dull and impracticable nature of 
such an undertaking, it presupposes that the particular can be 
grasped fully in and of itself. However, the primary mode of access 
to things is (xYcT0F-cTiq, which, as Heidegger emphasizes, "tr6gt nichts 
oder wenig vom Seienden bei sich: conveys nothing or little of beings 
themselves" EGA19 84,1029b8 1. For ataOcuiq discloses only the 
particular ['Cx(xcrTov], whereas: 
Der Weg auf dem das Seiende in der Eigentlichkeit seines 
Seins aufgedeckt wird, geht also vom xotO' icxo(crcov, durch 
dieses hindurchschreitend, gSTO(PUiVoV' zUMI xa06Xou. 
EGA19 861 
The path along which the being in the authenticity of its 
being is uncovered goes thus from the x(YO' e'x(x(TTov, across 
this traversal, geTc(Po(Ivov, to the xo(06Xou. 
The term 'x(x06Xou' is usually rendered by 'universal. ' However, 
Heidegger deliberately avoids this expression, presenting instead a 
reading of x(xO6Xou as at once the totality disclosed via the Xo-yo(; 
[O'Xov Xc-y6Acvov] and the integral character conferred upon a thing by 
its involvement in that totality EGA19 88-891. With this, we are 
brought back to a recurrent theme of this study. In Ch. 1.11, 
$universality' was discussed in connection with the notion of primacy 
in first philosophy and linked with <YoTi(x understood as Seiendheit. 
This approach was reflected in the interpretation of the ýp-yov of 
human being as activity in general or as such, and further underlined 
in Ch. 2.1 by the reading of np&ýiq as a formal designation. At 
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bottom, this abiding concern with totality arises from Heidegger's 
central interest in world, and more especially in the transcendental 
problem of world. In the present context, if Dasein is to gain an 
understanding of all things, it must overcome an inherent tendency to 
remain entranced by the spectacle of whatever is before its eyes and 
turn its attention to the totality of beings as such. That this 
requires a positive and even strenuous effort accounts for the 
difficulty attached to cro(pi(x (second point). However, if the impulse 
to go beyond the particular begins with what, in Heidegger's 
translation of the Greek np6xctpot, openly "vor der Hand liegt: lies 
to hand" 1982b13, GA19 1261, it soon leads Dasein away from its 
everyday concern to "greater things. "12 Returning to the particular 
from the horizon of the totality of beings, the ao96q is able to see 
things not as they proximally appear, but according to their first 
principles and is thus better able to pass on knowledge of what they 
are (third point). 
Explication of the fourth point requires a closer look at the nature 
of the ' 06v and the way in which it becomes accessible to Orv(X 
knowledge. In this regard, Heidegger applauds Aristotle for having 
shown 
dap des &-VotMv nichts anderes ist als eine Seinsbestimmung 
, 
bestimrnt ist. Sofern ein des Seienden, das durch das TiLXor 
Seiendes in seinem TtXoq fertig geworden ist, ist es so, wie 
es sich geh&rt, cl. ). IGA19 1231 
that the o'q(x96v is nothing but a determination of the being 
of a being via the rý: Xoq. Insofar as a being reaches 
completion in its x9Xoq, it belongs to itself and is ex). 
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By endorsing a reading of the cu' as rooted firmly in teleology and 
the relation of beings to change, Heidegger underlines that the 
I (x-y(xO6v as absolute is not extrinsic to the totality of beings it 
grounds and as such is contrasted with the Platonic idea of the good 
as a distinct and separable form in itself. 13 However, if the &-yo(06v 
is distinguished from the Platonic idea of the good, this is not to 
say that it is assimilated to the o'(-y(x86v -npaxc'6v associated with 
C 1096b3Of I For the dryo(196v is cons tant and unchanging and 
therefore cannot be acted upon, whereas the object of np&ýi(; is 
contingent and thus susceptible to the influence of Dasein (the 
criterion for distinguishing np&tiq and (pp6vqaiq from Occapicx and 
cro(pi(y is primarily time IGA19 1641). 14 Hence the 06v is not 
susceptible to ýppovqaiq as such, but is rather the object of Ocwploc 
and apprehended in cro(pfu. Indeed, if, as Aristotle proposes, the 
I wyo(06v is understood to be an 6'rpXý, it is disclosed in Oewpf(x simply 
as OWý and not as the ('YpXý of a specific act or form of knowledge, 
as in the case of activity. This contributes to the detachment of the 
I "<x06v from the world of human affairs and thereby determines that 
knowledge of it in the form of ao(pi(x cannot be put to practical use 
and must be sought for its own sake alone (the fourth point). 
* 
The determination of human being in terms of (pp6vrl(3ri,; and uo(piof 
inevitably leads to the question of their priority: which of them is 
the highest or most fundamental determination? If the problem were as 
straightforward as this, it would probably have exercised 
commentators less. But, as we shall see, the difficulty 
is 
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exacerbated in the first place by the fact that what is 'highest' and 
what is 'most fundamental' are not equivalent to one another. 
There is little doubt that Aristotle regarded cyo(pi(y as superior to 
(ppovrlcri q ENE. VI: I 143b331 , and indeed tha t prec i se Iy by vi r tue of its 
superiority it transcends what is 'most human' and shares in a 
measure of divinity. By contrast, q)p6vrlcrir , may be a less exalted 
virtue, but it is more fundamentally human 11178al0f]. Aristotle's 
rejection of the Euripidean view that mortals should have mortal 
thoughts and his enjoinder to live in accordance with what is highest 
in human being is perhaps contentious in itself. Yet we should beware 
of engaging the question at face value, for it is of course more 
complex than a straightforward choice between exclusive alternatives 
and there is no guarantee that the traditional categories of 'human' 
and 'divine' will be adequate parameters for the elaboration of what 
Heidegger calls a hermeneutics of facticity. 15 In spite of the 
tendency of commentators and readers of Aristotle to line up behind 
one position or the other by either recognizing the priority of uoqia 
or by promoting (pp6vqcTiq over it, that is, by identifying human being 
with either the highest or the most fundamental Of its P05Sibilities, 
this complexity may very well be unavoidable. Moreover, if this is at 
least to some extent the case when reading Aristotle's text on its 
own terms, so to speak, it is very much more the case when 
approaching that text via Heidegger. As we shall see shortly, 
acknowledging the irreducibility of such a complexity at once 
challenges those who would find in Heidegger a retrieval of practical 
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reason and rescues them from the unwelcome spectacle of Heidegger 
endorsing the priority of contemplation. 
Although Heidegger entertains the view that ýpp6vncriq may have 
priority on account of the fact that it is concerned with the Tg'Xoq 
of the existence of Dasein itself and as a whole IGA19 §191, he also 
recognizes that Tp6vrlair, is compromised by this same point. As he 
underlines: 
FUr Aristoteles und die Griechen wie auch fUr die rradition 
ist das eigentlich Seiende das, was immer ist, was st. 4ndig 
schon da ist. EGA19 1371 
For Aristotle and the Greeks, as indeed for the tradition, 
the authentic being is that which always is and which is 
constantly already there. 
By contrast, the cý: Xoq of human existence is, like that existence 
itself, finite and temporal. Ultimately, the matter is settled by 
this simple fact and cro(pi(x is accorded priority on account of the 
ontological priority of the being with which it is concerned. 16 
It has been persuasively argued that in recognizing ao(pi(x as the 
supreme virtue over and above (ppovrjcTLq, Heidegger complies with a 
tendency to 'Platonise' or even 'hyper-Platonise' Aristotle and 
thereby fails to exploit the more radical possibilities present 
within Aristotle's own text. Taminiaux, for example, contends that 
Heidegger's insistence on the primacy of aoqpia undermines the 
pluralism of the political dimension implicit in the Aristotelian 
conceptions of np&tiq and q)p6vqcyiq [LOF 1861. Over and above the 
contextual, ambiguous and essentially public character of such 
activity, Taminiaux sees Heidegger set the private, monological world 
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of the science of being, in which disclosure and individuation are 
secured by a retreat from the n6Xiq or rather take on the taciturn 
anonymity characteristic of the artisan, as the Athenian n6Xiq is 
transformed into Plato's workshop-republic. In Taminiaux's view, 
Heidegger's appropriation of TrpRiq reflects a rejection of the 
Aristotelian resistance to Plato. 
Dans I 'ontologie fondamentale, tout se passe comme si le 
Pioq OewpqTix6q d6vorait et r6gissait ]a np&ýiq tout 
enti6re. CLOF 1751 
In fundamental ontology, it is as if the Ploq @cwprjctx6q 
consumed and governed np&tiq entirely. 
Taminiaux has a good case. Heidegger is frequently unequivocal in 
championing the practice of fundamental ontology over np&ttq in the 
specifically Aristotelian sense and, by the same token, it is plainly 
not his intention simply to pit Aristotle against Plato. Yet even so, 
the extent to which Heidegger appropriates motifs from the 
Nicomachean Ethics does raise expectations of a recognizably 
Aristotelian, that is anti-Platonic, accent. Such an expectation is 
certainly shared by Bernasconi, who reflects on the apparent tension 
between Heidegger's referral of noiqcytq and TiLxvq to itp&tiq and 
(pp6vrlcriq on the one hand and his endorsement of the priority 
Aristotle accords to OswpeTv and ao(pi(y on the other 1HDP 1391. 
For his part, Bernasconi seeks to mitigate the problem by 
highlighting the difficulty of establishing the effective authorship 
of any part of Heidegger's text. Insofar as Heidegger allows a 
hidden 
resource within Aristotle's text to speak against 
the declared 
direction of the text itself, it is impossible, argues 
Bernasconi, to 
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attribute the trajectory of a reading unequivocally to either thinker 
and this indeterminacy accounts for the apparently contradictory 
strains within Heidegger's text. For whilst Heidegger's direct 
commentaries apparently endorse the priority of cro4pi(x, the deeper 
structure of his text presents a retrieval of (pp6vgcyiq achieved via 
the destruction of the history of ontology. Having recognized this 
indeterminacy, however, Bernasconi apparently wishes to promote the 
retrieval of (pp6vrj(Y-tq., whilst playing down the references to the 
priority of ao(pla. Yet this would be precisely to disown Heidegger's 
direct commentaries in the name of the co-authored outcome of the 
destruction of the history of ontology. Such an approach may fail to 
confront the full ambiguity of the text. For although I agree with 
Bernasconi that "it is essential to the destructive enterprise that 
the question of who owns the words remains open" 1HDP 1391, the 
matter is hardly resolved thereby (after all, Taminiaux's quarrel is 
surely with the text and not its author). In short, the indeterminacy 
of authorship should not dull our sensitivity to an indeterminacy in 
the text itself. Whoever the signatory may be, the manifest 
recognition of the priority of cyo(pi(y cannot simply be passed over in 
favour of the covert retrieval of (pp6vr)criq,, however important an 
element it may be in Heidegger's writing. Nowhere 
is this bind more 
pressing than where Bernasconi throws a 
Euripidean gloss on 
Heidegger's remarks concerning the proper scope of a mortal's 
thought, claiming the view that mortals abandon 
their aspirations to 




Sofern der Mensch jedoch sterblich ist, sofern er der Erholung und Abspannung in wietestem Sinne bedarf, ist ihm der ständige Aufenthalt beim Immerseienden, das letzlich 
angemessene Verhalten zum Immerseienden, versagt. [GA19 1711 
Insofar as man is nonetheless mortal, insofar as he needs 
rest and recuperation in the broadest sense, he is 
prohibited from dwelling alongside perpetual beings in the 
comportment towards them that is ultimately most 
appropriate. 
Yet this 'insofar' seems a slight basis on which to overturn 
Heidegger's repeated endorsement (with Aristotle) of the priority of 
aogi(x. If anything, it should alert Us to the danger of supposing any 
simple order of priority to be genuine; surely 'insofar' conveys 
measure and proportion rather than all or nothing. Heidegger's 
endorsement of croq)i(x as the highest virtue should not be received as 
a trojan horse concealing the 'real' itinerary of the reading 
(whoever it belongs to). Rather, the priority traditionally accorded 
to cro(p! (x must itself be transformed by the destruction of the history 
of ontology by which the retrieval of q)p6vijcFiq is effected. Thus, 
whilst it is important to distinguish between Heidegger's direct 
commentaries and the less overt readings that are the outcome of his 
critical appropriation via the destruction of the history of 
ontology, one should not renounce the former in order to support the 
latter. Indeed, to do so would be grossly reductive- 
A point of fundamental importance hangs in the balance. To what 
extent is the characterization of Dasein in terms Of np&ýIq tempered 
by the recognition of OCLOPETV as the highest possibility of 
existence? Is Taminiaux's account of Heidegger's complicity in the 
eclipse of np&tt(; and qp6vncriq the end of the story? 
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We have cast the problem as a tussle for supremacy between (pp6vq<Y'q 
and cro(pi(x, but this is only true up to a point. Moreover, once the 
limitation of this view is recognized, the charge that Heidegger 
suppressed the distinctively Aristotelian formulation of political 
activity falters. In the first place, we should acknowledge a 
fundamental respect in which Heidegger clearly does side with 
Aristotle against Plato. For Plato, (pp6vqcyiq signified knowledge 
about what is good for human beings. But this 'practical ' knowledge 
was grounded in knowledge of the absolute good, whereupon (pp6vrjcrtq 
also served as a name for philosophy as such. cDp6vqair ., and croq>lot were 
equivalent, sharing not only a common basis but, particularly 
significant here, a common structure, namely, that of science. By 
distinguishing (Pp6vqcytq from ao(pi(x, Aristotle withdrew political 
activity from the domain of science and established it as an 
autonomous region of experience with a structure and form of 
reasoning of its own. In Aristotle, then, (pp6vrlcriq is not directly 
subordinated to <3-oT! <x and, whilst Aristotle may be persuaded that 
contemplation of the heavens is ultimately more rewarding, the 
vicissitudes of life in the n6Xiq are left to themselves. Insofar as 
Heidegger adopts Aristotle's definitions of (pp6vqaic and aoqpio(, the 
same anti-Platonic current runs through his own reading5. Taminiaux's 
fears are therefore misplaced - for whilst they reflect an 
unmistakable trend in Heidegger's writing, this trend does not amount 
to the fundamental subordination of (pp6vqcriq to cyoq)! (x. On the 
contrary, placing (pp6vqcriq and cyo(pio( as the sole virtues at the head 
of their respective branches of the soul speaks against their being 
ordered in this way; the fact that aoq)! (x is 'higher' than q)p6vrl<: Tiq 
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does not imply the subsumption of political np&tiq under the auspices 
of theory. The problem is rather one of assessing the coordination of 
two relatively autonomous concepts, between which there is no direct 
order of dependence. 
No direct order of dependence, yet if Aristotle disengaged (pp6vrlai(; 
from ci-o(pi(x, the "'(06v np(YxT6v from the &V(x06v in its absolute sense, 
this disengagement was by no means total - and the question of the 
relative weight attached to (pp6vqaic and ao(pi(x not only in Aristotle 
but above al I in Heidegger turns on the extent and manner in which 
the two designations intersect one another. 
To begin with Aristotle, we have already seen that he argues against 
the existence of a single idea of the good over and above its 
particular significations: 
for even if the goodness predicated of various things in 
common really is a unity or something existing separately 
and absolute, it clearly will not be practicable or 
attainable by man; but the good we are now seeking is a good 
within human reach- (1096b321 
By denying the separate existence of an idea of the good, Aristotle 
opposes Plato. But how? It is easy to suppose that by diverting our 
gaze away from a putative absolute towards those goods relative to 
'concrete activity, ' Aristotle is insisting on the demarcation 
between the human and the divine. In this way, Aristotle is often 
said to have tailored ethics to a human proportion. Yet by insisting 
on a rigid demarcation between the human and divine fields of 
possibility, one invites the very elevation of the divine over the 
human that advocates of Aristotelian practical philosophy deplore. 
124 
Such a reading effectively launches its opposition to Plato on the 
basis of the very residual Platonism it seeks to expunge; the 
insulation of the human from the divine in the name of anti-Platonism 
unwittingly hands power back to the very philosopher-king it would 
depose. And as we have already seen, whilst Aristotle distinguishes 
here between the divine and the human, he is quite prepared to blur 
the distinction elsewhere by admitting the presence of divinity in 
man 11177b25,1178a2lfl and by exhorting human beings to pursue a 
divine science 1982b27ffl. Rather than trying to disentangle the 
human from the divine in an attempt to delimit the 'properly' human, 
identified as a kernel of Aristotelian radicalism within the 
trappings of a Platonic science, we should challenge such a reading 
by acknowledging the ambiguity in Aristotle's text and probing its 
source. 
Discreetly, such an ambiguity has already entered our reading. In the 
first place, we noted that the &V 06v in its absolute sense does not "(3( 
take the form of a Platonic idea and is rather inseparable from the 
order it grounds Ep. 1171. However, we have also said that it is 
precisely by virtue of its detachment from the world of human affairs 
(as indeed from the natural world) that ao(pi(x is accorded priority. 
How are we to reconcile the apparently conflicting demands of 
inseparability and detachment? In fact, the problem only arises 
insofar as we continue to deploy a r-egional conception of detachment. 
Rather than understanding croTI(x as the study of a specific region of 
being (unchanging O'CpXal), we have already presented it as concerned 
with the x(x06Xoi), with the totality. Accordingly, the detachment of 
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ao(pl(y derives not from the exclusiveness of the o'(-yo(06v, but rather 
from the fact that it concerns the O'CpXý of the totality as such and 
is not circumscribed within any specific region. It is independent 
because it concerns the whole and not because it is cut off from the 
whole. Consequently, the ('Y-V(x06v as absolute is not other-worldly, but 
should be thought in connection with the totality of beings as 
such. 17 Moreover this concern with the totality is itself linked to 
the distinctively Aristotelian withdrawal of ethical and political 
activity from the range of theory. Nicolaci sheds valuable light on 
the matter as he rebuts the customary reading, arguing that to regard 
Aristotle's departure from Plato as an attempt to 'humanise' ethics 
would be an unwarranted simplification. For when Aristotle denies 
that the good is an independent absolute, he is not rejecting a 
conception of the good beyond being as such, but qualifying the 
notion of its independence along the lines we traced out above: 
se il bene, secondo questo suo apice di assolutezza, fosse 
disponibile astrattamente come un universale e come qualcosa 
di separa to, non sarebbe - come 6- que I che 6 da sempre, 
originalmente, posto in causa dalla parte dell'uomo ... 
L'insegnamento dell 'Aristotele dell'Etica Nicomachea 6 che 
non possiamo contemplare astrattamente Pdx-VaMv secondo 
I 'intero, come universale, perch6 da sempre, fra 
Puniversale e if nostro desiderio di teoria si interpone, 
ha parte, I 'intero del I 'uomo. Questa interposizione ha la 
forma dell "Epyov cob dXvOp&nou: ]a praxis. ILHP 2601 
if the good in its highest sense as absolute were accessible 
in the abstract as a universal and independent, it would not 
be placed in question - as it is - by man from the very 
beginning... Aristotle's teaching in the Nicomachean Ethics 
is that abstract contemplation of the 6cycx66v as a whole and 
as universal is impossible, because from the first between 
the universal and our desire for theory there is interposed 
Cha partel the whole of man. This interposition takes the 
form of the cip-yov coZ &vOp6-xo-u: praxis. 
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Access to the (x-y(xO6v - even as absolute - cannot proceed from 
nowhere, or frOM 5ome Archimedean point beyond the exi5tence of that 
being for which it is a question. For the question is but a 
possibility of Dasein and as such takes its place within the horizon 
of Dasein's being-f or-the-sake-of -itself. Of course, this is not to 
say that the dryc(06v itself is reducible to an object of Dasein's 
concern. It simply means that the question cannot circumvent the 
ground of its possibility. Pursuit of the "'(x96v (i. e. for Heidegger, 
the horizon for the meaning of being) does not permit, still less 
entail, that the existence of Dasein be left behind. 
The ultimately unsurpassable character of Dasein's existence is 
encapsulated in Heidegger's recognition of the ontic foundation of 
ontology. The idea is not Heidegger's innovation as such and in 
modern times is found in the recourse to the subject. However, 
Heidegger points out that it pre-dates Descartes, and is articulated 
first in Aristotle's formulation of philosophy as at once ontology 
and theology. 18 Heidegger takes up the idea in terms of the relation 
between fundamental ontology and the existential analytic. 
Philosophie ist universale phänomenologische Ontologie, 
ausgehend von der Hermeneutik des Daseins, die als Analytik 
der Existenz das Ende des Leitfadens alles philosophischen 
Fragens dort festgemacht hat, woraus es entspringt und wohin 
es zurückschlagt. [SZ 38: 621 
Philosophy is universal phenomenology, and takes its point 
of departure from the hermeneutic of Dasein, which, as an 
analytic of existence, has made fast the guiding line for 
all philosophical inquiry at the point where it arises and 
to which it returns. 
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The purpose of the existential analytic is to secure the ontic 
foundation of the enquiry into the meaning of being by making Dasein 
ontologically transparent in its very facticity ISZ 404: 4561. But can 
the existential analytic reach a definitive formulation of the 
structure of Dasein's factical existence? How complete a presentation 
of Dasein's factical existence can it achieve? How confident can 
Heidegger be in anticipating that this foundation will have been 
"made fast"? There are at least two reasons for thinking that he may 
be a little over-optimistic. 
In the first place, as Heidegger himself acknowledges, the enquiry is 
inevitably informed by a "factical ideal" that eludes the grasp of 
the analysis ISZ 310: 3581. Such an imposition is even described as a 
"positive necessity. " Philosophy's task is therefore gradually to 
extend its borders, mapping its own hinterland, unfolding "with more 
and more penetration both the presuppositions and that for which they 
are presuppositions" ESZ 310: 3581. This is an ongoing task and the 
enquiry into being must return again and again to the existential 
analytic in order to re-elaborate its own basis. 
But if the task of the existential analytic is to secure the ontic 
foundation of the enquiry into being, in what is the guiding line to 
be made fast? The ontic foundation is ultimately not the existential 
structures elicited by the analytic but rather the factical existence 
of Dasein itself presented in these structures, and this existence, 
as we have argued throughout, and as Nicolaci reminds us 
in the 
passage above, is np&tir, In the end, therefore, the fate of 
the 
enquiry into being hinges on its capacity to mitigate the 
disjunction 
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that keeps the existential analytic from tracing the form and 
movement of factical existence itself. But how faithfully can this 
existence be rendered? The most profound obstacle to such a rendering 
is quite simply the thematic character of the analytic; as we have 
seen, the language for such an account is essentially lacking 
[Ch. I. V]. Accordingly, np&tIq' Dasein's ineluctable factical 
existence, is at once the condition of possibility of raising the 
question of being and at the same time the principle of closure 
preventing the prosecution of that question from securing either its 
own basis or, consequently, its conclusion. The resistance of np&ýtr, 
to thematic exposition occurs as a limit marking the finitude of 
philosophical enquiry. Heidegger, rather than approaching this as an 
external limit, thereby consolidating the identity of philosophy, 
opens the body of philosophical enquiry to allow the inscription of 
finitude within its very structure and practice. 19 
What this means will become clearer when we have trod the path taken 
by Heidegger in his radicalization of np&tiq. However, some light 
will be shed on the issue if we return to the question of the 
relative priority of (pp6vrlcriq and croq)icx. As we have seen, concern 
over Heidegger's endorsement of aoq)i(y as the highest possibility of 
Dasein's existence arises from a belief that the retrieval of np&ttq 
in his account of factical existence of Dasein may be overridden by 
the demands of fundamental ontology. Clearly, this presupposes that 
the relation obtaining between Tp6vqcriq and aoq)ia is parallel to that 
between the factical existence of Dasein and fundamental ontology. To 
prepare this analogy, however, one must first of all tackle the onto- 
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theological equivocality in Aristotle's use of the term cro<pio(, that 
is, allow the meaning of aoT! (x to be qualified by the introduction of 
the ontological difference. Indeed, this equivocality is present even 
in Heidegger's own commentaries -a fact that argues for the need to 
discriminate between such direct readings and the critical 
appropriation of the terms they involve. For in his reading of 
Nicomachean Ethics VI, Heidegger joins Aristotle in describing ao<pi(x 
as concerned with the ' Immer-seienden' and as an apprehension of the 
highest beings EGA19 1371, even though such a reading is utterly 
inconsistent with his conception of ontology and would amount to an 
ontical intepretation of being. By contrast, the introduction of the 
ontological difference suggests that ao(pi(x be understood to concern 
being and thereby to name the disposition of philosophy as 
fundamental ontology. 20 
The issue of the relative priority given to (pp6vqcriq and aoýpi(x is by 
no means clear cut from this perspective. First, the possibility of 
aoq>! (x understood in connection with fundamental ontology hangs on the 
fact that Dasein is a being for which its own being is an issue and 
that this concern with its own being takes the form of a self- 
understanding akin to 4pp6vrlcytr,. If this were not the case, there 
could be no access to the question of being. For the task of 
fundamental ontology is to raise to a thematic level the "vague 
average understanding of being" ESZ 6: 251 implicit within the 
relation Dasein bears to itself in its everyday concern. In this 
respect, the understanding modelled on (pp6vncTiq is primary. However, 
this is not to say that everything is rooted in Dasein's relation 
to 
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itself, that is, in Tp6vrlcyic, and in np&tiq. For Dasein's relation to 
itself does not entail its withdrawal from the world, but rather 
proceeds from the world in which it finds itself. In turn, of course, 
there can be no world without the disclosure of being. Accordingly, 
we can reverse the order outlined above and say it is on Dasein's 
understanding of being that its relation to itself depends. Moreover, 
as the ultimate ground, it is being that is the proper object of 
fundamental ontology. In short, the possibility of a thematic 
interpretation of being (croýpfoo arises within the framework of 
Dasein's relation to itself (4pp6vqcriq), which is in this respect 
fundamental. Yet as a comportment towards what radically exceeds the 
horizons of Dasein's being-for-the-sake-of-itself, and precisely 
insofar as the ground of those horizons is at issue, aoqi<x can remain 
without contradiction the highest possibility of Dasein's existence. 
The relation between Tp6vrlcrir, and cyoýpi(x again appears as one of 
coordination, not subordination. 
This would all be quite satisfactory were it not that to call ao(pf(y 
the disposition of fundamental ontology distorts its sense, whereupon 
the analogy at the basis of the reservations over Heidegger's 
treatment of np&ýiLq and (pp6vrlcyiq is itself seen to be inaccurate. 
However, we shall see that the changes required to rectify this 
distortion actually favour the idea of a co-ordinate relation between 
(ppovr)criq and croq)! (x and therefore lend further support 
to the view 
that np&tir, continues to play a significant role as a 
determination 
of Dasein's factical existence. 
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There are in fact two aspects of Heidegger's problematic that could 
be said to correspond to ao(pi(y more faithfully than fundamental 
ontology as such. First of all, Heidegger's definition of the xo(06Xou 
in the Sophist lectures explicitly ties it in with X6-yoq as a O'Xov 
XcV6ýLcvov. The xcx96Xob therefore designates a notion of totality 
inseparable from the structural character of disclosure and 
significance and may be compared in this respect with Heidegger's 
sense of world. This reading has the virtue of maintaining a 
commitment to cro(pia's concern with the horizons of the intelligible 
world. On the negative side, however, it compromises the sense in 
which the uo(piu designates a concern with what radically exceeds the 
world of Dasein's everyday existence. Accordingly, ao<pi(x and Tp6vqaiq 
are brought closer together, supporting the view that np&ýiq is not 
overridden by cyo(pl<x and the Pioq OccapeTtx6c. - but only at the price 
of weakening the conception of (yo(pi(x itself. Indeed, (pp6vrlcric, and 
uoTlu become two alternative and complementary perspectives on the 
same notion of totality - as constituted by Dasein's being-for-the- 
sake-of-itself on the one hand and simply as such on the other. 
Such a view i5 profoundly and deliberately problematised by the 
increasing prominence that Heidegger accorded to the question of 
nature. Not evident in the earlier Sophist lectures, by 1927 
it had 
already advanced enough to shadow the account of Dasein'5 
being-in- 
the-world and projective understanding in Being and 
Time. At this 
point, however, the question of nature seemed to remain eclipsed 
by 
the phenomenologically more correct problem of the worldhood of 
the 
world. Nature, then, seemed to have been reduced 
to the status of 
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environment or that which Dasein encounters Ep. 571. But nature has a 
darker side. It is also that which has no involvement in the 
referential totality, that which falls within the clearing, yet 
remains opaque. Only once in Being and Time does Heidegger hint at 
this aspect of nature, and then somewhat obliquely. 
Matur ist ontologisch-kategorial verstanden - ein 
Grenzfall des Seins von m6glichen innerweltlichen Seienden. 
Das Seiende als Natur in diesem Sinne kann das Dasein nur in 
einem bestimmten Modus seines In-der-Welt-seins entdecken. 
Di eses Erkennen hat den Charakter einer bestimmten 
Entweltlichung der Welt. ESZ 65: 93-941 
If one understands Nature ontologico-categorially, one finds 
that Nature is a limiting case of the Being of possible 
entities within-the-world. Only in some definite mode of its 
own Being-in-the-world can Dasein discover entities as 
Nature. This manner of knowing them has the character of 
depriving the world of its worldhood in a definite way. 
Nature begins where the world ends. In 'On The Essence of Grounds, ' 
Heidegger explains that the problem of nature had no place in the 
account of world given in Being and Time because it is not something 
towards which we comport ourselves [wozu wir- uns ver-halten]. 
Nonetheless: 
Matur isl Ur-5PrOnolich im Dasein offenbar dadurch, dap 
dieses als befindlich-gestimmtes inmitten von Seiendem 
existiert. CVWG-WM 155n-156n: 83n] 
Nature is primordially manifest in Dasein because Dasein 
exists as situated and disposed in the midst of being. 
Nature, then, is manifest in Da5ein without having been explicitly 
disclosed by Dasein. But how can this be, if nature is not worldly? 
How can what is not of the world manifest itself 
in Dasein? Without 
showing itself as such, like death, nature is manifest precisely 
in 
Dasein'5 finitude. Heidegger addressed the connected 
themes of 
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nature, philosophy and the finitude of Dasein with increasing urgency 
in the years following the publication Being and Time. 21 Perhaps the 
clearest exposition of the issue, particularly in the light of the 
problems we have been discussing, is in the Appendix to 910 of The 
Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, where Heidegger introduces the 
idea of metontology. The appendix begins by proposing that the 
temporal exposition of the problem of being (plausibly the 
culmination of fundamental ontology) must itself give way to a final 
stage in which the problematic is brought to an understanding of its 
own task and limits -a radicalization that Heidegger describes as an 
overturning [Umschlagl. He goes on to set out the relation between 
being and Dasein, whereby being depends on the understanding of 
being, which in turn depends on the factical existence of Dasein- 
Thus far, we could paraphrase in Aristotelian terms; the possibility 
of c)-o(pi(x depends on the totality of human exi5tence as np&ý-Lc,. But 
then Heidegger adds that the factical existence of Dasein in turn 
presupposes the factual extantness of nature. 
Gerade im Horizont des radikal gestellten Seinsproblems 
zeigt sich, daß all das nur sichtbar ist und als Sein 
Verstanden werden kann, wenn eine mögliche Totalität von 
Seiendem schon da ist- IGA26 199: 156-157) 
Right within the horizon of the problem of being, when P05ed 
radically, it appears that all this is Visible and can 
become understood as being, only if a possible totality of 
beings is already there. 
This final condition displaces Dasein from its central and 
fundamental place in the articulation of being; if Dasein can only 
be 
understood in connection with being and vice versa, the 
factual 
extantness of nature undercuts them both. In response 
to the 
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challenge of thinking this condition of finitude, Heidegger calls for 
a special problematic whose theme is "beings as a whole (das Seiende 
im Ganzen]" IGA26 199: 1571, and which i S, he stipulates, 
distinguished from any empirical science that simply accumulates 
information. The emphasis on what is fundamental for philosophy, on 
what is other than Dasein and on the notion of totality is 
unmistakably familiar from Heidegger's own account of ao(pi(x. if cTo(pjo( 
has any single destination in Heidegger's work, it is not fundamental 
ontology, but metontology. 22 
What are the implications of this for the role of np&kic with regard 
to Heidegger's conception of philosophy? Does metontology so displace 
or surpass Dasein's factical existence as to render its designation 
by np6tic, irrelevant? Having directed the problematic towards beings 
as a whole, Heidegger adds; 
Und hier im Bezirk des me ton tologisch-exis tenziel len Fragens 
ist auch der Bezirk der Metaphysik der Existenz (hier erst 
14fit sich die Frage der Ethik steHen). EGA26 199: t571 
And here also, in the domain of metontological-existentiell 
questioning, is the domain of the metaphysics of existence 
(here the question of ethics may properly be raised for the 
first time). 
It seems the account of Dasein's factical existence in terms of 
np&tiq has not fallen away after all. On the contrary, the 
implication, literally, of the factical existence of Dasein as a 
whole in the question of being is reaffirmed in the 
declared 
coincidence of the domain of metontology with that of existentiell 
understanding, the "understanding of oneself" that 
"never gets 
straightened out except through existing itself" 
[SZ 12: 331. In a 
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reversal (an Umschlag9) of the movement from the existential analytic 
to the question of being proper, a movement that previously circled 
only to renew itself, here we find the existence of Dasein presented 
as the very domain in which the fundamental question of metaphysics 
belongs, as though this question could only be 'straightened out' 
through that very existence. This concentration of the question of 
being in the realm of existentiell questioning was, I believe, an 
essential feature of Heidegger's thinking at this time, and one that 
followed directly from his reading of Aristotle. Although the 
question cannot be pursued any further here, we shall return to it in 
the Conclusion. 
* 
We began with Heidegger's hermeneutics of facticity and have ended 
with a lengthy consideration of aoýpl(x. Have we not gone somewhat 
astray, losing track of our central theme of np&ýic,? Posing the 
question in these terms already reveals a misconception we must take 
care to avoid, for it implicitly suggests that ao(pio( lies outside 
np&ýiq, disengaged from factical life and, above all, concerned with 
a different theme. But it is precisely this disengagement that the 
reading I have sought to develop here contests. In doing so, it 
confronts the predominant view that sets (pp6v9aiq and aoTi(y apart as 
entirely separable dispositions, even where they given a clear order 
of priority. By challenging the accepted independence of Vp6vgcriq and 
croq) 1 (x, we have therefore placed a question mark against the 
separability of their respective themes, namely the 
&vo(06v nP<x'x'x6v 
and the &Vcx66v in an absolute sense. Let the emphasis here rest on 
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'separability. ' I do not mean to suggest that these two 
significations of ('x-Y(xO6v are simply equivalent. However, it may be 
that they are necessarily crossed, at once inseparable from and 
irreducible to one another. In this respect, they may be likened to 
determinations respectively of Dasein and of being, whose inter- 
relation remained such a "distressing difficulty" for Heidegger 1HW 
74: 871. 
In the following sections we shall see how the term crogi(y serves as a 
vehicle for Heidegger to carry through the destruction of the history 
of ontology in such a way as to undercut scholastic philosophical 
anthroplogy and its modern descendents, returning Dasein to the 
context and structure of np&ýiq. 
III 
In the previous section, we saw how the priority of cro(pi(y was 
established primarily on the basis of its proper theme. However, 
Heidegger elaborates a further and particularly intriguing aspect to 
this priority, concentrating on the picture uo(picx gives of the 
ontological constitution of Dasein. 
On account of the fact that vobq, in the specific sense, is 
responsible for apprehending first principles, Heidegger describes 
(pp6vrlcri c, and ao4p I (X as "eigentlichen volizugsweisen des vobq: 
authentic modes in which voZ(; is accomplished" EPIA 2551. In the case 
of aopi(x, we have already mentioned that the aoT6q must know not only 
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the conclusions that follow from first principles, but those 
principles themselves. For this reason, Aristotle declares that 
IIc cro(picx must be vob(; and 'nia-cýjiij" 11141al9l, where the role of voi3c, 
in this combination is to apprehend the ('YpXofi and ultimately, of 
course, the o'(-V(x06v as absolute. 
As for Tp6vr)crir,, it too must grasp the ultimate particulars in a 
situation without recourse to reasoning, and this is why Aristotle 
describes the (pp6vigor, as having "an eye for things" 11143bl4l. Al I 
things considered: 
vouq apprehends the ultimates in both aspects - since 
ultimates as well as primary definitions are grasped by vobq 
and not reached by reasoning: in demonstrations voubr, 
apprehends the immutable and primary definitions, in 
practical inferences it apprehends the ultimate and 
contingent fact .... hence we must have perception of 
particulars and this immediate perception is VobC 23 
11143a35-b5l 
Now, if the intellectual virtues are ways in which truth is secured, 
then by virtue of its priority voiSc, must itself have a more 
primordial relation to truth, and this is indeed what we find: 
Die ))Wahrheit(( der o(iaOrjatq und des Sehens der ))Ideen(( ist 
das ursprUngliche Entdecken. Und nur weil v6rIa-tc, prirn-4r, 
entdeckt, kann auch der X6-yoc, als SIO(VOCTV 
Entdeckungsfunktion haben. ISZ 226: 2691 
The truth of (xIcrOrjo-i(; and of the seeing of 'ideas' is the 
primordial kind of uncovering. And only because v6qaiq 
primarily uncovers, can the X6Voq as Sicevoe*fv also have 
uncovering as its function. 24 
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NoiSq provides a primary access to things, prior even to their 
interpretation 'as' such and such or their articulation via the 
remaining intellectual virtues. 
This is not to say that Heidegger subordinates interpretation to the 
perceptual act, as though perception could somehow be lifted free of 
interpretation. In keeping with the strategy of a destructive 
reading, Heidegger recognizes a certain priority on the part of vobq, 
yet discovers a hitherto occluded basis for that priority, such that 
the relation of perception to interpretation is modified. Nobq 
acquires this priority insofar as it provides for each and every 
concrete discourse 
sein mögliches Worüber, was letztlich selbst nicht erst im 
Besprechen als solchem zugänglich werden kann. [PIA 2581 
its possible whereon, that which ultimately cannot become 
initially accessible in that discourse. 
In this way, vou-c. is an essential and indispensable element of all 
modes of disclosure not because it presents the thing itself, upon 
which a specific interpretative project can then attach significance 
of one kind or another, but rather because it discloses the 
horizon 
belonging to any such interpretative project against which 
the thing 
in question can first appear: 
Der voiSc ist das Vernehmen schlechthin, das 
heißt das, was 
ein Worauf f Ur irgendwelchen gerichteten 
Umgang mit 
überhaupt ermöglicht, vorgibt. [PIA 2571 
vob(; is simply perception, i. e. what above all 
makes 
possible and gives in advance a whereupon 
[Wor-aufl for any 
oriented activity. 
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The form of activity is of course linked to the particular Worauf 
that voi5r, apprehends. If we are concerned with np&ý, q, then the 
element of voZq in (pp6vgarig "macht die Lage des Handelns zugänglich 
im Festhalten des oi) 'cvcx(x: makes the site Of activity accessible by 
holding fa5t the ou 's"vexu" EPIA 2591.25 Alternatively, when the 
element of voZr, in cro(pi(x apprehends the "'(x96v as an absolute, then 
it is the totality of beings as such that is disclosed and a 
theoretical consideration of first principles that is opened as a 
possibility. 
Given that Heidegger is concerned above all with the transcendental 
problem of world, it is clear that it is the constitutive role of 
voU(; in both (pp6vqcriq and cro(pi(x that attracts him. Indeed, Heidegger 
openly states that his approach to (ppovncriq. and cro(pi(x is not 
motivated solely by an interest in the virtues themselves: 
Des Verst4ndnis des voýr)q von der aoýplcx und (pp6vrjair, her ist 
meiner Ansicht nach der einzige Weg, in das schwierige 
Phiihomen des votq einen vorliiufigen Einblick zu gewinnen. 
IGA19 1441 
., via cyogi(x 
and (pp6vrjatq. is my The comprehension of vobc 
perspective on the sole way of winning a preliminary insight 
into the difficult phenomenon of vobq. 
Heidegger is interested in cyo4plu primarily as a 'state of the 
soul ' and in what it can tell us about the ontological structure of 
factical life (PIA 2601. In a sense, it may seem that cro(pio( has 
little to tell us in this respect since, as we have already 
discovered, it is characterized by a certain detachment 
from everyday 
concerns. Commenting on this in the 1922 'Introduction, 
' Heidegger 
describes oewpi(x as an activity that 
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in seinem Worauf gerade das Leben selbst, in dem er ist, 
nicht mehr sieht. [PIA 263] 
in its horizon no longer sees the very life in which it is. 
7-o(4)1(x is hyperopic. Gazing at the highest and Most distant, it loses 
sight of life. Yet it is nonetheless life for that. The highest 
things with which ao(pioe is concerned are by definition 'unworldly' - 
as indeed are the sages to which Aristotle refers 11141b2f]. Yet far 
from diminishing its significance for Heidegger, the opposite is 
true; he regards the fundamental Bewegtheit of life as more easily 
discernible in <Yo(pior than in Tp6vgaiq precisely on account of 
former's detachment from the world. 
Lediglich in der reinen Zeitigung der aogi(x als solcher muß, 
ob der ihr verfügbaren eigentlichen Bewegtheit, das Sein des 
Lebens gesehen werden. [PIA 260-2611 
The being of life must simply be seen in the pure 
temporalising of crwi(x as such, on account of its accessible 
authentic Bewegtheit. 
The privilege accorded to aogio( thereby stems from its characteristic 
detachment, by virtue of which it serves as access to the 
determination of voZ(; as the structure of the disclosive activity of 
the mind in general . That Heidegger chooses 
to approach the question 
of vobq in this way, as opposed to assuming its structure and 
movement to be self-evident in thinking, may be taken to indicate 
that noetic activity cannot be treated in isolation from 
the 
existence as a whole in which it is embedded. As such, 
it reinforces 
his critique of the preeminent role played by vobq 
in Plato's 
conception of transcendence. 
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The activity associated with cro(plof is, as we have said, OewpcTv, of 
which Heidegger writes: 
Das OetapeZv ist die reinste Bewegtheit, über die das Leben 
verfügt. Dadurch ist es etwas »GÖttliches«. [PIA 263, cf. 
also GA19 §181 
OewpcTv is the purest Bewegtheit of which life is capable. 
Accordingly, it is something 'divine'. 
Heidegger immediately goes on to explain that Aristotle's conception 
of the divine has nothing to do with religion as such, but simply 
denotes the highest form of being. Nonetheless, we cannot help being 
struck by the fact that Heidegger endorses the identification of the 
"authentic being of man" with what is by definition more than 
human. 26 In so doing, he is following a tendency evident in Aristotle 
(but not in him alone) to move from the designation 'what is most 
human' to that of 'the purest instance of what is most human' -a 
movement that risks, perhaps necessarily, effacing the ostensibly 
human dimension from which it arose- Or rather, and we have touched 
on this above Epp. 104-1051, it may be understood as a form of 
transcendence in which human being resides in the possibility of 
transcending itself - With the advent of 
Christianity, what had been a 
recognizable but still ambiguous impulse towards an other-worldly 
existence acquired new definition, shaping the history of 
philosophical anthropology to which we referred at the beginning of 
this chapter. In accordance with his strategy of destructive reading, 
Heidegger neither denies nor affirms this tendency as such, 
but 
rather repeats it in such a way as to retrieve 
from it a conception 
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of transcendence that is not determined by the opposition of human 
and divine forms. 
Here, for example, Heidegger emphasizes the way the intellectual 
virtues are grounded in vouq, which is exemplified above all in 
0 cwpia, whose purest form in turn is divine being: 
Das OcTov ist nur... v6gcyiq voýacwq. EPIA 2631 
The OF-Tiov is simply ... v6qcri c, voýcrcwq. 
If we recall the account of anxiety in Being and Time, its 
significance lies in the way beings in the world slip their moorings 
and Dasein is brought face to face with world as such. In a 
remarkable echo of the purity of the divine mind, Heidegger describes 
how in anxiety: 
Die existenziale Selbigkeit des Erschliepen5 mit dem 
Erschlossenen 
... ISZ 188: 2331 
the disclosure and the disclosed are existentially the 
selfsame... 
Anxiety therefore fulfils for Heidegger an analOgOU5 role to that 
which, in one respect, he assigns cyo(pi<y in his reading of Aristotle, 
that is, it provides unique access to the existential structure of 
Dasein precisely insofar as it is in anxiety that the world of 
Dasein's everyday concern recedes and the involvements in wh I ch it is 
for the most part absorbed fal I away, leaving it exposed to its own 
existence as radical potentiality for being and accessible in 
its 
totality ESZ §401.27 Just as cro4pi(x exposes the characteristic 
Bewegtheit of vobq, so anxiety exposes the essential movement of 
Dasein as disclosure. If Heidegger's account of 
transcendence 
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proceeds via a radicalization Of VoZq, and if, as this example 
illustrates, the disclosive capacity Of vok must be treated as 
inseparable from Dasein's existence as a whole, then the connection 
between vobr, and the GeTov must itself be broken in order to allow an 
interpretation of the Bewegtheit of existence that does not take its 
bearings from a conception of divine being. We shall therefore turn 
now to the radicalization that leads from cyo<pio( and GewpeTv to the 
determination of divine being. 
IV 
In fact, this transition does not have its source in ao(pio( as such, 
but in the account of movement that informs the conception of 
Bewegtheit identified with <YoTi(y. That Aristotle's account of 
movement is important for Heidegger's understanding of facticity is 
not in itself surprising. In broad terms, Aristotle understood 
nature, the sublunary world, as that which is in movement: 
Heidegger's concern was simply to discern the form of movement 
specific to Dasein. Thus, several years before its thematic 
supersession by temporality, the Bewegtheit of factical life provided 
the focus of Heidegger's 1921/22 course on Aristotle and the f irst 
part of the 1922 'Introduction' is written from essentially the same 
perspective. 28 It is Aristotle's Physics that provides the conceptual 
basis for Heidegger's account of facticity. Indeed, the importance of 
this text for Heidegger cannot be under-estimated. As Heidegger 
remarks, in his Physics Aristotle wins 
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einen prinzipiel len neuen Grundsatz, aus dem seine Ontologie 
und Logik erwachsen, von denen dann die oben schematisch ruckläufig gekennzeichnete Geschichte der philosophischen Anthropolosie durchsetzt ist. [PIA 251) 
a fundamentally new principle for his ontology and logic, by 
virtue of which the schematic retrospective of the history 
of philosophical anthropology outlined above is followed through. 
The principle in question is Aristotle's theory of sbv(xglq 
(potentiality] and cvlLpycioc [actuality], introduced in response to 
the inadequate concept5 of otherwi5eness, unequalne5s and non- 
existence by which his predecessors had sought to define movement 
[201b20f]. Whereas these concepts had failed to apprehend movement, 
those of 816ve(gir, and cvtp-yc-t(x were drawn, in Heidegger's view from 
the phenomenon itself in its ultimate and original structure EPIA 
267, GA33 §171. In Chapter Four, we shall consider Heidegger's 
interpretation of these terms in detai I. For the time being, I et us 
set out a provisional view of how this fundamentally new principle 
has influenced the history of philosophical anthropology: how have 
S'6v%Liq and cviEp-yci(x determined the ' logic ' of f actical I if e? 
Aristotle's account of movement in terms of Si6v(xgtq and ývtpVct(x may 
be understood as a response to the aporias generated by the theories 
of hi5 predeces5ors, notably the Eleatic and Megaric philo5ophers. 
The first of these arises with the question: how can being come from 
non-being? The recognition of movement or becoming entails the 
further recognition that things are not given all at once, 
but rather 
in succession. Since movement is understood as a process of 
differentiation, the earliest state of things must have 
been one of 
indifference or infinity. However, this initial 
infinity could only 
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take one of two forms, both of which are unsatisfactory. Each element 
could retain its individuality, in which case the totality would be 
finite and could not account for the infinity of movement: or the 
primordial totality could be undifferentiated and indeterminate, in 
which case it would be opposed to the finite and determinate nature 
of being and would therefore be aligned with non-being, returning us 
to our original predicament. Aristotle's response is straightforward: 
it is equally permissable to say that being proceeds from being and 
that being proceeds from non-being, providing that what is meant by 
'being' is different in the case of each source term. Thus, being in 
the sense of Cviý-pyci(x proceeds from being in the sense of Suv(xgiq and 
both evtpyEi(x and Suvoqiiq are recognized as significations of being 
[Met. E. 2: 1026a33f]. 
The second aporia is concerned less with the origin of becoming than 
with becoming itself: how can what is become different without 
ceasing to be the same? In other words, is change reducible to a 
series of discrete births and deaths or is there an underlying 
subject that persists throughout? If, in the manner of the Eleatics 
and their Megaric followers, the identity of a seated and a standing 
Socrates is denied, then the world is merely a juxtaposition of 
singular existences with no possibility of change, nor indeed of 
unity. If on the contrary the seated and standing midwife of wisdom 
are identical, then one is committed to the co-existence of 
contradictory determinations (Socrates seated = Socrates standing). 
Aristotle's conception of 5,6v<xýLiq and cvtpyCicx provides a way of 
articulating this difficulty by allowing one to say 
that the subject 
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I &noxc i lievov I of change is po ten tiaI ly aII the f orms tha tit can 
actually become. The being of what is in movement is expressed in 
terms of both 5,6vo(gir, and 
Aubenque suggests that in putting forward the theory of Sbvcxgiq and 
ýVIEP-Ycia, Aristotle is not so much resolving the aporia as 
thematising it, and in a sense this is quite right. For in spite of 
the "cathartic" effect of Aristotle's theory at the level of everyday 
discourse, "Jes distinctions de sens manifestent leur caract6re 
problematique ]or-squ'on les r6f6re 6 ]a source indistincte d'ob elles 
sont issues: the terms of the distinction manifest their problematic 
character when one refers them to the indistinct source from which 
they have emerged" [PEA 4531. The challenge Aristotle poses to 
subsequent thinking is thereby to take advantage of the advance in 
conceptual subtlety and power without allowing the fundamentally 
aporetic character of the phenomenon of movement to be diminished 
thereby. 
The problematic character of Aristotle's analysis here may 
be 
attributed to the subtlety of his aim in seeking to 
determine what 
movement is in itself [Ph. 111: 200b12-141. As we know, 
he rejects the 
possibility of movement existing independently 
from what moves 
1200b331, whereupon access to movement can only 
lie via the moving 
thing. Yet it is also true that movement 
is said to be the 
realization of a potentiality "and of the subject only 
qua seat of 
this potentiality" [201b5 My emphasis]. 
In this way, whilst the terms 
S16v(xgiq, and ýv4ycio( are intended 
to articulate movement itself 
rather than what is in movement, they must 
be drawn from and applied 
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to movement as it appears, which is in each case in the guise of what 
is in movement. This gives rise to two related difficulties. 
The fact that the terms are 'drawn from and applied to' the same 
phenomenon opens Aristotle to the charge of circularity; movement is 
defined in terms of Slbvo(g-Lr, and evitpve-Lor, and Suvagir, and Cvt; p-Vcjoc 
themselves defined in terms of movement. On the other hand, one could 
deflect the charge of circularity by pointing out that a 
phenomenologically genuine account must be led by the phenomenon 
itself and that the concepts of Sbvo(gtq and eviEpyci(x drawn from the 
phenomenon of movement and not from the thing in movement, Yet, and 
this is the second difficulty, insofar as movement only ever appears 
as the movement undergone by particular things, one cannot assume to 
have secured proper access to movement itself: one must remain 
constantly vigilant towards the distinction between the being of 
movement and the being of the thing in movement. 
These two considerations - that of circularity and that of access - 
are highlighted in the following passage from Aubenque: 
I] s'agit donc d'appliquer au mouvement en g6n6ral une 
terminologie qui s'e, 5t constitu6e pour parler de ce qui est 
dans le mouvement. Autrement dit, Vacte et ]a pui I ssance 
pr6supposent toujours le mouvement cofwe horizon 6 
Vint6rieur duquel ils signifient. [PEA 4531 
It is therefore a matter of applying to movement in general 
a terminology constituted in order to talk about what is in 
movement. In other words, act and potential always 
presuppose movement as a horizon within which they signify. 
Here is both the strength and the vulnerability of 
Aristotle's 
analysis. Not only do ývg: pycx(x and Sbv(xglq presuppose 
the horizon of 
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movement, but, if they are to be understood as significations of 
being, it is of paramount importance that their intrinsic connection 
with movement not be broken. 29 As the terms are given meaning within 
the horizon of movement, they can be understood only insofar as that 
horizon itself is preserved as such and the terms in question allowed 
to articulate our experience of it. Insofar as it conforms to this 
model, Aristotle's account may be said to be phenomenological. 
Yet the first sentence in the passage quoted above draws our 
attention to the risk involved here, namely that of determining the 
horizon in terms appropriate to that which is disclosed within it. 
Indeed, because the analysis is engaged proximally with things in 
movement, there is a tendency to understate the fundamental role of 
Slbv(xlit(; and ývcpycioc as significations of movement itself. For 
Heidegger, this represents the errancy of metaphysics par excellence 
- the determination of being in terms of beings and the effacement of 
the ontological difference. 
Aubenque is right, therefore, to insist on the fundamentally aporetic 
character of movement (even in the light of Aristotle's conceptual 
advance), since this discourages a hasty assimilation of movement to 
the more familiar terms of what is in movement. At the same time, the 
success of such an interpretation will depend, and here we 
depart 
from Aubenque's presentation of the matter, on the extent 
to which 
the terms Suvcygiq and ývtpyctoc are in fact drawn from the phenomenon 
of movement itself, rather than simply from what 
is in movement as 
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Aubenque suggests; Slbvo(g Iq and ýv! EPIEIO( must be understood as 
ontological designations. 
The requirements we have outlined for reading Aristotle's account of 
movement are frequently breached by interpreters. For example, 
Aristotle defines xivrjaiq in the Physics as "the progress of the 
realizing 1evTcX9Xci(y1 of a potentiality, qua potentiality" 120tal0l. 
Yet Ross, in his commentary on the Physics, interprets this as 
meaning that xivn(: Yiq is the "passage" from Slbv(xpir, to ývj: p-yE: j()(. 30 
Although such a reading seems dubious in the face of Aristotle's 
account of Sf)v(xjiiq and c'W: pVcm at Metaphysics 8.3, one is obliged to 
take it seriously by virtue of its prima facie plausibility (at the 
very level of common sense that Aubenque described as "cathartical ly" 
released). Reservations over such a reading are expressed well by 
Aubenque, who regarded such a reading with the utmost suspicion: 
Mais ce serait 16 une d6finition extrins6que du mouvement, 
envisaS6 non en lui-mC-me, mais dans son point de d6part et 
dans son aboutissement; ce serait sub5tituer des positions 
au passage lui-m6me. Parall6lement, ce serait user des 
notions d'acte et de puissance d'une fagon extrinsdAque par 
rapport au mouvement, comme si ]a puissance et I'acte 
6taient les terms entre lesquels le mouvement se meut et non 
des d6terminations du mouvement lui-m6me. [PEA 453-4541 
But this would be a definition that is extrinsic to 
movement, in view not of itself but of its point of 
departure and its completion. It would be to substitute 
position for the passage itself. At the same time, it would 
be to use conceptions of act and potential in a way 
extrinsic to movement, as though act and potential were the 
terms between which movement moved and not determinations of 
movement itself. 
To regard Sbvcx4i(; and ývg: pVci<x as the poles between which movement 
is 
draped is to place them outside the horizon of movement and 
thereby 
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contravenes the condition to which we referred above. Consequently, 
it is doomed to misconceive all of the terms involved and, to the 
extent that it fails to secure an understanding of movement itself, 
even to echo the patently incoherent views of the Megarics to which 
these same passages address their critique. 31 Such a view of the 
matter might easily be dismissed as a popular misrepresentation, were 
it not for the fact that its source lies within Aristotle's own 
approach to the matter. 
One could begin by looking at the term evepycio( itself, and in fact 
this is where we come across the first of two important senses of 
radicalization to which the idea of the moving thing is prone. The 
basis of the term in cip-yov betrays the influence of production: ýv- 
I E: pye'Lo( means literally in-the-work. 32 Since the work is what comes at 
the end of the process, one is immediately invited to understand the 
movement itself in terms of what apparently lies outside it. As we 
have already said, to understand cvcpVct(Y as extrinsic to movement is 
philosophically spurious. Indeed, in the context of the account of 
ýviEp-yctcx and xivrjaiq at Met. 8.6, it is palpable nonesense. Yet even 
here, where c'vIEp-Vzicx and x! vrjcF,. q. are contrasted to one another as 
different kinds of dynamic event, the contrast is made in terms of 
their respective relations to their end ET9Xor, 1 and the tendency is 
once more reinforced. 33 In this first sense of radicalization, the 
movement of a thing is understood in terms of the end of the movement 
and thereby in terms of what is essentially other than movement. 
This 
tendency is embedded deeply in the language of metaphysics. 
Indeed, 
it arises from the very dominance of the language of production 
that 
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we identified at the outset, since the movement of production is 
governed by the 'ci-Aoq and the cg: Xoq, as - CPYov. is by definition 
separable from the movement itself, extrinsic to it. Insofar as the 
problem of movement is approached from the perspective of production, 
it will therefore be inclined to reduce movement to a passage between 
states, to substitute position for transition. 34 Although this 
tendency remains for the most part implicit, we have already found 
its influence over the orientation of Aristotle's thinking to be 
considerable. Moreover, as Heidegger makes clear, such influence is 
by no means restricted to Aristotle alone and is at work still more 
forcibly in the Aristotelian current in Scholastic philosophy. 
The direction taken by such interpretation as a result of this 
tendency is most evident in what I shall call the second 
radicalization. Here one finds cvý: pyciu as the designation of a form 
of movement found and firmly rooted in the physical world taken up 
and used as the basis for thinking divine being. In Aubenque's words: 
Aristote usera de I 'expd6rience sublunaire de I 'acte pour 
penser, par un passage 6 ]a limite qui en ext6nue ]a 
relation A ]a puissance, Dieu comme Acte pur. [PEA 4511 
Aristotle uses the sublunary experience of act, taken to its 
limit in such a way as to outstrip its relation to 
potential, to think God as pure Act. 
By virtue of its attribution to the being of the unmoved mover, 
ivý-p-yci(x is placed beyond movement and its essential 
link with 
Sbvo(giq is broken. In this way, it is extrapolated from the realm 
in 
which it receives its sense to an external or 
transcendental point, 
whereupon it is then understood to ground the realm 
from which it was 
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drawn. This is clearly a dubious enterprise, since the couple 
Si)v<)(g, tq-CVjEp, jr, L(x arise together from the phenomenon of movement 
itself and the attempt to isolate ývlEp-yzi(x not only from Sbv(xAtq but 
even from the horizon of xivqatq in which both terms belong should, 
as we have said, be followed with caution - and doubly so if it is 
understood to provide the basis for a treatment of xivriair, For 
whereas the initial tendency promoted an understanding of each 
specific movement in terms Of what lies beyond that movement, here we 
find all movement grounded in what lies beyond movement. Access to a 
conception of movement 'as such' is thereby closed off. 
If we return now to Heidegger's presentation of aoq1(x as exemplary of 
the Bewegtheit of factical life, we can begin to see how the 
radicalization outlined above informs the history of philosophical 
anthropology. 
Heidegger states that the "authentic being" of man manifests itself 
in aoq)! (x. However, such "authentic being" is not immediately 
accessible even via cro(pia and cannot simply be read off from human 
life as such: 
sondern es entspringt in seiner kategorialen Strukture aus 
einer bestimmt vollzogenen, ontologischen Radikalisierung 
der Idee des Bewegtseienden. IPIA 2601 
rather, it arises in its categorial structure out of a 
deteminate accomplished ontological radicalization of the 
idea of the moving thing. 
Heidegger repeats the same point in the following paragraph: 
Der Seinscharakter der eitir, und damit der &pETý, das heißt 
die ontologische Struktur des Menschenseins, wird aus 
der 
Ontologie des Seienden im Wie einer bestirmten Bewegtheit 
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und der ontologischen Radikalisierung der Idee dieser 
Bewegtheit verst-Undlich. (PIA 2611 
The ontological character of the 'Cýiq and thereby of the I O(pc, cý, that is the ontological structure of the being of 
man, is intelligible on the basis of the ontology of beings 
in the manner of a determinate Bewegthei t and the 
ontological radicalization of the idea of this Bewegtheit. 
The Bewegtheit in question is, of course, that of production. If 
there were any doubt, this confirm5 that the radicalization to which 
Heidegger is referring here is that which we described above as a 
tendency to describe movement in terms of its end- If this notion of 
radicalization is understood in the context of an attempt to 
apprehend the o'(pXcxi of beings in the natural world, it leads to the 
projection of the 63(pX(xi beyond the movement itself: ultimately, the 
&pXý of all movement is the divine unmoved mover and the problematic 
of ontology is accomplished in the form of theology. In terms of our 
conception of CFOT L (X this would correspond to a regional' 
interpretation of its characteristic detachment Epp. 125-1261 
Naturally, the train of influence by no means drew to a halt with the 
determination of divine being: the translation into theology turns 
out to be merely a detour and divine being a way-station on a 
circuitous route back to a determination of human being. Heidegger 
gives a succinct account of the way in which this radicalization has 
influenced the history of philosophical anthropology. 
Die entscheidende Seins-Vorhabe, das Seiende 
in Bewegung, 
und die bestimmte ontlogische Explikation 
dieses Seienden 
sind die Motivquellen für die ontologischen 
Grundstrukturen, 
die späterhin das göttlichen Sein im spezifisch christlichen 
Sinne (actus purus), das innergöttIiche Leben 
(Trinität) und 
damit zugleich das Seinsverhältnis Gottes zum 
Menschen und 
damit den eigenen Seinssinn des Menschen selbst entscheidend 
bestimmen. [PIA 263 My emphasisl 
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The decisive Seins-Vorhabe, the being in movement, and the 
particular ontological explication of this are the 
motivational sources for the fundamental ontological 
structures that were later to exercise a decisive influence 
over the specifically Christian conception of the being of God (actus purus), the inner-godly life (Trinity) and thereby also the ontological relation of God to man and thus 
the meaning of being proper to man. 
The pivotal term in this genealogy is actus purus, which is of course 
the Latin translation of the Greek ýv: ý-pyci<x. In turn, ývitpVci(x is the 
Bewegtheit specific to OewpeTv and voiSq, whereupon we are back to the 
influence of Aristotle's conception of cro(p i (x on philosophical 
anthropology. However, it is important to consider that this 
influence has not come directly from Aristotle, but has passed via 
scholastic theology. For whilst Aristotle himself had already begun 
to anchor the meaning of conceptions drawn originally from practical 
philosophy and ontology in their application to theology, this 
tendency was continued and reinforced in scholastic philosophy until 
the original sources of key terms had all but disappeared, their 
translation into Latin and the new context of Christian theology 
conspiring to bury the traces. Only then, once the terms in question 
had been refined almost beyond recognition, did the influence reflect 
back on philosophical anthropology. To undo this course of events, 
Heidegger must reclaim a conception of ývtpyci(x from scholastic 
philosophy and thus implicitly from the modern tradition that 
followed in its wake. However, it is not simply a matter of returning 
to Aristotle, as though such a return were possible without a 
profound naivety. As we have already seen, Heidegger engages in a 
strategy of return or recovery that he terms the destruction of 
the 
history of ontology. But such a destruction is only one of 
three 
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elements that Heidegger describes as constitutive of phenomenology. 
In addition to the "construction" that issues from a phenomenological 
reading, Heidegger names a third and vital moment, viz. "reduction" 
EGA24 §51. By this, Heidegger means the shift in perspective from a 
thing to its being, from an ontic to an ontological determination. 
With regard to the question of movement, such a reduction will 
constitute Heidegger's own repetition of the radicalization that he 
identifies as the source of the ancient and above all scholastic 
conception of ývtpyciu. In this way, a phenomenological reading of 
xivr1cric, will give rise to an interpretation of ývtp-ycic( that, like 
the view it is intended to supplant, designates the being of 
movement. Unlike the sense of actus purus, however, it will prove not 
to have been won at the expense of movement itself. Rather, it will 
bear in a different and more direct fashion upon what is, for 
Heidegger, the fundamental problem of Aristotle's Physics, a problem 
that is moreover central to Heidegger's own hermeneutics of 
facticity; namely, that of determining "das Seiende im Wie seines 
Bewegtseins: the being in the manner of its being-moved" (PIA 251, 
cited above, p. 1101. 
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Chapter Four 
DUNAMIS AND ENERGEM. H" ING AN END 
In the previous chapter, we began by outlining the importance of 
movement to Heidegger's hermeneutics of facticity and, more 
specifically, how Aristotle's account of movement in the Physics 
bears on Heidegger's interpretation of Micomachean Ethics V1. We 
showed that the usual understanding of movement implicitly elevates 
the xt'Xoq over and above the movement itself and how the conception 
of end arising from the experience of production compounds this 
tendency to divorce the &pXý and ctXoc, of movement from movement 
itself. Moreover, this first 'radicalization' invites the further 
extrapolation, ambiguous in Aristotle but unequivocal in his 
Scholastic 5UCcessors, from movement in the natural world to its &pXý 
the unmoved mover. As a result of this second radicalization, the 
conception of movement brought to philosophical anthropology became a 
matter of transition between external points. The movement specific 
to human life was conceived negatively with regard to God (a trail to 
heaven through the vale of tears), and the reality of movement 
expulsed from movement itself. In this way, the schema of Christian 
theology cemented the tendency inherent in Aristotelian metaphysics, 
blocking access to a radical understanding of movement in its own 
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terms and thereby committing philosophical anthropology to an 
inadequate basis. 
In this chapter we shall set out to establish how Heidegger responds 
to this predicament by reviewing the conceptions of 8,6voqLir, and 
I cvtp-Vci(x intrinsic to an understanding of movement. Above all, it is 
a matter of reaching a determination of these terms as articulations 
of movement itself and this means that, as we suggested in the 
previous chapter, movement must not only remain the horizon within 
which they are determined, but must be disclosed as that horizon. In 
the course of this reading, we shall arrive at a revised 
understanding of the relation between movement and its end, which is, 
of course, where we began. Narrowing the focus, Heidegger's reading 
of Met. 8.2 will yield an interpretation of the form of Sbv(xgi(; 
specific to hurnan being (as possessed of logos), thereby en5uring 
that the account of movement is focussed on the question of factical 
life. Finally, Heidegger's reading as a whole underlines the 
IF importance of the notion of having lexciv] to the question of 
potentiality and thus also of movement. Most significantly of all, 
this invites us to return to the conception of citir, that emerged as 
fundamental at the end of Chapter Two. 
In Section IV of the previous chapter, I drew primarily on Aubenque 
in order to mark out the consequences of common interpretations of 
9,6vofjiir, and iv9p-je-L(x. Now it is time to pursue 
this issue more 
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carefully via Heidegger's own reading of these terms. By far the most 
sustained interpretation appears in the 1931 course dedicated 
entirely to Aristotle's Metaphysics 19.1-3. Although Heidegger's 
commentary on the text is explicitly concerned with only the first 
three chapters of Metaphysics E), it is premised on an understanding 
of the structure of the book as a whole. 
Aristotle divides the enquiry into Sibvcxgic, and iW: pysiof roughly into 
two phases and the question turns on precisely how one understands 
these phases and their connection with one another. In the opening 
paragraph, he writes (in the Ross edition): 
And first let us explain potency 1S6vofgiq1 in the strictest 
sense, which is, however, not the most useful for our 
present purpose. For potency and actuality 1ivtpVcto(3 extend 
beyond the cases that involve a reference to motion. But 
when we have spoken of this first kind, we shall in our 
discussions of actuality explain the other kinds of potency 
as well. 11045b35-1046a4l 
The implication is clear: the provisional analysis will address 
S, bv(xgic; with regard to movement Ex(yc& xivilcriv], but this will be 
I followed by an account of 60v(xjiir, and svtp-Vcic( terms in a further 
sense Uni nXitov], and it is this second sense that takes precedence 
in the study as a whole. That the sense of Sf)v(xgir, with regard to 
movement is at once the "strictest" and "not the most useful" for the 
purposes of the enquiry at hand strikes one as odd. Yet this state of 
affairs is apparently confirmed by Aristotle's remarks at 
the 
beginning of Book VI. 
Since we have treated of the kind of potency 
ESbv(xgxql which 
is related to movement, let us discuss actuality 
1ivtpyci(xl 
- what, and what kind of thing, actuality 
is. For in the 
course of our analysis it will also 
become clear, with 
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regard to the potential, that we not only ascribe potency to 
that whose nature it is to move something else, or to be 
moved by something else, either without qualification or in 
some particular way, but also use the word in another sense, 
which is the reason of this inquiry in the course of which 
we have discussed these previous senses also. 11048a25-301 
Marking a break with the analyses in the first half of the book, this 
passage heralds the introduction of the 'further senses' of 5(wo%jr, 
and 6v6p-Vs-, (x to which the account as a whole is directed. In Chapters 
6-10 of Book E) Aristotle develops the interpretation of 8(wotgir, and 
f 
evkpyci. ot from di5CUSSiOnS of entirely human and earthbound activities 
through accounts of Uil [matter] and gopq)ý [form] towards a final 
chapter on the issue of truth and error. 1 Taking these senses of 
S16wYlitc. and evLpycicy to lie beyond movement, as the customary 
interpretation of 1046al-4 implies, has a twofold effect. First, it 
paves the way for a theological interpretation of ývgp*yci(x as a 
changeless ground E1050bl-5,12072bffl, a reading that culminates in 
the scholastic notion of the pure act. 2 In addition, viewing 
the 
further sense of 66vcxýLiq as independent of movement invites an 
interpretation of I)Xn simply as inert material - an interpretation 
that owes more to the Cartesian tradition than 
to Aristotle. For on 
closer inspection, BXrj is 8,6v(xjici not simply as stuff 
in general , but 
as that particular stuff which can become a 
house, a tree or whatever 
11046a22-25,1048b36ffl. YXn is always relative to a specific process 
of change or production. Consequently, as 
Heidegger pointed out some 
years later, the interpretation of the 
being of this "so-called 
material" depends on how change and production 
themselves are 
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understood EVWB-WM 274: 2493. Determining the meaning of "uXrl as 
6-3v(xgzx to have no regard for movement closes off such an approach. 
Clearly, Heidegger cannot go along with the view that the 'further 
senses' of Sf. )v(xgiq and civtpyciot are somehow independent of movement. 
Indeed, the reading he seeks to develop, above all in opposition to 
the scholastic reception of these terms, depends directly on 
countering such an interpretation. In so doing, he is by no means at 
odds with Aristotle's text, as we can see from the definition of 
86v(xiiii; towards which the account has been directed. 
I mean by Sbv(xjiir, not only that definite thing which is said 
to be a principle of change in another thing or in the thing 
itself regarded as other, but in general every principle of 
movement or of rest. 11049b5-9: translation modified] 
It would be hard to claim that the sense of Si6vo%ic, given here 
extends "beyond the cases that involve a reference to motion" as the 
customary translation of the opening paragraph of Book E) would have 
it [1046al-31. The question Heidegger (and indeed any serious 
commentator) must address is therefore how this definition may be 
reconciled with the earlier negative remarks concerning movement 
11046al-21. 
Let us compare Heidegger's own translation of the passage from the 
opening paragraph of Chapter I that we quoted above in the Ross 
edi ti on. 
Und zuerst (wollen wir handeln) über Sibvcxgic. in 
der 
Bedeutung, in der man meistens eigentlich das Wort 
gebraucht; freilich ist die so verstandene äüv(Yglc, wahrlich 
n ich t brauchbar für das, was wi r jetzt (in 
dieser 
Abhandlung) vorhaben. Denn die Slöv(xlitr, und die cvL-pyciot 
(die 
eigentlich unser Thema sind) erstrecken sich 
über mehr als 
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die entsprechenden Ausdrücke, die nur im Hinblick auf Bewegung genonmen werden. Aber nachdem wir darüber gehandelt 
haben, wollen wir, und zwar in den Erörterungen über die 
cvL-pyciot auch dber die anderen (d. h. die weitertragenden 
Bedeutungen der S()vofjLiq, ) einen Aufschlup geben. 11045b35- 
1046a4, GA33 49-501 
And first of all (we wish to deal) with the sense of SbvaVtq 
in which it is for the most part actually used. Though 
36v(xgiq understood in this way is not in fact appropriate to 
what we have before us (in this discussion). For 66vugiq and 
cvtp-Vci(x (which are properly our theme) concern more than 
the corresponding expressions used solely in reference to 
movement. But after we have dealt with these we shall, in 
our discussion of s-"v9pjei(x, also give an account of the 
others (i. e. of the further reaching senses of S6V(XVjq). 3 
There are several points at which Heidegger's translation differs 
from the customary reading as represented by the Ross edition quoted 
above. First, Heidegger suggests that the initial enquiry introduced 
by this passage concerns dunamis not in its 'strictest sense, ' as 
many commentators have suggested, but rather as they "as they are for 
the most part actually used. "4 He then describes this usage as not 
wholly appropriate lbrauchbarl, rather than 85 SiMply not USefuj. 5 in 
this way, he avoids one of the pitfalls of the usual translation, 
name I y, having to dismiss the 'strictest' sense of Sbvowiq as 
relatively useless for the enquiry at hand, a gesture that 
paradoxically denigrates as inessential the very senses of 86vofilir, 
the account is apparently concerned to establish. Instead, 
Heidegger's translation encourages us to regard the first part of the 
account as a necessary prelude to the ensuing consideration of 
the 
more fundamental senses, senses that are less familiar precisely 
because they are more philosophical. But in what does 
the transition 
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from the sense of 8lbvOfAic, and ývtpVciof x(yx& xivnalv to the sense of 
these term5 Ent nXtov consi5t? 
. 
The Greek phrase in question is "ent nXgov -y&p Ccr-rIv rl Si)v(xýLjc 
cvtp, yp-, L()f cC3v g6vov Xcy6licvov )((X'rdf xivricriv, " rendered in the Ross 
edition as "For potency and actuality extend beyond the cases that 
involve a reference to motion. " This translation crucially elides the 
adverb g6vov [solely], thereby presenting the preservation or 
eschewal of a reference to movement as exclusive alternatives. By 
contrast, Heidegger is careful to retain g6vov, proposing that the 
further senses of SfmxAiq and iv9p-ycic( do not lie wholly within the 
perspective denoted by the expression xcxu& xivriatv. The transition 
from the general understanding of Sbv(xgiq and cvtpyci(x to their 
further sense therefore involves a changed relation to movement, 
rather than a break with movement as such. 
We saw in Ch. 3. IV that there is a risk of referring improperly to 
movement in terms that are more appropriate to what is in movement 
and that such a confusion leads to the treatment of movement as 
present -a t-hand, vorhanden. The same tendency is 
implicit in our 
apprehension of abv(xgiq, as Heidegger points out: 
Wenn wir auf Bewegungen hinblicken fxcxrä»xivrlcrivl, 
begegnet 
uns Bewegtes. Und wir sprechen denn (unwillkürlich) von 
Kräf ten, die das Bewegte bewegen, und ebenso von 
Tätigkeiten, die am Werke, bei der Arbeit f"epyovl sind. 
EGA33 501 
If we look at movements [xaT& x1vncriv], we come across what 
is moved. And we then speak (involuntarily) of powers 
that 
move what is moved, and likewise of activities working 
on 
the work [EpVov]. 6 
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Af)v(xjLiq. and 6Vt'PYe1(x X(XT& xfvncylv are themselves treated as present- 
at-hand, as things like any other. 7 For Heidegger, the apprehension 
of S()v(x1iiq and evL-pVs'L(x x(xcdc xivr1criv is purely ontic. In this way, 
the shift in perspective accompanying the introduction of the further 
senses of Suv(xjitq corresponds to a transition from an ontic to an 
ontological determination -a trajectory matched by Aristotle's 
declared intention to establish "when a thing exists potentially and 
when it does not" 11048b361, that is, to determine Sf)vofptc, as a 
signification of being. According to this reading, Aristotle's 
question would have to change from 'how describe what is in 
movementV to 'how describe the way in which what is in movement 
exists? ' In short, the further senses of Simygiq and iv(; pycicy would 
not be independent of movement and the eschewal of questioning xof-c& 
xIvrjaiv would not entail leaving movement out of the picture. On the 
contrary, movement must above all be kept in view, but not xcrE6t 
x1vnatv. Rather, Heidegger characterizes the acquisition of an 
ontological perspective as a transition from asking x(YE6f xivriaiv to 
asking xotr& xfvnacwq, EGA33 531.8 The difference Heidegger wishes to 
highlight is that between asking in connection with movement and 
asking about movement. In the f irst case, the meaning of movement 
itself is presupposed as the horizon of the enquiry, whereas in the 
second case it is movement itself that is at issue. To take 
Heidegger's own example, if we consider the movements involved 
in 
building a house, we think of materials being cut and assembled, 
their powers realized via the movement of building. 
Wir blicken aber nicht auf die Bewegung als 
Bewegung, nicht 
auf das xivoügsvov fi xi-voü; ic-vov wir fragen nicht, was 
da-s 
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Bewegtseiendes als solches sei; 
nicht 4 06v und die x(vqcrir, nicht 
But we do not look at movement 
xivobgevov ý xivo6gevov; we do not 
as such might be. We do not take 
xfvn(ylq fi Civoti. 
wir nehmen das xivolbgcvov 
clwxi. IGA33 53-541 
as movement, not at the 
ask what the moving thing 
the xlvoý6Vcvov ý ov e or 
Movement itself is reduced to the transition between states and comes 
to be seen as accidental to the thing that happens to be in movement. 
Out of view, it is not regarded as intrinsic to the being of the 
thing in question. Heidegger's reading of Met. 8 sets out to reverse 
this tendency. in his view, to ask after Slbv(xgiq and ýW: pycm in 
their further sense Is'ni nXiýovl is to ask after them xaTd( xivqacwc,, 
and this means to consider them not simply as the limiting conditions 
of movement, but as articulations of movement itself and therefore as 
ontological determinations of what is in movement EGA33 531.9 Indeed, 
by preserving the horizon of movement, this reading enables one to 
understand how Sbv(xgiq and ý-vtpjei(x feature as one of the four basic 
significations of being in the sublunar world 11026ba33f, p. 341. 
The further senses of Si)v(xliiq are therefore expressly not to be 
understood as in any way independent of movement. Indeed, assuming 
such independence, as many commentators do, commits the enquiry at 
best to obscuring what is original in Aristotle's thought, and at 
worst to incoherence. However, it is still not clear how the enquiry 
into S6voqLir, and ivC'p'yCI(x x(xlc& XIVII(Y'v contributes to securing 
the 
ontological senses of 8bv(xgiq and ivLpySI(x- if the sought after 
senses are precisely not accessible to questioning xotx& xfvrraiv, what 
is to be gained by dedicating the first half of 
Book 0 to this very 
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perspective? Is the sense of S()v(ygjq XOM& xfvnaiv not relatively 
%useless, ' as the customary translations suggest? 
If it were, the fact that Heidegger chose to devote an entire lecture 
course to the examination of the first three chapters of Book E) would 
on the face of it be somewhat surprising. In fact, he never states 
explicitly how the analyses presented relate to a reading of the 
further senses as they are developed by Aristotle in Chapters 6-10. 
There are, perhaps, too many points at which the interpretation would 
have to anticipate itself. However, some indication of Heidegger's 
conception of the text's development in this respect emerges at the 
end of 57. Heidegger speculates (heuristically) on how one might 
expect Book 8 to look, breaking its thematic development down into a 
series of discrete stages. 10 Having already drawn attention to the 
potential inadequacy of such a schematic conception, Heidegger then 
remarks: 
Des Verhdltnis von &6výxliiq und ývitpyst(x x(xlcdf xivncriv zu ý 
S6vcxgtq und ý ivtpyci(x, die iýnt nXtov sind, dieser 
6bergans 
ist nicht einfach das Auswechsein des einen gegen das 
andere, sondern er ist ursprUnglich Eines: ein Entwurf mit 
Fu, 8punkt in der Sf)v(xILtr, und 6vi: pyci(x x(xr& xfvrlatv. EGA33 561 
As for the relation of Sbvcxgiq and ývgpyzia xcxc& xfvwtv to 
V n 86v(xpiq and r'I c'vCpyci(x, which are eni nXtov, thi 9 
transition is not simply the replacement of one by the 
other, but is rather originally one [integral]; a projection 
anchored in 8i)v(xgiq and ivtpVcicx x(xc(k xivnaiv. 
The account of Slbv(xpiq and evtp-yelof x(x'cdf x1vnct'v is clearly more 
than 
just a foil for the ontological determination of 
these terms x(xtdf 
xfvnac(aq. Indeed, Heidegger goes further, underlining 
that the 
determination of S6v(xgtq and cv9pyci(x 
bri nXtOv is neither an 
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extension nor a generalization of former account. If a definitive 
passage from one phase of the enquiry to the other is ruled out, it 
seems that the two phases must in some sense be concomitant. 11 
Regrettably, Heidegger's commentary gets no further than 1047a32, 
just before the end of Met. 0.3. However, it would be wrong to -gay 
that it breaks off inconclusively. On the contrary, it is as though 
the enquiry had been carried through to a high point, the culmination 
of the whole study. Perhaps Heidegger feels here that he has elicited 
from Aristotle's text the Fuflpunkt in which the original integrity of 
the projection between perspectives is anchored. However, before 
seeking to establish the nature of the connection with the sense of 
5 f)v(YIL ic ., iýni nXCov 
that Heidegger perceives in Met. 0.3, we must take a 
I more general look at how the perspective of questioning xuidt xIvnaswq 
is opened up. 
II 
Aristotle defines dimamis in Met. 8.1 as: 
&Pxý Acwpoxýq ýV (, Xxx(p n rj &XXO 
an originative source of change in another thing or in 
itself qua other. [1046al0f] 
With slight lexical variation, a similar definition is given 
in 
Met. A. 12: 
xlvýcrcijl; iv ilctpov 
a source of movement or change which is in another 
thing 
than the thing moved or in the same thing qua other. 
110198151 
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This definition has come to be seen almost as a commonplace requiring 
little or no further investigation. Not so, objects Heidegger. For 
the description given here could only be said to define 3bvo%tq once 
the meaning of all the terms in the definiens have themselves been 
fixed. But in addition to doubt over whether the 'in another' Eiv 
&XX4) or ev vc6pov] qualifies jicvxPoXý or *&pXý the meaning of &p)(ý 
itself has yet to be established. Moreover, the senses of x1vnaiq and 
jicvxpoXý can hardly be taken for granted, since the purpose of the 
whole enquiry could be said to consist in an elaboration of precisely 
these terms. Accordingly, Heidegger intends to treat the definition 
less as a point of conclusion than of departure, the material from 
which a definitive outline [Grundrifil of Sbv(xgiq will gradually 
emerge. 
We tend almost irresistably to discover in phenomena a pattern that 
]ends them meaning. As Heidegger points out, we might understand 
autumn leaves to be finding their proper place as they fall to earth 
(a form of interpretation he claims has been wrongfully disparaged 
and abandoned). Or, as is more common, we might regard falling leaves 
as explicable in terms of a pre-existing condition: trees have the 
potential to shed their leaves in autumn and leaves 
have the 
potential to fall to earth. Yet in saying this, how are such 
potentialities apprehended? When we speak of the 
load-bearing 
capacity of a bridge or of the gravitational 
force exerted by the 
earth, he asks, have we grasped a potentiality 
directly and in 
itself? Clearly not: 
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Kr9fte lassen sich nicht Unmittelbar feststellen, wir finden immer nur Leistungen, Erfolge, Wirkungen. IGA33 781 
Powers do not let themselves be grasped directly; we find 
only achievements, results, actual effects. 
However, such actual effects are themselves inaccessible, even 
unintelligible, independently of the powers to which they correspond. 
In this way, we are tempted to conclude that we only experience 
something as actual insofar as it is apprehended as the actual effect 
of a power, and above all as the effect of a power understood as a 
cause. In this way, S()VO(J. Llq, emerges as a function of causality. 12 
Heidegger warns against taking the meaning of causality to be self- 
evident, above all because the conception of causality most familiar 
to us today, and the one operative in the illustration above, is 
impoverished in comparison to the theory of the four causes as 
presented in Aristotle. In this respect, Heidegger's reservations 
have less to do with Aristotle's own theory of causality than with 
the reductive emphasis on efficient causality alone that predominates 
in modern philosophy. Whilst this bias, fostered by the rise of 
seventeenth century science, is characteristic Of P05t-Cartesian 
thinking, its roots stretch back into scholastic philosophy, where 
existence is already understood in terms of actuality and actuality 
as the effect of a cause EGA24 §§10-113. The relation between 
efficient cause and effect thereby becomes paradigmatic for 
understanding reality. 13 Moreover, on this intepretation, Slbv(xjLiq, as 
'what caused the change, ' will be treated as an entity that is 
present-at-hand like any other - just as Heidegger in fact 
describes 
the apprehension of 8i)v(xgEjq xoftdf x(vqaiv. At a stroke, therefore, we 
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find that ontology is committed to an ontic conception of grounds, 
the understanding of being is narrowed to include only presence-at- 
hand (the being of the work) and the possibility of Sbv%Ljq 
signifying a unique manner of existence, as Aristotle intends, is 
effectively removed. In short, the elevation of efficient causality 
to the status of an ontological principle cements the interpretation 
of being informed by the experience of production. 14 Apparently, the 
most direct way for Heidegger to oppose this reading would be to 
reverse the reduction of Aristotle's theory of the four cau5es to a 
conception of efficient causality alone. However, simply to restore 
the interpretation of 5bv(xjiiq, to the context of the four causes is 
not in itself an adequate response to the problem of defining 
8()vo%-tq,, particularly in view of the caution Heidegger must exercise 
with regard to production. 
Aristotle gives two substantially equivalent accounts of causality 
[Ph. 11.3, Met. A. 1-21. In order for any movement or change to take 
place, there must be four causes, which are as follows [194b24ffl. 
1) The material cause For there to be a bronze statue, there must 
first be bronze; in each case of movement or change there is 
something that undergoes the movement or change. 2) The formal cause 
This something must acquire a new form and the image or determination 
of what it is to become is the formal cause. 3) The efficient cause 
The movement or change must be initiated by something and 
this is 
termed the efficient cause. 4) The final cause In addition, 
the end 
or purpose for the sake of which the movement or change 
is undertaken 
is called the final cause. 
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If we recall Heidegger's account of the way terms such as ciSoc Arl, 
gopq)ý, oikrlu and others receive their meaning from the experience of 
production, it is impossible not to see the same experience informing 
the doctrine of the four causes -a fact to which we have already see 
Bernasconi allude 1p. 591. Each cause as defined above corresponds to 
a moment in the process of production, as though they too were 
derived precisely as a formalisation of such a process. 15 This does 
not mean that they cannot occur simultaneously, coincide with one 
another, or even articulate actions that are on the face of it 
unconnected with production. On the contrary, they may very well do 
so. However, this only underlines the extent to which the experience 
of production dominates our understanding of all forms of activity. 
Restoring the modern conception of efficient causality to the 
Aristotelian theory of the four causes will thus do little to offset 
the influence of production - unless the theory of the four causes is 
itself placed under scrutiny. 
Leaving aside the issue of production for a moment, Sýbvujiic. could 
only be adequately defined on the basis Of the four causes if the 
meaning of each of the four causes were itself secure. Yet this is 
manifestly not the case, since the meaning of the material cause 
(at 
least) is surely implicated in the account of Sbvýx; Ltq 
itself. 16 
Rather, as with the individual terms in the definiens, 
Heidegger's 
interpretation of the four causes will develop in tandem with 
the 
interpretation of Sbv(xgiq. This hermeneutic flexibility 
is of the 
utmost importance for Heidegger's response to 
the problem of 
production as we have described it. Indeed, the necessity of 
such an 
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approach arises directly from the fact that Heidegger is interested 
in Sf)vofpiq, and kV9pysi(x above all as significations of being. If 
their meaning were wholly determined by the theory of the four 
causes, then it is the latter that should feature alongside the other 
fundamental significations of being. Yet not only is this not the 
case, but the theory of the four causes is itself shrouded in 
difficulty. Are there just four causes and, if so, why? From what 
region of being does each cause arise and to what extent can it be 
applied OUt5ide that region: e. g. is space the material cause of 
geometrical figures? 17 Heidegger is anxious to restore a genuinely 
ontological significance to the theory of the four causes, but this 
entails keeping it alive as a problem, not regarding it as an 
established doctrine. 
Heidegger's strategy, then, is twofold. In the longer term, he 
undertakes to recover a more complex and nuanced reading of the four 
causes. 18 A reading of this kind is given in later essays such as 
'The Question Concerning Technology' (1955) and 'Science and 
Reflection' (1954), although the strategy was present in outline much 
earlier: in Heidegger's 1926 lectures Die Grundbegriffe der entiken 
Philosophie we already find a description of causality as an 
ontological determination of beings insofar as they are or can be in 
movement EGA22 13-151. With regard to the present enquiry, we can say 
that Heidegger aims to elaborate a conception of 8-6v%Lir. that does 
not proceed from causality. In so doing, he clears the way for an 
account of movement that is not dominated from the first 
by the 
influence of production. This, and the senses of 3bvo(gi(; and 
ivtPIE'a 
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that emerge from such a reading, will lead us back to the problem of 
Heidegger's radicalization of ITP&tiq as a determination of Dasein's 
transcendence. We shall now trace Heidegger's reading of the 
remainder of Met. E). 1 as it is presented in his 1931 lecture course. 
* 
Following the definition of Sbv(xgiq to which we referred at the 
beginning of this section, Aristotle identifies two senses of the 
potentiality or power of being acted upon 1Sbv(xgiq Tob n&TXcivi: that 
of passively undergoing change 156vocgi,; Tob Tr(xOcZvl and that of 
resisting change or destruction ['ctiq om(Y9clofql 11046all]. 
Heidegger translates the first of these as Ertragsamkeit, conveying 
the susceptibility, even acquiescence, of that which tolerates change 
EGA33 881.19 The second is translated as Widerstand, denoting a 
resistance to all forms of change, modification, degradation or 
destruction EGA33 891. Both of these senses refer back to the primary 
sense of an originative source of change in what is other. Given that 
each of them consists in a relation to an active power of formation, 
it is tempting to suppose that the primary sense in question must be 
&6v(xgjc, cob noICTV, the potentiality of doing or making. But 
Aristotle makes no reference to this kind of Sbv(xgtc, here and 
Heidegger explicitly rules it out of consideration. In 
fact, he 
continues, it would be mistaken to place any single form of 
&6v(xýLtq, 
in a position of priority: rather, the primary sense should 
be 
understood as the still undetermined Grundr-ifi of 
the essence of 
a 16v(xg Iq. 
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Nonetheless, of the two secondary senses mentioned, Heidegger accords 
Widerstand a certain priority, inasmuch as Ertragsamkeit is itself 
unintelligible without reference to the character of that which 
resists (GA33 91-941. Moreover, in contrast to our understanding of 
6,6v(xgei r, as the hidden causes of the actua I ef f ects I Wirkungen] , our 
experience here is more immediate. For if resistance is the 
manifestation of a power, this power is not a hidden cause lying 
behind the phenomenon, but is rather encountered directly in the 
resisting thing itself: "Das Widerstehende selbst ist das Kräftige 
und die Kraf't: The resisting thing is itself what is powerful and 
power" EGA33 911. Circumscribing our experience of power in the 
resistance of things favours a consideration of power that does not 
take as its point of reference the active power of a subject, but 
which recognizes resistance and movement, thrust and counter-thrust 
[Stofl und Gegenstofll in the reciprocal relation of things to one 
another EGA33 941. Having framed the matter in this way, Heidegger 
draws the phenomenon of resistance into the light of the Leibnizian 
conception of potentia: 
Widerstand aber ist nicht einfach Gleichgültigkeit gegen 
Bewegung, kein bloßes »5ie nicht mitmachen«, sondern 
Gegenstreben, d. h. ein Eigenes, von wo aus sich im anderen 
Ding etwas bestimmt. IGA33 97) 
Resistance, however, is not simply imperviousness to 
movement, no plain 'not going along, ' but rather a counter- 
striving, ie. something proper, from out of which something 
determines itself in the other thing. 20 
Enriching the notion of resistance with that of striving 
(Streben] 
not only restores dynamism to the modern conception of matter, 
it 
also paves the way for an interpretation of 
human potentialities on 
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the basis of broader understanding of 6bvO(A1q in the natural world. 
Such a displacement of subjectivist metaphysics had, of course, been 
central to Heidegger's work for some while, even where his analyses 
engaged humanist or subjectivist themes and tropes. In this emphasis 
on resistance and its characterization as Streben, for example, 
Heidegger is implicitly working through the philosophical basis of 
resoluteness [Entschlossenheit] that was so important in Being and 
Time. And significantly, just two years after delivering these 
lectures on Aristotle, Heidegger returned to the theme in his 
Rectoral Address, using language strongly reminiscent of the account 
of power in terms of resistance offered here. 21 As we shall see, the 
concept of Streben will continue to play a important role in 
Heidegger's interpretation, above al I with respect to O'pcýiq, desire. 
At this point, Aristotle introduces a further specification of 
Slbvcxlii (ý xor-c& xi vrIcTi v, and one that wi II be crucia If or the purposes 
of our own reading. 22 
Wiederum werden nun die bereits angeführten 
Kräfte genannt und als solche verstanden entweder nur 
einfach in Bezug auf das, wozu sie Kräfte sind, zum Tun bzw. 
Leiden, oder aber in Bezug auf das »in der rechte Wei5e«, so 
daß auch im Verstehen dieser Bedeutung von Sý6v(Ygic in 
gewisser Weise darin mitverstanden sind die Bedeutungen der 
vorgenannten. [1046al6-19, GA33 991 
Again, the foregoing come to be called (5ý6v%Lsiq) powers and 
understood as such either simply in relation to that of 
which they are powers, acting or undergoing, or else in 
relation to acting or undergoing 'in the right way, ' so that 
in understanding this sense of Sibvc(giq the previously named 
senses are in a certain sense also understood. 
In this way, to query 'can she run? ' is to ask whether she can run 
well; to remark of a cricketer 'he can't play short-pitched bowling' 
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is not to doubt that he can offer a stroke, but that he can 
consistently play good strokes. Moreover, the same pattern is found 
in cases of 8bvO(jII(; 'cob 7r(AcTv and ictiq Omoresi(xq; to say that green 
or damp wood does not burn is not to deny that it will combust, but 
to say that it does not burn easily and well; to say that the 
outhouse is weatherproof is not to boast that it can stand up to 
weather, but that it can resist bad weather. The notion of 
potentiality or power implicitly refers to the manner of existence 
that represents its accomplishment. Heidegger goes on to express this 
relation in terms of the concept of Str-eben introduced above. 
Auch und gerade im Begriff der 5-6v(xj. Liq xocc& xivrjaiv liegt 
demnach ein Verfassungm&fliger Bezug auf -ciLXoq: damit ist 
nicht dergleichen wie ))Zie1strebigkeit(( gemeint, sondern: 
innere Zuordnung von etwas auf Ende, Abschlu, 6, Fertigkeit. 
In der S1bv(xgiq, liegt daher das Moment des Unterwegs-zu, des 
ausgerichteten Strebens, ausgerichtet auf ein Ende und 
Fertigwerden. EGA33 1001 
Even, indeed precisely, the concept of Sbvoegiq xotT& x1vqcTiv 
comprises a constitutive relation to the x9Xoq: this in no 
way means a 'purposefulness, ' but rather an inner assignment 
(orientation? ) of something to an end, a rounding off, a 
readiness. In Slbv(xgtq there lies the moment of on-the-way- 
to, the oriented striving, oriented towards an end and a 
becoming ready. 23 
At first glance, Heidegger's remarks on the relation between dunamis 
and the telos seem to flirt with contradiction. Initially, he rules 
out any idea of S-6v(xgiq as a 'purposefulness' [ZielstrebiEkeit]. 
24 
Yet in its place he offers the image of a settled orientation 
towards 
a given end and goes on to describe 5-6vcqLiq as an oriented striving 
lausgerichteten Streben] and as being underway towards Eunterwegs-zul 
an end. Whilst balking at the idea that Sbv(xgi(; might at a certain 
Point arrive like a train at its destination, we are 
left wondering 
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how to distinguish Sf-mxg-tc, as an "ausSerichteten Streben" from a 
"Zielstrebigkeit"? The answer stems from the fact that the vEXoc, 
marking the accomplishment of 815V(yRlq is not a work but a manner of 
existence. 25 glbv(xj. Lir, does not strive towards accomplishment, but is 
accomplished as a manner Of striving, and as a manner rather than a 
subject of striving, it is already 'at, the end in question. Whilst 
this clearly speaks against any reification of S'6v%Lir, as something 
present-at-hand, it still remains to spell out the meaning of Streben 
here and accordingly of the description of Sbv(xgiq, as 'underway. ' 
Heidegger will begin to address these questions in the remainder of 
his commentary on Met. E). I, but a fuller answer will emerge gradually 
over the course of his commentary 
Aristotle opens the next passage with the following guarded remark 
concerning the possible connection between Sbvagiq Tou TEoiciv xO(I 
Tt&crx CIv 
Offensichtlich, wird nun also folgendes: Eine Kraft zum Tun 
und zum Erleiden ist das einmal (in einer Hinsicht) so, daß 
eine einzige (als ein und dieselbe) beides ist,... sie ist 
sodann so, daß die eine von beiden je eine andere ist (daß 
sie beides als je eine andere in einem anderen ist)- 
11046a19-22, GA33 1031 
Clearly, then, a power to act and to undergo is such that at 
the same time both are (in one respect) singular (one and 
the same) ... and then 
that one of the two is in each case 
other (they are both as other in another). 
On first inspection, this may seem little more than a recapitulation 
of the earlier point that the power of being acted upon and 
that of 
acting are complementary. However, this passage pushes the 
issue Of 
their unity beyond any sense of complementarity, raising 
the question 
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of the 'primary sense' to which all other senses refer. According to 
Ross, the sense in which the power of acting is one with that of 
undergoing reflects their occurrence as "complementary aspects of a 
single fact" [AMC 2411. Their unity, on this reading, arises from the 
phenomenon they articulate, but is not extended to the powers 
themselves: what is in fact one appears, and is named, as two. The 
ambiguity introduced by Aristotle is thereby portrayed as a failure 
of language to grasp the fact of the matter; the meaning of S1bv<xjiiq, 
I is isolated from the unity of (3-bvcxjjLi(; coi5 nojeTv )cO(j ircko-Xciv and 
cemented as twofold in the wake of the division. For Heidegger, on 
the other hand, the ambiguity lies in the essence of Sbv(xgtq itself 
and directly concerns the sense in which the active and passive 
powers may be said to be the same. Are they two distinct kinds of 
Simxgiq or just one? And if they are just one, how is it to be 
understood? EGA33 1041. Arguing the case for single essential sense, 
Heidegger describes how Sluvagic, cot) -n6fcrxE: iv and 816valitc, -Tob ITOIE: Tv 
are inseparable from one another, not just in general or at an 
abstract level, but in each instance. 
Kraft ist in sich der Bezug der ('xpXý roZ noiE: Zv auf eine 
o(pXý tot n(xcyXcZv und umgekehrt. Das Wesen der Kraft ist in 
sich, aus dem eigenen Wesen her und in Bezug auf dieses, in 
einer ursprünglichen Weise in zwei Kräfte 
auseinandergegangen- EGA33 1051 
Power is in itself the relation of the &pXý Tob noicTv to an 
I OtpX' Tob n(xcrXeTv and vice versa. The essence of power is in rl 
itself, from out of its own essence and in relation to this 
essence, divided in an original manner into two powers. 
By casting the primary sense of s-6voqiiq. as the essential sense and 
distinguishing it from each factual instance of SibwxýLiq, 
Heidegger 
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reveals the putatively 'useless' analysis of S6v(xgjq x<xT& xivgcrlv to 
be a genuinely important introduction to the ontological question of 
dunamis. 26 For whilst it is not yet a matter of Slbv(xgl(; Jni c TExtov, it 
seems that Heidegger's interpretation has taken a decisive step 
towards the xa-r& xivnaccoq perspective that he associated with a 
properly ontological determination of S-6vo(giq. To be sure, the 
genitive phrase does not appear in this discussion and Heidegger even 
confirms tha titiS stil I Slbv(xl-L'(; XO(T& xivqcrlv that is under 
consideration. However, the way Heidegger pursues the question of 
S-3voqi, Lq from this perspective alters the scope of the perspective 
itself. I ndeed, the original determination of xcxT& xivncTiv is 
modified to such an extent in the course of the present analyses that 
before moving on to the next phase of the. reading, Heidegger will 
declare the true significance of the expression Sbv(xgi(; x(YT& xivqcFtv 
to have become evident for the first time. His description of this 
true significance leaves little doubt that the sense of Si6v(xgiq, at 
which he arrives here is properly speaking ontological. 27 
Nonetheless, when Heidegger describes the essence of power as divided 
into two powers, he does not wish to suggest that the essence is in 
any way separable as a prior form. It is not the case, he writes, 
that first there is one and then the other. Rather, the ambiguity 
between them belongs to the essence of what we call power IGA33 1061. 
As he is quick to underline, this does not mean that the essence of 
power is a composite of the two manifest and pre5ent-at-hand powers. 
The essence of power lies in the relation between these 
two: 
das Kraftsein ist beides als eines. IGA33 1051 
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being-power is both as one. 
It is here, at this point of identity and difference between Suvocgir, 
, cob TEoiE: Tv and S-6v(xgi(; Tob 7t&crXcjv, at the original cleft [Grundrip] 
between them, that Heidegger lodges the ontological sense of SbvoqLiq. 
In defending his reading, Heidegger insists on a certain reading of 
the phrase ev ('x'XX4) in the definition of Sbv(xgiq 11046aill. For Ross, 
the distinction between '&pXý of change in another thing' and '&pXý 
of change in itself qua other' depends on ev ('x'XX(. p pertaining to 
gs, uxpoXý only and not to ('XpXý [AMC 2411. For Heidegger, however, 
referring Ev &Xlq) to gcvxpoXý favour5 the identification of Sbvotgic, 
II as (xpXrl, wi th tha t which initiates change, name I y, the ontic 
determination of 6i)v(xgiq coZ iroicTv. Not only does such a reading 
lack a strong textual basis, but it also gives undue emphasis to the 
active powers of the subject or agent, tacitly opening the door to 
the reductive interpretation of 5-6vocgir, in the light of efficient 
causality. That a commentator of Ross's distinction defends a reading 
that implicitly elevates Sibvugic. T-oiS noisTv above the other senses 
and which identifies the arche with the agent of change -a move 
whose repercussions he would surely deplore - is testimony to the 
force with which this perspective imposes itself - On the other 
hand, 
associating ý-v o'(XXcp with the &pXý allows Heidegger to say that where 
there are two ontic potentialities present, it is not unequivocally 
the case that the dxpXý resides in the agent: ontologically speaking 
the &pXý lies neither in the passive nor the active side 
but in the 
difference between them, or rather, in their fundamental 
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differentiation. It is precisely this dynamic nexus that he explores 
in his commentary on the final Passage of Met. e. j. 
Aristotle raises the issue of the contrary to Sbvcxgtq in the sense of 
what may be called incapacity or impotence and, in the wake of the 
previous considerations, carries the investigation to a new level. 
The passage begins as follows. 
Und die Unkraft (Unkräftigkeit) und demzufolge auch das 
»unkräftig« ist als das der iYiý)voeyz(; im besagten Sinne 
Gegenüberliegende ein Entzug lcyTepqcrigl; daher ist jede 
Kraft, wenn sie zur Unkraft wird, d. h. als Unkraft je in 
Bezug auf dasselbe und in Gemäßheit desselben (bezüglich 
worauf die Kraft eine Kraft ist, ist jegliche Kraft 
Unkraft). [1046a28f, GA33 1081 
And un-power (impotence) and accordingly also 'im-potent' 
is, as that which stands over against 5bv(xgiq in the sense 
intended, a privation IcTTiLpqaiq1; hence, each power, in 
becoming a-power, i. e. as un-power, is in each case in 
relation to and conformity with the same thing (with regard 
to that which the power is a power, every power is un- 
power). 
The key to the passage is the concept aTtpqui(ý, translated by 
Heidegger as Entzug and usually rendered in English as privation. 28 
In general, <: rc 1ý' p TI<3-1 q signif ies the condition of being without 
something. This may of course take several forms, which Aristotle 
lists both here and in Book V [1046a32f, 1022b22ffl. However, these 
are ontic examples. In the context of the sentence preceding 
these 
illustrations (that quoted above), Heidegger detects a move to repeat 
the relation of active and passive powers at the level of 
the essence 
of Sbv(xgic, itself. Thus a correspondingly essential sense of aTtpnai(; 
is required. 
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Insofar as the 6 ý6vofg Iq 101'3 TEOICTV does not meet insuperable 
resistance, it may be said to have a domain of efficacity. Heidegger 
describes this as the power holding sway over or governing not simply 
what submits to it but also itself Isich selbst beherrscheyfl. 
However, such governance can fail, whereupon the power gives way to 
its privation. 
Accordingly, when Aristotle writes that power is intrinsically 
related to un-power, Heidegger understands him to mean that every 
power, as finite, is bound from the first to its own reversal. In the 
case of specific powers, we have already seen that active powers are 
essentially related to the power of resistance Ipp. 173-1751. As 
regards the essence of dunamis, the relation is still more intimate. 
For in this case, the relation of power to un-power is not that of an 
original plenitude to its exhaustion or its externally imposed limit, 
that is, it does not consist in the transition from one phase to 
another. 
Der steretische Wandel der Kraft zur Unkraft ist demnach ein 
anderer als etwa der von Bewegung zur Ruhe, nicht nur, weil 
überhaupt Kraft und Bewegung dem Sachgehalt nach verschieden 
sind, sondern weil der der Kraft eigene Besitzcharakter dem 
Verlust und Entzug innerlicher verhaftet ist. [GA33 1131 
The steretic change of power to un-power is thus nothing 
like that of movement to rest, not only because the cases 
are ... different, but because 
the case of power is 
intrinsically bound to its own possession of loss and 
privation. 
The essence of 5,6v(xgi(; is not 'pure' Sibv(xgic, but rather comprises 
its own negation (as indeed befits the cr-undri, 6 between active and 
passive senses) . 
29 Moreover, the notion of (TTf-P9cylq throws the sense 
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of mastery associated with power into relief as a function of 
possession: the positivity of Slbv%Llc, is characterized in terms of 
possession, its overturning or surpassing in terms of privation. The 
essence of Sbvo(giq is therefore a play of possession and privation - 
the emergent leitmotiv of Heidegger5 reading. For the time being, 
however, its value lies in furthering our interpretation of Sbv(xgiq 
as the O'Wý gcTo(POXýq- 
Heidegger described arche-Sein as "in sich ein Ausgehen zum anderen: 
in itself a setting out for what is other" IGA33 1011. In the light 
of what we have discovered concerning the differential character of 
the essence of 8 . 6v0% Iq and its characterization in terms of 
possession and privation, let us compare this with the following 
passage on the meaning of ýLcvxpoXý: 
gs-r(xßolý meint daher in der vollverstandenen Leitbedeutung 
nicht mehr nur einseitig das aktiv Umsetzen, aber auch nicht 
das passive Ertragen dazu, sondern den Wechselbezug beider 
als solchen. [ ... 1 sie 
fällt so wenig zwischendurch, daß 
gerade die Aufweisung der bezdge - 56vapzg; T-ob TloicTv xui 
n&aXciv W'q gl(x - sie in den Blick bringt. EGA33 115 My 
emphasis] 
Understood properly in its fundamental significance, 
gsT(xpoXý thus no longer means merely an active turn-around 
or the corresponding endurance, but the relation of exchange 
between them as such. [... I So little does it occur between, 
that it brings into view the relation Sbv(xgiq Tob noicTv x(yi 
n&CYXCIV 6q gl(x. 
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0 
MvcofpoXý, then, has nothing to do with the realization of an ontic 
potentiality in its actual form, but is rather the phenomenon of the 
differential relation between the active and passive senses of 
potentiality; a relation that displays the essential unity of the 
senses as much as their difference. Accordingly, S1bv(x4Iq, as the &pXý 
of ýLc-capoXý, is not the initial impetus for a determinate transition, 
but rather a 'setting-out' (Ausgehen] that constantly surpasses 
itself in a play of possession and privation. Only on the basis of 
such a play can anything like movement actually occur. In this 
respect, the nexus of R3v(xAiq and oTspq(yjq is the fundamental 
structure underlying the phenomon of movement understood as 
metabole. 30 
* 
Looking back at the initial definition of St)v(xgt(; in its primary 
xc 0( Oc (essential) sense as the <'pXý AcvxPoXýr. 'w "XX4) ýý "XXO, it is now a 
little clearer what Heidegger meant by the claim that the enquiry 
into Slbv(xgi(; x(xE& xivrIcTiv may not itself engage the ontological 
question of Sbv(xgiq x(xT& x1v9cYswq, but that it is useful nonetheless. 
For as Heidegger's commentary shows, the ontological question 
is 
present, albeit for the most part implicitly, even 
in these so-called 
preliminary considerations. In this respect, 
the two phases of the 
enquiry are, as we suggested Ep. 1671, concomitant. 
In his reading of this first chapter, Heidegger 
has achieved one 
thing above all. He ha 5 elicited from 
Aristotle's text an 
interpretation of 8-3v%Liq that, whilst intimately 
bound up with the 
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concept of Sbv(xglq Tob TroieTv, does not proceed from an established 
conception of production and does not concede priority to the active 
powers of the subject. Indeed, its predominant formulation is in 
terms of ge'uxPoXý, understood as the point of original scission 
between the active and passive senses of potentiality. On the basis 
of this interpretation, Heidegger will, in his reading of Book () 
Chapter 2, seek to distinguish the sense of SbvofAiq specific to human 
being. 
III 
In the opening passage of Met. 19.2 Aristotle distinguishes powers 
belonging to beings with a soul from those belonging to beings with 
no soul, thereby invoking the theme of possession and privation 
raised at the end of the previous chapter. At the outset, Heidegger 
notes that the distinction in question here is between ways of being 
[Seinsweisen], adding that by virtue of Sbv(xgiq being a signification 
of being, such ways will bear on the essence of sbv(xA, q itself. In 
addition, the distinction between beings with and without soul is 
crossed by another, namely, that between powers that are accompanied 
by a rational formula 1S1bvcx9'q ýLC'cd( X6'YO'ul and those that are not 
1SDv(xgeiq ocX6yoq1, whereupon the condition of being 
human is 
determined not simply as having soul, but rather of 
having X61oc,; a 
human being is a ((pov X6-yov c'Xov. As a designation of 
the essence of 
human being, the verb 'cXciv thus signifies a way of 
being. Yet, as 
Heidegger remarks, the notion of possession 
itself hereby becomes 
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questionable, since one presumably does not possess either X6Voq or a 
soul in the same way as one possesses consumer durables. Indeed, if 
it is in general true that the character of possession cannot be 
understood in isolation from its object, it is especially true when 
it is logos that is the object of possession. In Chapter One, we 
remarked on Nicolaci's observation that because our relation to all 
things is determined by X6-yoc,, the manner in which X6-yo(; itself is 
possessed is similarly determined Ipp-63-641. The verb 'cXciv in the 
expression r-cpov X6-yov 'P-Xov does not denote a relation between the 
subject Z: 4)ov and the object X6Voq, so much as a manner of existence 
specific to human being by virtue of its determination by X6yoc,. As 
such, having X6yoq amounts to a way of having things. The question of 
how human being is related to X6yor, is thereby translated into the 
question of how it is related to things, for the nature of that 
relation is itself dictated by X6-yoc,. 
Before proceeding with the cormnentary, Heidegger recalls the 
distinction Aristotle makes between the scientific and calculative 
parts of the rational soul ENE. VI. 2: 1139al2l. The former 
1ýn, Lcr, crjgovtx6v1 is described as knowing something in such a way that 
one at the same time has an understanding of self. By contrast, the 
latter 1Xo-Viac-Lx6v1 is a circumspective reckoning or con5ideration 
with an implicit reference to choice and decision. 31 In addition, 
both are described by Heidegger as belonging to logos understood as a 
general gathering together and setting forth of that which is related 
[die Sammlung des unter sich Bezogenen: GA33 1211. This is nOt 
restricted to apophantic or propositional form and can equally 
be 
186 
questioning, requesting, wishing etc., all of which fall under the 
general title of 'announcements' or 'indications. ' X6Voq thus 
understood is ))Kundschaft(( IGA33 1221 and provides the basis for both 
Dasein's acquaintance with things in the world and with "seine eignen 
M, 5g Ii chke i ten und No t wen digke i ten: its own possibilities and 
necessities" EGA33 1281. This affirmation of X6, Vo4; as the common 
ground of both vEXvrj and qýp6vqcyiq, frames the discussion that is to 
fol low. 
Moreover, it does so in a very important fashion. For Met. e. 2 
continues: 
Daher sind alle Fertigkeiten [TeXvoýil und Weisen des 
Sichverstehens auf Herstellung [noigTix(xi von 
etwas Kräfte (in unserem Sinne also Vermögen): denn sie sind 
solches, von wo aus als in einem anderen dieses ausgerichtet 
ist auf ein Umsetzenkönnen. 11046b2-4: GA33 1301 
Thus all preparednesses 1TtXv(xt1 and ways of understanding 
oneself with regard to the production of something 
[7roiqTixofi CnicyTýg(xil are potentialities: for they are such 
as have their source in what is as other and are directed 
towards a capacity to change-around. 
This passage sets the tone for the rest of the chapter inasmuch as it 
deals exclusively with Sibv%Liq in terms of cni(YTýgq. One is thereby 
encouraged to regard the sense of Sbvcxgiq, associated with human being 
as intrinsically a matter of noincr1q. Yet, as Heidegger reminds us, 
, 4cE& 
'x6you, one if al I -ctxvrl and noiijcix(xi ýTrjcy*Týjmi are Sibvagelc 
cannot make the contrary inference. What emerges from Heidegger's 
reading is an understanding of albvo(glq gci& 16yo, that is 
based on a 
conception of X6yoq as Kundschaft and which underlies 
both the 
ýnicmrjýLovix6v and the Xo-Vicrcix6v. Accordingly, Heidegger wi 
II be able 
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to follow Aristotle in elaborating a conception of Sbv(xglq gc'u& X6-Vou 
that is linked to noirjcixý C"Jt1cr'Cýj1rj, and at the end of it still ask 
whether X6-yoq has thereby been determined in its most fundamental 
sense EGA33 146-1473. If not, then of course the same will also be 
true of SibvocýL'L(; ýLcc& X6-you. For our purposes, we shall have to see 
how this fundamental conception of 56vocgiq pertains to the 
ontological determination of Dasein in terms of np&ýIq. 
Aristotle begins the paragraph in question by noting that 
potentialities related to X6-yo(; may be directed towards one of two 
contrary ends, whereas potentialities with no relation to X6yoq can 
issue in one end alone. Accordingly, medicine can kill or cure, but 
that which is wet can only make you wetter. Why should this be so? 
That is, why should the involvement of X6-yo(; 'explain' the relation 
of potentiality to contrary ends? Aristotle suggests that it is 
because the X6-yoq discloses at once that with which one is concerned 
and its privation. For his part, Heidegger addresses the issue by 
elaborating the role of the slSoq in the process of production. 32 As 
the image of the 'epyov that is held in advance of its production, the 
ziSoq announces the end to which the activity is directed. However, 
as such an announcement, it is not merely a pure object of intuition, 
but rather an interpretive synthesi5. 
Das ciSog ist ein so zusammengelesenes Ausgelesenes, ein 
Isy6Acvov, es ist 16yor,. Und das EiSor, ist rg: ), or, - das 
be- 
endende Ende, reir-lov - das Vollkommene, das 
Vollendete, 
, 
ist seinem Wesen nach immer Erlesene, Auserlesene; rgloc 
ausgelesen: X6yoq. EGA33 1421 
The ciSoq is what is interpreted, read in this way as one, a 
Xcy6ýLcvov, it is X6Voq. And the ciSoq is TtXoq - the ending 
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end, -cý: Xciov - the completed, accomplished, picked, picked 
out; in its essence, the TýXoq is always interpreted: X6Voq. 
The question of why X6Voq should compri5e the P055ibility of 
affirmation and negation is hereby elaborated in terms of the 
relation between the agent and what is to be produced. However, the 
source of this possibility must be traced back beyond the 
introduction of X6, joc. as a sufficient explanatory principle in 
itself, and above all beyond its more conspicuous links with 
production. 
The elSor, in each case conveys an 'as' which discriminates between 
success and failure in the accomplishment of the end. In turn, this 
may be understood in terms of X6Voq as a Kundgabe, for what is thus 
given is given as such and such and not otherwise. The possibility 
of discrimination therefore rests on the specificity of this 'as' 
ISZ §331. But why should this 'as' belong to the X6Noq? 
Weil die Kundgabe zur Kundschaft gehört und Kundschaft 
ursprunglich einem Erkunden antwortet. Erkunden aber ist 
notwendig Weg-einschlagen, je Wahl des einen Weges unter 
Aufgabe des anderen, und ist zugleich 
Übernehmen eines 
Standortes undAufgabe des anderen. IGA33 1451 
Because the Kundgabe belongs to kundschaft and Kundschaft 
originally responds to an Erkunden. Erkunden, however, 
is 
necessarily a breaking-open of a way; in each case a choice 
of one way and the surrender of others, and similarly 
the 
assumption of one standpoint and the surrender of others. 
X6, yo(;, as Kundschaft, "responds" to a more original 
feature of the 
sou I that Heidegger calls Erkunden, a form of 
disclosure that 
precedes re-presentation and which forgoes 
the reassurance of seeing 
its destination in advance. A critical, that 
is, discriminatory, 
189 
relation to the world is established ahead of its subsequent ordering 
in terms of ideas and the relation of X6-yoq to contrary ends is 
presented in terms of the orientation of the soul towards one thing 
rather than another, that is, in terms of the movement of the soul 
itself. This does not mean that the X6yo(; is in any way secondary: 
the notion of Erkunden to which Heidegger appeals here does not 
precede the X6-yoq, to be subsequently refracted through it, any more 
than &6v(Xglq gcT& X6-you is a modification of a pre-rational 
potentiality. The idea of such a discriminatory relation goes back to 
Aristotle's description of opetir, as in each case either flight or 
pursuit. Moreover, OpEtl(; is itself described as essentially 
responsive to X6yoq 1p. 981, whereupon the sense of Er-kunden to which 
Heidegger appeals here may be said to comprise a reciprocal relation 
of O'pctiq and X6-yor, in which each term is effectively equiprimordial. 
It is of course as just such a conjunction of desiderative and 
rational elements that Aristotle characterizes human being as the 
&pXý (ef f icient cause) of activity 11 139a3l-1139b7, p. 941.34 However, 
thought only motivates activity if it is for-the-sake-of something, 
that is, if it is oriented by a relation to a specific end, the 
opex, cov, which is the final cause of the activity. For there to be 
activity, the soul must have a relation to the (xpXý that is the final 
cause. With this, we return to our suggestion in Chapter Two that 
Heidegger conceived of transcendence as a radicalization of 
the unity 
of votr, and o'pcýiq. In fact, for Aristotle, the unity of 
the terms is 
manifest in -npo(xipq(Tiq and this is echoed 
by Heidegger's emphasis on 
the element of decision or choice inherent 
in the fundamental 
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orientation of the soul. Naturally, this is no accident, for the 
account of S1bv(x9tq gcT& X6you bears directly on the determination of 
human being in terms of T1poO(! P9cTiq and the remainder of the passage 
under discussion 11046bl5-241 itself hinges on the description of the 
II soul as possessed of the of movement [xivq'crcwq eXci <xpXývl. In order 
to carry forward our enquiry into the relation to the end of 
activity, we must continue to focus on the way that the soul 'has' 
such an ('XpXý. 
With regard to the contrary ends to which Suv(xgi(; ýLz-cd( X6-yo-o is 
related, Aristotle writes: 
Denn eine Kunde [16yo(; ] geht immer auf beides, aber nicht in 
gleicher Weise, und sie gehört (ihrer Seinsart nach) in eine 
Seele, die selbst (als solche) ein Von-wo-aus für Bewegung 
in sich vor-hält. 11046b20-21, GA33 1491 
Then a Kunde EX6yo(; ] always relates to both, but not in the 
same way, and (in accordance with its way of being) it 
belongs in a soul, which itself (as such) holds before 
itself a source of movement. 
The soul grasps the &pXý of movement, of its own movement, via (in 
the manner of) X6-yor., and in such a way that it holds the &pxý 
"before itself. " This is clarified a little further, in terms of the 
&pXý as an o'pexT6v. 
Die Seele hat diese o'(pXý, sofern die Seele als wesenhaft 
(DA. III. 9: 432b7) auf ein 6p£xz6v strebende, als O'pct-Lc 
bezogen ist. Das Haben, 'cXE: iv Ccf, 16yov 'EXov) meint also 
nicht einfach: an sich haben als irgendwelche Eigenschaft, 
sondern etwas haben in der Weise des Sich-dazu-verhaltens. 
IGA33 1511 
The soul has this &pXý insofar as the soul as essentially 
desiring, as O-p cýiq, (DA. 111.9: 432b7) is related 
to an 
opexT6v. Having, E': Xciv (cf. X6-yov 'c'xov) therefore means not 
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simply having in itself as some property, but rather having 
something as a comporting-oneself-towards it. 
Possession of the &pXý consists in the relation towards it, which is 
that of desire: to 'have' and to 'desire' are equivalent here. How 
can this be so? Does one not desire what one does not have? Is desire 
not at bottom a not-having? And, on gaining possession of a thing, is 
one's desire for it not satiated? The object of desire is 
unmistakably 'there' in some sense. But how is this to be expressed 
in terms of having? In his lectures on the Theatetus (offered the 
semester after the course on Met-e. 1-3, in the Winter of 1931-1932), 
Heidegger notes that to possess something is customarily understood 
to mean having it at one's disposal IGA34 2121. However, he writes, 
such an experience is often accompanied by a forgetfulness Of the 
self, a loss of the subject. Contrary to appearances, such having 
amounts to a form of slavery in which the self forsakes the capacity 
of choice and is held in thrall by that which it ostensibly 
commands. 35 Such possession, however complete, is duly inauthentic 
EGA34 2131. By contrast, an authentic sense of having is said to 
involve the self 'coming to itself' Ezu sich selbst kommen] - an 
expression our present interests forbid us to take at face value. How 
is such a movement to be understood? In what sense does one arrive at 
oneself? These were precisely the questions that we posed to Nicolaci 
in Chapter One when he described the sense of self-relation specific 
to np&tir as a raggiungersi [arriving at or reaching oneself] 
Ep. 641. 
Our point at the time was that the usual understanding of such a 
movement implicitly involves a relation to an external end, 
that is, 
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a form of relation determined by the experience of production and 
inherently inappropriate to the understanding of np&tlc .. Could the 
sense of 'authentic having' to which Heidegger refers here offer an 
alternative, such that it may give a sense to the expression 'coming 
to oneself' that may illuminate the for-the-sake-of relation that, as 
we have maintained from the start, must be distinct from the relation 
between the agent and the work? Certainly, if we are to indicate the 
way such a relation may be conceived, then an alternative to the 
sense of possession outlined above must be discovered, and the 
opposition between having and desire is clearly not irrelevant to the 
matter. Moreover, the opposition between having and desire is not as 
clear cut as it may seem. Indeed, Heidegger goes so far as to ask 
whether desire may be not merely a manner of having, but actually co- 
consitutive of the essence of authentic having EGA34 2141. 
In Heidegger's view, desire, like having, has both authentic and 
inauthentic forms. In its inauthentic form, it consumes itself 
"chasing after Inachlaufen]" that which is desired and thereby brings 
about the destruction [Zerst6rung] of the desiring self. 36 But not 
every desire loses itself in its object. That desire is #over-to' 
(Hin-zu] something does not necessarily mean that it is 'away from' 
itself [Weg-von-sich-selbstl EGA34 2151. 
Vielmehr läßt sich (zunachst) ein Streben denken, das 
im 
Hin-zu auf das Bestrebte gerade dieses Bestrebte als ein 
solches fest-und dabei auf sich selbst zu hält, um 
in diesem 
Auf-sich-zu-halten des Bestrebten sich selbst zu finden, und 
zwar sich selbst nicht als ein Punkt und ein 
Ding und ein 
Subjekt, sondern sich selbst im Sinne des Wesens 
der Seele, 
die Wesenhaft Verhältnis ist, - und also sich selbst zu 
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finden gerade als dieses Strebensverhältnis zum Bestrebten. IGA34 2151 
Rather, one can conceive (provisionally) of a striving that holds that which is striven for fast as such in the over-to [Hin-zu] and thereby holds it close by itself: and in this holding-close-by-itself of that which is striven for finds 
itself and does so not as a point or a thing or a subject, but rather in the sense of the essence of the soul, which is 
substantially relation, - and thus finds itself precisely as this striving-relation to that which is desired. 
In this waY, authentic desire informs the notion of authentic having 
that we came across a moment ago, helping to shed light on the sense 
of 'coming to oneself' that was associated there with the for-the- 
sake-of relation. But first, how is it that what is held in desire is 
neither consumed nor remains entirely alien? It is true that what is 
given (in and through the X6yo4; ) must, to preserve the sense of 
giving, remain in part other EGA33 144-1451. Heidegger chooses to 
explicate this by referring to the way that what is disclosed is in 
each case disclosed in this or that respect, as this or that. 36 That 
which is disclosed must remain in part other precisely insofar as it 
is held as something. If the finitude of desire consists in the fact 
that it engages what is desired in each case only in a particular 
respect, then it is on account of such finitude that desire does not 
achieve the complete possession of what it desires. 
But have we not merely described a weakneS5 of desire, its 
incapability Of wholly grasping its object and thereby annulling 
itself in the ful I achievement of its end? We should certainly beware 
of laying too much emphasis on the previous explanation. 
For given 
that the account of o'pcýi(; forms part of a broader account of 
Si)v<xýLlc, 
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by which it is in turn informed, we might expect the sense of 
finitude attached to S1bvocgt(; to be reflected in the conception of 
desire. Heidegger warned us earlier against thinking the finitude of 
s6v(xgjq as the waning of its powers or as its inability to overcome 
an external limit. The 6pex-c6v, then, is not viewed as an entity 
towards which the soul must move, as when the process of production 
draws toward the pre-sighted end IGA33 1511. In fact, what is 
striking about Heidegger's description of authentic desire is 
precisely the degree to which it lacks any sense of pursuit. The 
description of desire holding that which is desired "close by itself" 
imbues the phenomenon with a sense of St85iS that seems at odds with 
the very notion of desire. Whilst this is certainly true, we should 
avoid any jumping to any obvious conclusions, for, ontologically 
speaking, even that which is at rest is determined in terms of 
movement. 38 Our task will thus be to arrive at an understanding of 
such apparent stasis that is itself fundamentally conceived in terms 
of movement. In this, it may be instructive to recall Heidegger's 
characterization of Dasein's being-towards-death CSZ §950-531. We 
cannot enter into a full account of it here. However, as the present 
enquiry is concerned at bottom with the form of movement specific 
to 
the existence of Dasein, the determination of Dasein's being-towards- 
death will at once be informed by and, perhaps, 
illustrate some of 
the issues raised by the discussion of desire. 
Heidegger of course 
rules out any thought that being-towards-death 
be understood as a 
death drive. This would be to seek the actualization of 
death, 
whereas his intention is to show how death 
is preserved precisely as 
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possibility. Accordingly, it is not a case of Dasein's movement 
towards death, so much as a relation to death that is at once made 
possible by the end in question and yet which is at the same time 
responsible for that end as such (i. e. for its having the form of 
possibility). In the case of desire, too, the being of the end as the 
I upXý of the movement is determined by the relation itself, which is 
only what it is by virtue of the desire. In this way, what is desired 
is held in the very movement of desire: desire has its end. To recall 
an earlier description of dunamis, it is unterwegs-zu precisely 
because it is ausgerichtet auf Ep. 1761. To say that desire is 
unterwegs-zu is not to say that has yet to arrive. Quite simply, 
desire does not move towards its end because it is itself movement: 
and movement itself does not move, only what is in movement. By 
analogy, it would be more accurate to say of desire that it is itself 
a mode of having, rather than the subject of having. 39 In this 
respect, the reason desire does not have its end absolutely or, as it 
were, conclusively, lies in the essential relation of power to its 
own reversal. For the sense of movement implicit here has less to do 
with transition, least of all that between active subject and passive 
object, or agent and work, than with the essential differentiation of 
activity and passivity within Sbvagic. itself, that is, with ýLc-mPo). 
ý 
as the overturning of having and not-having into one another. 
And it 
is in this, its relation to crctpTIcur, that the finitude of 
S1bv(xVtr, 
properly consists. 
np&ý IC But what of the specificity of ? 
We began this section by 
noting that in spite of the bias in Aristotle's presentation 
towards 
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noiryc-txý Cn-Lacýgrj, Heidegger's interpretation of X6VoC, as Kundschaft 
secured the basis for a neutral determination of 816-MAI(; gCT& X6VOU 
that was not itself governed by either Tloinaiq or npditiq- How then 
are we to draw from this any conclusion regarding the for-the-sake-of 
relation and the movement specific to the existence of Dasein as 
7[P&t I q? 
In all of this, what is it that is supposed to be 'had'? Ultimately, 
the O'fpXý to which the soul is related is the final end, the 6ry(xO6v. 
But, as we saw in Chapter Three, the o'(-Vcxo6v is not given directly as 
such. Inevitably, indeed necessarily, the existence of Dasein as a 
whole interposes itself and the question becomes intertwined with 
that of the oi-yo(06v np(xxc6v, clýnp&ýiot. This same congruence of the 
I (x-Voc06v in an absolute sense and the (x'-y(xO6v Trp(xxc6v, of Dasein's 
relations to being and to its own existence, is evident in 
Heidegger's remarks concerning the concomitance of desire and having. 
To his description of having as a manner of comporting oneself 
towards something [Sich-dazu-ver-hal ten: GA33 151, p. 1921, he added 
that in such having the soul "comes to itself, " and it does so "as 
this striving relation": that is, in 'having' the 6pexc6v, holding 
sway over it, the soul also has or holds itself over against the 
privation and withdrawal characteristic of Sbv(xglq itself [GA34 2151. 
The relation to the o'pexT6v is not only inseparable from the relation 
of such having-desire to itself, but can only be manifest in such a 
relation. This becomes clear when we recal I that the 6cy(xO6v npaxE6v 
is r-U71p&tiot, a manner of existence. We have already seen 
that Sbv(xgiq 
is essentially articulated in terms of a manner of existence. 
Having- 
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desiring the end therefore means having-desiring a manner of 
existence and this necessarily entails that there i5 Sj)v(xgj(;, that 
is, that 81. ) holds sway over the dissipation and 
' v(xg iq loss that 
characterize its essential finitude. 
In this way, we are brought back not only to the place of self- 
relatedness in the relation to the f inal end, but also to the nature 
of that relation in terms of the concomitance of desire and having 
that we have already identified as of the utmost significance for the 
question of the for-the-sake-of relation. Moreover, in returning to 
it we have found the dominant theme to be that of having. There would 
be little difficulty in bridging the gap from here back to the end of 
Chapter Two, where the bond of voi5q, and 6pet-tr, characteristic of 
human being as an (xpXý of activity was traced in Aristotle to ýýic, 
the relation to virtue and itself related to the Greek verb E'XE: iv, to 
have. However, we shall defer any further consideration until we have 
looked at Heidegger's commentary on Met. (). 3, where the question is 
not that of essence but of existence. Having reached an understanding 
of what Sf)v4xjtt(; is, it is now a matter of determining how it exists 
as such. Given the interpretation Heidegger has offered, this will 
mean establishing how the play of appropriation that characterizes 
the f ini tude of Sbvugi c, wi II manif est i tse If in a manner of the 
existence of that being possessed of Sbv(xglq pcT& X6you- 
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IV 
If the first two chapters of Met. E) were concerned with the essence of 
S1bvoqiiq, the third engages the question of its existence, that is, 
not with what Sýbv(xAiq is, but with the way that it manifests itself. 
This is not to say that the two questions are wholly separate from 
one another. Quite the contrary; the essence and the existence of 
S'Uv%Li(; (as indeed of anything else) must be considered in connection 
with one another CGA33 169,2221. Indeed, our remarks on the 
authentic and inauthentic forms of having and desire in the previous 
section have already carried the account of the essence of Sbv(ygt(; so 
far as to broach the question of its existence. Since Met. 8.3 
addresses itself to this issue explicitly, it might be regarded as a 
supplement to the enquiry carried out in the previous two chapters. 
However, it is more than a conclusion. A substantial part of the 
chapter is taken up with a polemic against the Megaric school over 
the existence of Sibvo(ptiq, and, as is we] I known, Aristotle frequently 
prefaces his own account of a problem with a critical review of 
competing theories. In view of this we might expect the chapter to 
serve as a springboard from which Aristotle launches a new phase of 
the enquiry. This is indeed the case, and in two important respects. 
First of all, in establishing the manner of existence appropriate 
to 
Sibv%Liq xo(T& xivqcFiv, Aristotle carries the enquiry another step 
nearer to the account in Met. E). 6 of 816v(xVic, as a signification of 
being, that is, of S1bv(xgjq 6ni nV: ov. More immediately, 
however, the 
Megarics' theory of the existence of Sbvo(ýLi(; brings 
the theme of 
6v16p-ycioc to the fore for the first time, and this heralds 
Aristotle's 
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own interpretation of i i: 6vc"C'(3c "ý'c6 x! vr1o`1v- This is important to 
recognize, since Aristotle does not draw attention to the fact that 
evtpycia xotT6 x-'Lvrlcriv will be addressed here. And even when the 
determinations of S1bv(xgiq xoti 1E: vCPYc1(X ýni nXiEov are introduced in 
Met. 8.6, he gives no indication that the preceding chapters have 
dealt with anything besides Sbv(x#t4; x(xcd( xivr1criv. In this way, the 
critique of the Megarics at once supplements the preceding enquiry 
into the essence of 8ý6v(xgiq and opens the way for both phases of 
Aristotle's account of CVtp-VCj<X. 40 Ultimately, however, the 
determinations of the essence and existence of Sbvo(giq must be 
considered as a whole, a single account reflected upon itself. 
Heidegger's commentary on Met. 0.3 is long and particularly rich. We 
shall therefore have to be more selective in our reading than 
hitherto, picking out only those themes that are most important for 
the problematic at hand. 
* 
Met. 0.3 begins with an outline of the Megarics' thesis concerning the 
existence of Sbvocgiq. 
Es gibt aber gewisse Leute, wie z. B. die Megariker, die 
sagen, nur wenn eine Kraf t am Werke sei, dann sei das 
Kräftigsein zu etwas vorhanden, wenn sie aber nicht am Werke 
sei, dann sei auch kein Kräftigsein, z. B. der nicht bauende 
(Baumeister) sei nicht kräftig des Bauens, wohl aber der 
bauende, wenn er baut; imgleichen gelte das auch von den 
anderen kräften. Daß das, was mit dem Gesagten sich 
einstellt, nirgends unterzubringen ist, das ist nicht schwer 
zu sehen. [1046b29-33, GA33 1621 
There are certain people, such as the MegariC5, who say that 
being-powerful for something is only present when a power is 
at work, but that there is no being-powerful when it is not 
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at work; e. g. the (builder) who is not building is not 
capable of building, but only the one building, when he is building. It is not hard to see that what is proposed here 
cannot be accomodated. 
The question, then, is whether and how S, 6vo%Ljc actually , can be 
present as power. It is the Megarics' view that Sibvocgiq can only be 
present in the very actualization for which it is a power, in 
cvi: pyci(Y; in Heidegger's terms, only when it is 'at work. '41 As the 
end of the passage quoted above suggests, Aristotle is quick to seize 
on the absurdities that follow from the Megaric thesis and points out 
immediately that it commits one to saying that only the builder who 
is actually building may legitimately be called a builder, and 
similarly with other arts (TtXVOCI 1. Elaborating the problem, 
Aristotle notes that the Megaric thesis leaves no room, or rather 
time, for either learning or forgetting such arts: one passes from 
being able to build to not being able to build directly on laying 
down tools. Understandably reluctant to accept such a view, Aristotle 
reminds us that the powers in question here must be acquired over a 
period of time and that once acquired, they are not lost in an 
instant. The power to build, present in the acquired capacity of the 
builder, not only persists throughout the movement of building, 
but 
survives the end of that movement. As such, its existence cannot 
simply be identified with the activity or its accomplishment. 
The crux of the matter is that the Megarics do not 
distinguish 
between power (or potentiality) and possibility. 
In their view, 
whatever has not yet taken place does not exist. 
Consequently, what 
is potential does not exist and, which amounts 
to the same thing, 
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cannot be present until such time as it actually occurs. Moreover, if 
the existence of what is potential is denied, there wi II be no sense 
in saying that something has the power or potential to change. 
Accordingly, what is not happening cannot happen and the very 
possibility of movement is denied. But one cannot affirm this and 
continue to claim, as the Megarics do, that Sbv(Xgiq exists only in 
the movement of realization without lapsing into self-contradiction: 
such a view clearly precludes any sense in which potentiality itself 
may be present. Conversely, Aristotle's recognition of the importance 
of learning and forgetting, of acquisition and loss, lead him to the 
question of how potentiality can be present precisely as 
potentiality, independently of the realization of that for which it 
is a potentiality. We shall look at this more closely in a moment, 
but first of all, some more general remarks. 
Aristotle frames his treatment of the issue in such a way as to 
magnify the contradiction in the Megarics' thesis. Yet if Heidegger 
emphasizes Aristotle's achievement in posing the question of Sbv(xgiq 
in this way, he also underlines repeatedly that the Megaric thesis 
contains an important element of truth. Heidegger characterizes the 
actual existence at issue as Vor-handensein or Anwesenheit. For the 
Megarics, this sense is determined solely with regard to the work, 
the 'Cpyov. For Aristotle, however, this conception was too narrowly 
drawn and had to be broadened in such a way as to encompass the 
presence of S1bv(yjiiq prior to and following its realization. Aristotle 
thereby challenges the paradigm of the work that exerted such an 
influence over Greek conception of being and 
insists in particular 
202 
that it is inappropriate to the C43ov X6-yov c'Xov. Moreover, in so 
doing, he casts a different light on movement itself. For the 
Megarics, movement is the becoming present of what was absent; for 
Aristotle, movement is at once the becoming present of what was 
absent (the work) and the becoming present in one way of what was 
already present in another way (Sbv(xglq) IGA33 1851. Yet it would be 
wrong to suppose that the Megaric thesis had been dismissed entirely. 
Rather, Aristotle's break with the Megarics is set against the 
background of a broader continuity. For his response remains within 
the ambit of productive activity whilst focu5sing on the very 
condition for such activity, namely, having acquired the potential to 
act in such a fashion. For Heidegger, then, Aristotle's determination 
of the existence of Sbvo(giq in terms of having does not repIace the 
Megaric thesis so much as place it within its proper limits, that is, 
ground it in its necessary condition of possibility IGA33 1841. 
As we have seen, Aristotle understands the existence of S1bv(xgiq to 
consist in the way that it is possessed by an individual. In 
Heidegger's terms: 
Vermögend-sein zu etwas heißt eben: die äbvo(litc, haben, und 
das entsprechende Nichthaben besagt: nicht vermögend-sein. 
Dieses Haben und Nichthaben birgt in sich das Wirklichsein 
und Nichtwirklichsein der älbv(xgig. Wird also das Haben als 
ein Sein gefaßt? Offenbar ist hier das E'Xciv und gý 
gXctv in 
ganz bestimmtem Sinne verstanden. [GA33 1771 
being-able to do something simply means having the 6bv(xgiq, 
and the corresponding not-having means not being-able. 
This 
having and not-having harbour in themselves the 
being-actual 
and not being-actual of 5bv(xj. Liq. Is having 
thereby grasped 
as being? Clearly 'cXciv and gý ýXciv are understood 
here in 
a wholly specific sense. 
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According to everyday idiom, one has the power to do something. Yet 
if we recall that the essence of Sj)v(ygjq was itself defined in terms 
of having, then the sense 1 01 in which : 'E: xE: tv and lirl exciv are intended 
here does indeed become problematic. For one cannot have having, 
whereupon the sense in which one might be said to have a power is 
equally obscure. As Heidegger suggests, it is more appropriate to 
understand 'E': Xciv and gý " SXF-1 v as ways of being: one does not have 
power, one is, exists as, power in a manner akin to that of having as 
outlined with regard to the essence of power. 42 Accordingly, the 
acquisition of power is not comparable to the addition of an 
accidental property to a substantially constant subject. In 
Heidegger's terms, it is a fundamental modification in the manner of 
Dasein's relation to itself and to things in the world. Moreover, 
because 81bv(Ygir, is not an object, and its acquisition less an act 
performed upon an object than a modification of the subject itself, 
it can be neither performed nor 'willed' as such. In Aristotle, this 
problem manifests itself in the difficulty surrounding the origin of 
c terms, the -cg: Xvrl required 'ýE: I(;; to Put it in the starkest possible 
to build cannot be acquired otherwise than by building, yet one 
cannot build without having already acquired some measure of TtXv9- 
Heidegger reiterates a variation of this bind 
in the opening 
Paragraph of 'The Origin of the Work of Art, 
' but it is evident 
elsewhere too, albeit in a less overt fashion; 
for example, in the 
question Of Dasein's alternation 
between authenticity and 




What we have touched upon here in connection with Slbvofgi(; could be 
described as the problematic relation between essence and existence. 
How is what something is manifest in how it is? A somewhat crude 
response might present the relation in terms of appearance: the 
thing-like essence appears in a certain fashion, is articulated in a 
series of forms determined in part by the context of its appearance, 
a series responsive to synthesis and the cognitive reconstruction of 
the essence ISZ 52: 76-771. But if such an approach was already 
rendered problematic by Aristotle's animation of substance, it is 
driven to new heights of implausibility by Heidegger's ontological 
appropriation of Aristotle's practical philosophy. In the first 
place, the essence-existence relation is all but collapsed insofar as 
the essence of Dasein lies in its existence CSZ 42: 671: the what of 
Dasein is determined precisely by the ontological structures that 
determine the manner of its comportment in and towards the world. 
There is, therefore, no substantial essence. However, a new and still 
more problematic difference threatens to open up, namely that between 
ontological (existential) determinations and their ontic 
(existentiell) counterparts. As we saw earlier [p. 91, by taking the 
ontological structures constitutive of Dasein from the language of 
activity, Heidegger risks giving the impression that 
the divide 
between Dasein's deliberate activity and the movement constitutive of 
its ground (Abgrund as well as Grund) has been effaced. 
In spite of 
the congruence of essence and existence at 
the basis of Heidegger's 
account of Dasein, there remains a difference 
between them which is 
indeed brought all the more sharply into 
focus by the proximity of 
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the respective determinations, both of which are defined in terms of 
having. Heidegger insists on their being understood via one another. 
But are we to understand having as in each instance the same? To be 
sure, the essence of Dasein lies in its existence, but how does the 
definition of its essence in terms of a play of appropriation and 
loss and as mastery over itself translate into an existentiell 
comportment? Can we even conceive of such a translation? If in 
broader terms, questions such as these arise as a consequence of 
Heidegger's ontological interpretation of Aristotle's practical 
philosophy, in the present context they follow from the fact, noted 
above, that one cannot have potentiality because potentiality is 
itself defined essentially in terms of appropriation and loss, that 
is, as having. Insofar as having potentiality is therefore a manner 
of existing, it may be described as a form of movement 11022aff]. 
Accordingly, it is in terms of movement that the question of the 
relation between essence and existence will increasingly be phrased. 
The actuality of Sibvagiq consists in the possession of a skill or 
ability, in what Heidegger calls EingeUbtsein I being-pract iced) IGA33 
1911. For there to be movement, this EingeUbtsein must 'come' to an 
AusUbung [exercise or execution] or AusfUhrung (leading out], an 
event that Heidegger describes at once as Ubergehen [going-over] and 
as UberfUhren werden [being led over] EGA33 1911. This touches upon 
the problem of how movement begins. Allowing a transition from rest 
to movement invites an infinite regression of such beginnings. 
It is 
for this reason that Aristotle rejected the idea that 
the beginning 
of movement could itself be a movement. 43 Heidegger's response 
is to 
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propose that the transition is always already underway in the essence 
of Sbv(xgiq. Prior to the occurrence of movement, potentiality already 
exists as 6bV(X9IV Exe I V, a condition that Heidegger describes 
variously as Gehaltenheit (having-heldness) and as an Ansichhalter 
(holding-in-itself]. Rather than being something that happens to such 
a condition, the SichUberfUhren is itself intrinsic to Sbv(xgiq as an 
Ansichhalten. 
Die Überführung wird dem Vermögen nicht als etwas Neues 
dazugeschoben, sondern ist als Aufbehaltenes in diesem 
Ansichalten. IGA33 1921 
The leading over is not added to the potentiality as 
something new, but is rather held back within this holding- 
in-itself. 
Movement does not spring from an inert condition of potentiality. 
Accordingly, the term SichUberfUhren suggests that AusUbung and 
AusfUhrung, as designations of movement, are not so much initiated as 
released from the essence of Sbvcxgtq in and through a modification in 
its manner of existence. Indeed, in elucidating this notion of 
SichUberfEffiren, Heidegger explicitly refers the reader back to his 
account of the essence of Slbv(xjiiq and in particular to the fact that 
every power 'holds sway' over something other than itself. At the 
same time, of course, it must hold sway over itself and, in its 
finitude, over the withdrawal and loss [cyTtpnaiq1 that inheres 
in its 
essence. The dimension in which the predominance of appropriation 
over loss takes place is invoked by Heidegger's reference 
to the 
Spielraum required by the notion of SichUberfUhren. 
In this way, the 
account of the existence of Sbvo(piq refers 
back to its essence, and 
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the sense of movement as gccofpoXý that 
take in the broader perspective of the 
that S'6v(xgiq and z'vsP'VcI(x themselves 
movement and it is precisely in view of 
movement that one has recourse here to C 
terms of gcT(xpoXý. What, then, of Sbv(xglq 
one finds there. Yet if we 
account as a whole, we see 
arise as articulations of 
the relation of 6ý)v(xgiq to 
he account of its essence in 
and movement? 
Having argued that the Megarics' thesis on the actualitY of Sbvcxgiq 
does away with movement, Aristotle illustrates the difficulties to 
which it leads: 
Immer nämlich wird sowohl das Stehende stehenbleiben als 
auch das Sitzende sitzenbleiben; nicht nämlich wird es sich 
aufrichten, wenn es sich gesetzt hat; denn es ist 
unvermögend [&ciiý)vo, -zovl, daß es aufstehe, was das Vermögen 
aufzustehen gar nicht hat. 11047a15-17, GA33 2111 
Thus, one standing will remain always standing, just as one 
sitting will remain sitting. Thus, if one has sat down, one 
will not get up. What does not have the potential to stand 
up will therefore be incapable 10'(8bvo(Tov1 of standing up. 
As Heidegger remarks, between sitting and standing there lie sitting 
down and standing up as kinds of transition, libergang. But these do 
not lie between the end points in the same way a stone lies between 
two other stones. For the state of sitting is itself a 'having-sat' 
and standing is 'having-stood-up': 
der Obergang gehdrt zu diesen Ph. Unomenen als das, wodurch 
sie in verschiedener Weise hindurchgegangen sein mUssen bzw. 
hindurchgehen werden. Das Verm6gendsein-zu ist in seiner 
eigensten Wirklichkeit mitbestimrnt durch dieses PhYnomen des 
libergangs. EGA33 2111 
transition belongs to these phenomena as that through which 
they must in different ways exist as gone through toward5 or 
be gone through towards. Being-potential-to 
is in its 
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authentic actuality co-determined through this phenomenon of transition. 
Both the end of the movement and the potential for the movement are 
fundamentally determined by the movement itself. Heidegger 
encapsulates his interpretation of Sbvo(giq in an example, that of an 
athlete, a sprinter, poised on the starting line in anticipation of 
the gun- What do we see, he asks? Not simply a man who is not in 
movement, who is kneeling down. This could be said equally well, or 
rather better, of an old peasant before a station of the cross. 
Rather, it seems as though the whole of the athlete's frame is bent 
towards the way ahead. In fact, adds Heidegger, does it only seem so? 
Mein, es sieht nicht nur so aus, es ist so, und - was ebenso 
entscheidend ist zu bedenken - wir sehen das unmittelbar so. 
EGA33 2181 
No, it not only seems so, it is so and - what is precisely 
decisive to think - we see it immediately to be so. 
Here, then, potentiality is present as such. Both the intention to 
run and the ability to do so well are concentrated in the very 
sti I Iness of the athl ete awai ting the signa I to go. As such, itis 
anything but the absence of movement. 
Wirklich-Vermögend-sein ist das bereitschafterfüllte Im- 
Stand-sein-zu, dem nur noch die Enthemmung in den Vollzug 
fehlt, so daß, wenn diese vorhanden ist, sich eingestellt 
hat, das heißt: wenn der Vermögende sich ins Zeug legt, der 
Vollzug wahrhaft Ausübung ist und nur dieses. Er ist nichts 
anderes als Sich-ins-Zeug-legen - Evep-Vci(x (I'c'p-Vov: das Werk 
oder das Zeug). [GA33 2191 
Being-actually-potential is the fully ready being-in-place- 
to, the accomplishment of which lacks only the release, so 
that when this is present, it is engaged: ie. if what 
is 
potential sets to work, the accomplishment 
is truly 
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performance and only this. It is nothing other than setting 
to work - evtp-yevy Ocpyov: the work or the tool). 44 
For the potentiality to be present as such, it is not enough that it 
be acquired and held in readiness. It must also be plain that it can 
be put into practice. Hence the definition of potentiality that 
Aristotle gives at 1047a24 and which Heidegger translates in the 
following way (given the importance of this passage and the 
particular force of his translation, I shall not attempt my own)-45 
In Wirklichkeit vermögend aber ist dieses, dem nichts mehr 
unausführbar ist, sobald es sich in das Zeug legt, als wozu 
das Zeug zu haben angesprochen wird. 11047a24-26, GA33 2191. 
It must hold sway over itself and over that which stands in 
resistance against it: the sense of mastery implicit in the 
complementary relation of Slbv(xgiq -uob noiciv xcxi n&cyXctv and, of 
course, in the essence of Sbv<xgtq itself. Clearly, then, ývtpjeia is 
relevant to the definition of dunamis, though not as the Megarics 
thought. Rather, it contributes to the definition of movement, in 
view of which 816vocgir, is itself defined. In the passages above, it 
directly denotes movement, which is characterized by vý: p-ycio( as 
'Sich-ins-Zeug-legen. ' This most unusual translation has a twofold 
significance. First of all, it preserves a sense of 
the etymological 
composition of the word from its elements, en and 
the verbal form of 
Cp'yov: in-work, at-work. 46 But in addition, 
Sich-ins-Zeug-legen can 
also mean 'to buckle down' or 'to put one's shoulder 
to the wheel' 
and thereby conveys the sense of concentrated 
effort which 
Heidegger's interpretation attaches to Sbvagiq. 
What this eloquently 
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demonstrates is that Heidegger understands Sbvo(Aiq and cvcPycl(x in a 
fully integrated fashion. Moreover the scene of integration is 
movement itself, precisely because the two terms in question are 
treated from the first as articulations of movement, the point, as 
Aubenque has it, of their original indistinction [PEA 4531: 
das Vorhandensein des Vermögenden als solchen in gleicher 
Weise wie die Wirklichkeit im Sinne des Vollzugs sind Weisen 
des In-Bewegung-seins, auf dieses in sich bezogen und nur 
von daher zu fassen. IGA33 2161 
the being present-at-hand of potentiality as such and 
similarly the actuality in the sense of accomplishment are 
ways of being-in-movement, to which they are intrinsically 
related and only in connection with which can they be 
comprehended. 
If both S-6v(xji'Lc, and Cvgpycicx are ways of being- in-movement, do they 
share a common feature? Can we get closer to what is meant by this 
sense of being- in-movement? Let us turn brief ly to Heidegger's later 
essay on Aristotle's conception of <pbatq, where he gives a succinct 
account of his interpretation of cvc'p-Vci(x and E'vTsXtXei(x. 
Movement is, for Aristotle, a fundamental characteristic of the 
sublunar world. Accordingly, even those things which are 
superficially at rest are determined with regard to movement. Rest, 
therefore, is simply a limiting case of movement, rather than a 
condition essentially opposed to movement. It, too, has its 
being in 
what Heidegger calls Bewegtheit [being-moved]. Indeed, 
the purest 
manifestation of Bewegtheit is to be found where rest 
does not mean 
the cessation of movement, but rather where movement 
is, as it were, 
gathered into its end: 
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dieses Innehalten die Bewegtheit nicht aus sonder ein, ja 
nicht nur ein, sonder erst aufschließt. IVWB-WM 282: 2561 
this ingathering, far from excluding being-moved, includes 
and for the first time discloses it. 
This is why circular movement, in which there is no discernible 
beginning or end, represents the highest form of movement, a movement 
which is at all times complete and which is therefore tantamount to 
being at rest. However, the example Heidegger gives is taken from 
Met. 0.6, namely that of seeing: one sees and has seen at the same 
time and in such seeing there is no separation between movement and 
end. Seeing is an F', vý-p-yziu, in the specific sense that stands in 
contrast to xivqcyiq and which characterizes also, amongst other 
things, living well and being happy [1048b25, cf. p. 321. In Chapter 
One we saw the so-called cpVov argument conclude in the determination 
of the final end, cUTEpcxt1Lot, as the evitp-Vem of the soul 's rational 
faculties, that is, of the intellectual EýClqv of those 
potentialities described in this chapter in terms of S, 6vO%L'(; ge-I& 
X6-you. 
We saw then that the essence of Si6vo(gir, consisted 
in a sense of 
mastery in which the appropriative current in 
the play of 
appropriation and loss prevailed. This play, the essential relation 
of Sbv(xgiq, to its own finitude, was described 
by Heidegger in terms 
of metabole. Moreover, the possibility of such mastery 
was in turn 
intrinsically linked to a notion of end as a manner of existence, 
the 
how that gives the Sbv(xýLiq its necessary orientation. 
Further on, we 
found that the existence of Sbv(xliiq 
depends upon one 'having 
212 
potential ' and that this is characterized as the relation to an end 
which itself denotes a manner of existence. This relation, at once 
having and desiring, is in turn parallel to the sense implicit in the 
essence of SbV(Xg1q. Having potential thereby consists in a 
desiderative appropriation of the end, where this end is a manner of 
existence and therefore not independent from that existence as the 
desiderative appropriation itself. Having the end therefore amounted 
to having itself, that is, to the existence of Siýv(ygiq as a form of 
mastery. In the present case, we find that the Bewegtheit of a 
movement is said to consist in the way the movement of a moving being 
'has' itself in the end, a sense captured in the very word ývlccXtXcic( 
by which Aristotle denotes such Bewegtheit and which Heidegger, 
avoiding Latinate forms, translates literally as 'Sich-im-Ende- 
Haben, ' 'having-itself-in-the-end. '47 The being of movement is 
thereby identified with its end, but not so as to suppress the 
significance of the movement itself. cvucXtXci(Y is intended here to 
denote the condition of the thing that stands at the accomplishment 
of movement, that which has become what it is. As such, it should be 
understood in the light of the example of sitting and standing from 
Met. 8.3 mentioned above; the end is the condition that arises by 
virtue of the movement and is no more isolated from that movement 
than the present is from the past. 48 But what of the sense of 
V cvTcXtXzi(x and e'vep-yetoe associated with movement, 
that is, the 
cVtP'ycicx of S-&v%L,, 4; qua &6v(xýL-Lq 120lb4l? One of the most 
important 
and most challenging aspects of Heidegger's interpretation 
is the way 
these various usages of the terms cvTcXtXci(x and 
ývtpyctcx are brought 
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together. Whereas the stasis of the end as 1-7'vCPVC14Y is of ten 
contrasted to the dynamic character of movement as the cvEP-yc1<Y of 
5-6v(xjiiq,, Heidegger highlights the common thread in these disparate 
senses by way of an interpretation that could be said to comprise two 
principal features. First, it remains insensible to the distinction 
between state and process, which is appropriate only to the level at 
which movement is contrasted to rest, but is inapt if applied to the 
level of Bewegtheit as the common condition of that which is or can 
be in movement. In this way, it remains faithful to Aristotle's 
declared intention to articulate not merely the phenomenon of a thing 
in movement, but rather movement itself [Physics 111.1-2, especially 
200bl2l. 49 Second, the determination cv-ccXitXci(x that is ostensibly 
devoid of all potentiality and movement insofar as it represents the 
accomplishment of change is itself given what might be called a 
dynamic sense by virtue of the component C"Xciv. Taking this in its 
verbal sense lends CVTSxtxC1O( a appropriative moment (hence 
Heidegger's translation: Sich-im-Ende-Haben, having-itself-in-the- 
end). 
In asking af ter Bewegtheit in this sense, Heidegger aims 
to 
articulate the being of a xivoibýLcvov, the line of enquiry closed off 
by the usual perspective of questioning xo(T& xjv9cTiv. 
Following 
Aristotle's lead, he takes the example of making something. When we 
look at someone making something, we see movements. 
But these are not 
simply the movements of the artisan: 
sondern er [Aristotelesl denkt bei 
der Entstehung des 
Tisches eben die Bewegung dieses Entstehenden selbst 
und als 
., 
ist geT(xßolý, das Umschlagen von eines solchen. xivqcric 
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etwas zu etwas dergestalt, daß im Umschlagen dieses selbst in einem mit dem Umschlagenden zum Ausschlag, d. h. in den Vorscheinkommt. IVWB-WM 283: 256-2571 
Rather, in the Sener 
thinking precisely of 
and as such. xlvqat(; 
into something, such 
change itself breaks 
appearance along with 
ation of the table, he [Aristotle] is 
the movement of this generation itself 
is jicc(xpoXý, the change of something 
that in the change the very act of 
out into the open, i. e. comes into 
the changing thing. 
This is not change as the process Of transition between pre- 
determined states. What Heidegger means by the "very act of change" 
is change as such; that is, change understood as the manifestation of 
the play between activity and passivity, appropriation and loss, by 
which he characterized ýLvuxpoXý in connection with the essence of 
dunamis. Indeed, in a development of the interpretation set out in 
the lectures on Met. 8.1-3, Heidegger presents Sibvagic, here in terms 
of appropriation [Eignung]. Accordingly, the "very act of change, " 
ge, uxpoXý, is described as an emerging appropriation. Given that the 
being of xivncylq lies in its end (as described above), Heidegger can 
give the following tran5lation of Ari5totle's definition of xivqcTir, 
in Physics 111. 
Das Sich-im-Ende-Haben des Geeigneten als eines Geigneten 
(d. h. in seiner Eignung) ist offenkundig (das Wesen der) 
Bewegtheit. [201b4f, VWB-WM 283: 2571 
The having-itself-in-the-end of the appropriated as 
appropriated (i. e. in its appropriation) is clearly (the 
being of) being-moved. 
This extraordinary, and extraordinarily powerful, interpretation 
merits lengthy consideration. However, we can do no more 
here than 
take stock of the fact that it confirms what we 
have already said 
about the relation between cvtpyE: i(x and 
ývccXtxcio(, xivr)aiq, and the 
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essence of Sf)vo(giq. Notably, the first parenthesi5 preserves the 
ambiguity between state and process necessary to a genuinely 
fundamental determination; the having-itself-in-the-end, even where 
it designates what might be called the 'perfect condition' of 'having 
become' and therefore the gathering of the movement in the end, 
nonetheless remains aPpropriation, having as a movement or activity. 
But if this can be said of the end of a movement that has the form of 
a process, it is all the more applicable to that form of movement 
which itself goes by the name of ý-vtp-yci(x. It too is a modality of 
being-moved and is thus also determined ontologically as having- 
itself-in-the-end of the appropriated as appropriated, i. e. in its 
appropriation. In short, as a form of movement in which the very act 
of change is no less present than in the manufacture of a table, the 
existence of iEvtpycia as an activity repeats the AcwPoXý that lies 
at the essence of 8fmxgie.. Seeing, playing the flute, living well 
and, we might add, ei)np&ttoc, are forms of movement in which the 
constitutive relation to the end, an end which is in no way extrinsic 
to the movement, is conceived In terms of having, appropriation. 
216 
Conclusion 
THE ACT OF APPROPRIATION 
The problem we set ourselves was to establish whether Heidegger's 
critical assimilation of Aristotelian practical philosophy comprised 
a means of understanding npftiq otherwise than as a superficial 
modification of nofTjaLq,. This meant finding an alternative to the 
representational form characteristic of the relation to an external 
end and to the assumption of the work as paradigmatic for the 
understanding of being in general , and of Dasein in particular. Above 
all, we said, notrIcriq and np&tiq must be distinguished by more than 
the placement of their respective ends. To do this, however, required 
an understanding of the form of movement specific to wp&ttq, as a 
designation of human existence. Heidegger's analysis of Sbvixgir, paved 
the way for such an understanding by providing an ontological 
interpretation of movement, that is, an interpretation of movement as 
the being of beings. The accompanying determination of ivkpyciof was 
thereby seen to denote the Bewegtheit of Dasein, not in contrast to 
the existence of S6v(xjilLq,, but as the form of movement specific to 
that existence. 
When looking at the connection between transcendence and np&tiq, 
we 
found that the unity of vobc. and o2petiq constitutive of 
human being 
as an &pXý of activity is accomplished via C'ýiq.. 
As such, and in the 
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light of Heidegger's interpretation of transcendence and the aW06v, 
we suggested that 'Etir, may be understood as a relation to ground. In 
addition to designating both the dispositional relation to ethical 
virtue and the intellectual dispositions by which truth is secured, 
this term simply means 'having, ' which Aristotle characterizes as 
losomething like an action or a movement". 1 It is this action or 
movement that lies at the heart of the account. Changing perspective, 
we suggested in Chapter Three that the hermeutics of facticity, as an 
account of the form of movement specific to the existence of Dasein, 
called for a re-intepretation of Evfpyeiot. The determination of 
a6vcYlitc, in terms of having and above all the radical interpretation 
offered of this with regard to the essence of SbVCXV1q, the 
corresponding reading of ivkpVcia as the being of movement and 
finally the account of movement itself in terms of appropriation 
provide a remarkable way of bringing together the treatment of 
movement and the theme of having as it occurs in connection with 
transcendence: the fundamental movement characteristic of the 
existence of Dasein is itself to be understood in terms of 
appropriation and having, understood, as we have seen, not as one's 
having of something, but as a movement of appropriation akin to the 
sense of pcx(xPolxý at the essence of S6v(xjiiq. Moreover, the essence of 
Sbvcxpir, as a movement of finite appropriation is mirrored in its 
actual existence as 8bv(xpiv EcXciv, having potential. Insofar as 
Dasein exists as potentiality for being, it is therefore determined 
by this 'action or movement' of appropriation. But what of 
its end? 
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Because potentiality is essentially related to its successful 
accomplishment, the relation to its end implicit in its actual 
existence is a relation not to an extant thing, but to a manner of 
existence. In a similar fashion, the final end of activity, 
cu"S(xigovfix or su'np(xtIcy, itself denotes a manner of existence defined 
in terms of the good. However, the position is complicated in 
Heidegger's case by his translation of Aristotle's lexicon into the 
ontological register, as a result of which wpUttic, denotes the being 
of Dasein as such and is not, or at least not primarily, a possible 
form of activity amongst others. 2 What, then, can c, 6np(xticx mean? The 
pursuit of or flight from a particular end or manner of existence 
becomes the pursuit of or flight from existence itself; existing 
well, for Heidegger, is implicit in the appropriative moment of 
potentiality for being. Existing as potentiality for being, Dasein is 
characterized by the Bewegtheit of finite appropriation; it exists as 
an activity or movement that is an end in itself, constantly engaged 
in an appropriative relation with its own existence as potentiality 
for being and existing as the activity or movement of that 
appropriation. As such, it is izp&tiq, an activity that is an end in 
itse If. 
In this way, and in accordance with Heidegger's declared intention, 
we can say that the account of wpftiq as an activity or movement of 
finite appropriation bestows coherence upon the structure of activity 
in general, insofar as it alleviates the naivety that Heidegger 
detected at the heart of Greek philosophy: the being of Dasein is 
distinguished from that of the work, and the instrumental activity in 
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which Dasein is for the most part engaged has been more adequately 
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Chapter One 
1. Except where indicated, the passages from Aristotle's Nicomachean 
Ethics presented in English are taken from the translation by JAK 
Thomson, London, Penguin, 1976. 
2. T Engberg-Pedersen, Aristotle's Theory of Moral Insight (1983) 
Oxford, Clarendon Pre5S, 1983, (hereafter ATM) Chapter 1. 
3. It may be objected that the use of this terminology imposes an 
anachronistic set of Kantian concerns on Aristotle. In fact, the 
notion of a condition of possibility - though not a Kantian 
transcendental condition - follows simply from the theory of final 
causality, insofar as the final cause is that 'for the sake of which' 
any specific act is said to have been undertaken and is therefore 
that without which it would not have occurred. 
4. Aristotle, Metaphysics, trans. WD Ross, Oxford, Clarendon, 1908. 
5. It may come as no surprise to learn that Heidegger saw in this 
passage an implicit recognition of the ontological difference. 
6. This relation is also variously termed 'focal meaning' by GEL 
Owen CLogic and Metaphysics in Some Earlier Works of Aristotle' in 
Articles on Aristotle Vol 3: Metaphysics, ed. J Barnes, M Schofield, 
R Sorabji, London, Duckworth, 1979, hereafter AE, pp. 13-32) and 
paronymy by G Patzig, ('Theology and Ontology in Aristotle's 
Metaphysics' in Articles on Aristotle Vol 3: Metaphysics AE 33-49). 
7. In view of the fact that the translation of oiýaio( as 'substance' 
is frequently misleading, I shall, as indeed in the case of many 
other terms, retain the Greek. 
8. For Aristotle's understanding of priority, cf. 1018b8ff. 
9. The basic theme is i) matter, ii) form, iii) the compound of 
matter and form. For a set of variations, cf - 1017bl0f, 1042a24f and 
1069a3Of. 
10. W Jaeger, Aristoteles: Grundlegung einer Geschichte seiner 
Entwicklung, Berlin, Weidmann, 1923; tr. Aristotle: Fundamentals of 
the History of his Development, trans. R Robinson, Oxford, Clarendon, 
1948. 
11. Patzig argues that Aristotle had sought "a philosophical 
discipline that is both a first and a general philosophy, and a 
substance that is so superior to all other substances that it can at 
the same time be called in a certain sense substance in general. 
" If 
we are to follow Aristotle, he writes, we should not oppose 
the two 
definitions of first philosophy to one another, but rather appreciate 
that "these two definitions essentially belong together and that only 
their conjunction adequately characterises Aristotle's 
'first 
philosophy. '" Indeed, first philosophy "is theology of so special a 
kind that it is as such and at the same time ontology. 
" Even if we 
accept the np6r, civ relation may be adequate 
to explain the 
universality of theology, Patzig's interpretation 
is still flawed on 
his own terms because he cannot accomodate 
Books r, H and G. He 
brings ontology and theology together by the np6c, Civ structure, 
but 
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only in certain books: thus, the conflict is levelled out in one context only to be readmitted in another. Cf. Patzig, 'Theology and Ontology in Aristotle's Metaphysics' cited above (n. 5). 
12. P Aubenque, Le probl6me de 1'6tre chez Aristote, Paris, Press 
Universitaires de France, 1962, (hereafter PEA). Aubenque's study is 
perhaps the most comprehensive and stimulating of the modern 
commentaries and has already become a classic of its kind. 
13. P Merlan takes Met. E. 1: 1026a30-31 to be the decisive moment, cf. From Platonism to Neo-platonism, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1975, 
pp. 168-170. In Book 17, therefore, 'universal' does not indicate an 
abstract generality, but rather the presence in all things of the 
primary substance and first philosophy is theology in a strong sense. J Owens, too, proposed that ontology simply is theology, since the 
system of np6c 'v ., c relations shows the nature of all things to be derived from the primary substance, which is therefore the cause of 
all things. Cf. The Doctrine of Being in Aristotelian Metaphysics 
(1951), Wettern, Universa, 1963, pp. 160-175. This thesis is similar 
to that of Merlan's insofar as the universality of first philosophy 
is seen to depend on the highest form of substance whose very 
priority might have been thought to destroy the basis for such a 
claim. But in place of the rather crude assertion that divine being 
is present in all things, the onus is shifted to the influence of the 
highest substance on all beings. 
14. Similarly, having discussed the wp6q, 'Ev relation earlier, he 
asks: "Cette solution en est-elle une dans le cas de L'Lstre? N'est- 
elle pas plut6t le probIdAme m6me hypostasie?: Is this solution a 
solution in the case of being? Is it not rather a crystallization of 
the problem? " [PEA 1921. 
15. It should be pointed out at this stage that the association of 
being as such with oiýcFlo( may have both basis and significance. Later, 
I shall discuss Heidegger's reading of this issue, in which a close 
association does emerge Epp. 37-391. However, it is always tempered by 
the fact that Heidegger resists any straightforward identification of 
oi)cr1(x with its categorial signification. 
In spite of the plausibility of Aubenque's reading, it is by no means 
common amongst commentators on Aristotle. Cf. L Lugarini, Aristotele 
e ]'idea della filosofia, Firenze, La Nuova Italia Editrice, 1972, 
pp. 246-248. Lugarini accepts the application to the problem of being 
of the irp6q, 'Ev relation drawn from the example of health. However, he 
does not 'overlook' the discrepancy between the two cases (to which 
Aubenque draws attention), so much as emphatically deny any such 
difference: "La specificith del suo fondare - del suo esser mia 
(pibaiq, mia &pXý - dipende del fatto che pure ]a salute 6 uno 
dei modi 
del 'salutare', preso come tale e in generale, ovvero 6 uno dei suoi 
molteplici sensi; non 6, invece, 1'esser-salutare in quanto tale: The 
specificity of its foundation - of its being my WIXF'c., my 
&W - 
depends on the fact that health is also a modality of 'healthy, ' 
taken as such and in general , i. e. , 
it is one of its many senses; 
this is not the case with being healthy in general" p. 247. In putting 
forward this view, Lugarini is laudably anxious to avoid any 
suggestion that the unifying term is a generic term for the series 
in 
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question. Yet to this end, he begins from the view that the primary sense of being is itself one of the categories and then proceeds to understand the model, namely, health on the basis of that which it was intended to inform. This seems somewhat unnecessary, inasmuch as the notion of universality which the np6c, 'Ev relation is to introduce does not rely on encompassing each element within a single genus. 
16. GA33 §1. We shall examine Heidegger's reading of Met. 8.1 in Chapter Four, Section 1. 
17. Aubenque draws textual support for this reading from Aristotle's 
declaration that the categories apply as much to non-being as to being: cf. 1089al6 and 1051a34. 
18. "Wie geht das zusammen? Die Antwort fehlt. Und wir bedenken fortan: Die Frage nach dem Wesen der Kategorien fuhrt ins Dunkel: How 
does this work? There is no answer. And from now on we reflect: the 
question of the essence of the categories leads into darkness" 
EGA33 71. 
19. Heidegger's most extended reference to oixyfix occurs in Vom Wesen 
der Menschlichen Freiheit (1930), Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio 
Klostermann, 1982, (hereafter GA31) §§7-8. Cf. also Metaphysische 
Anfangsgriinde der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz, Frankfurt am Main, 
Vittorio Klostermann, 1978, (hereafter GA26) pp. 182-183, tr. Th e 
Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, trans. M Heim, Bloomington, 
Indiana University Press, 1984, p. 145; SZ 25: 47 & 90: 123; VWB-WM 239- 
301: 219-270. In his reading of Aristotle's Physics B 1, Heidegger 
insists that Seiendheit [beingness] is "the only adequate translation 
of o1krf(y, " and that oiýai(y, beingness, is that which distinguishes a 
being as such. That the same translation was already in place in 1926 
is evidenced by Heidegger's 1926 lecture course Die Grundbegriffe der 
antiken Philosophie, p. 92. (This course has not yet been published 
and I am indebted to Franco Volpi for having made a typescript of it 
available to me. The text is presently being prepared for publication 
by Franz-Karl Blust and will appear as Volume 22 of the Heidegger 
Gesamtausgabe, Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann. Hereafter, it 
will be referred to as GA22, followed by the page number appropriate 
to the typescript. For an account of the course as a whole, cf. 
Volpi's monograph 'Heidegger e la storia del pensiero greco: figure e 
problemi del corso del semestre estivo 1926 sui 'Concetti 
fondamentali della filosofia antica, ' in Itinerari n. 1-2,1986. In 
view of this, we can say that the term Anwesenheit denotes the kind 
of being attributed to ousia as beingness and is therefore 
complementary to the aforementioned translation. 
20. Regarding the importance of not allowing the meaning of o6criot to 
be reduced to its categorial sense alone, cf. Volpi, 'Heidegger e la 
storia del pensiero greco, ' p. 254. Volpi reminds us that o6aia is 
understood by Heidegger as a manner of being and not, as it were, as 
a kind of substance. 
21. Aristotle repeats the same point in Book 11: "1 ... I the 
branch of 
philosophy on which we are at present engaged is not, like the 
others, theoretical in its aim - because we are not studying to 
know 
what goodness is, but in order to become good, since otherwise 
it 
would be useless" [1103b26f - translation modified]. 
The tension 
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which arises as a result of the commitment of what is formally a theoretical treatise to a deliberately non-theoretical end places the 
text itself under considerable stress. As we have noted above (pp. 13- 
14), in Nicolaci's view, it opens an entirely unexpected space within 
which new possibilities of reading the text present themselves, LHP 
247-250.1 shall return to this excellent study below, pp. 61-64,126- 
127. 
22- With regard to the distinction between analogy of proportion, 
intended here, and analogy of attribution, a scholastic usage 
corresponding to the np6q, Fv relation as described here, cf. GA33 46- 
47, GA22 87, RA Gauthier &JY Jolif, L'Ethique a Nicomeque, 
traduction et commentaire Tome 11 premiere partie, Louvain, 
Publications Universitaires de Louvain: 1959 -&- Paris, editions 
Beatrice-Nauwelaerts, 1959, (hereafter ENT) pp. 46-47. 
23. J Burnet, The Ethics of Aristotle, London, Methuen, 1900, p. 29. 
24. "Si le bien nous apparaft sous diff06rents aspects, qui ne 
reldAvent pas d'une science convnune, c'est qu'il se dit dans les 
diff6rentes significations de I'C-tre; et si le Bien en tant que bien 
n'est pas un simple mot et presente une unit66 relative de 
signification, il le doit 6 VegalitL6 des rapports que ses 
diff6rentes significations entretiennent avec chacune des cat6gories 
de l'Otre: If the good appears to us in different guises that cannot 
be treated by a single science, it is because it is articulated in 
the different significations of being. And if the Good qua good is 
not merely a word, but actually presents a relative unity of meaning, 
this is due to the fact that its different significations bear an 
equivalent relation to each of the categories of being" PEA 203. 
25. Cf. Gauthier & Jolif ENT pp. 45-47. In their view, Aristotle's 
apparent preference for the analogical argument in the Aficomachean 
Ethics represents an over enthusiastic rejection of the Platonic 
theory (for it is the furthest from a theory of the ideal Good), and 
Aristotle's more considered and therefore definitive approach is to 
be found in Metaphysics, where the np6q, 'Cv relation is introduced to 
account for the homonomy of being. 
26. Cf. 1096a5-6 & 1096b29. Presenting the case for the np6r, civ 
relation, Gauthier and Jolif write: "le bien unique, qui est le 
principe et ]a fin de tous les autres, c'est le bien essentiel; par 
example, pour I'homme, c'est ]'intellect qui est ]'essence de I'homme 
et qui est son bien: the single good that is the beginning and end of 
all the others, is the essential good; e. g. for man, the 
intellect is 
the essence of man and his good" [ENT 451. 
27. Cf. the problem of priority in Section 11. 
28. SRL Clark, Aristotle's Men, Speculations on Aristotelian 
Anthropology, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1975. 
29. T Nagel, 'Aristotle on Eudaimonia' in Articles on Aristotle's 
Ethics, ed. A0 RortY, Berkeley, University of 
California Press, 
1980. 
30. D Achtenberg, 'The Role of the Ergon Argument in 
Aristotle's 
Micomachean Ethics' in Ancient Philosophy 9 (1) Spr. 1989 pp. 
37-47. 
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The main issue in each of these alternatives is to what degree the term Zpyov is associated strictly with productive activity and to 
what extent it is allowed a broader signification. This will plainly have a significant bearing on the conception of human activity 
associated with the final end or practicable good. As the rest of this chapter will make clear, my own view is that to rely too heavily 
on the format of productive activity in understanding human activity in this sense leads to irresolvable contradictions. Note also that the entire passage under discussion here recalls Plato's Republic, 
352d-353b. 
31. The first group of activities are crafts, whereas the second 
clearly do not issue in any independent result over and above their 
activity. Whil5t they could hardly be called np6(tcic,, they could 
certainly be identified as ivepyci(xi [Met. 8.61. It is a matter of 
debate to what extent the no19criq/np&tiq distinction and the 
xfvqcriq/ivtpycio( distinction may be considered parallel to one 
another. The issue is to the fore of the following passages in the 
text. However, at this point I shall do no more than recognize a 
marked proximity between the two sets of terms. In any case, the two 
examples are by no means equivalent to one another. 
32. Cf. 1097b32f and Gauthier & Jolif, ENT 55-56, who emphasise this 
expression. They read it as indicating that the definitive character 
of human being lies beyond each regional preoccupation or activity 
insofar as it lies in the soul. In itself, this is an entirely 
reasonable interpretation. However, it could only masquerade as a 
full explanation as long as one refrained from asking what is 
understood by 'soul. ' 
33. GA33 196-197, and also Heidegger, Die Grundbegriffe der 
Metaphysik. Welt - Endlichkeit - Einsamk-eit, Frankfurt am Main, 
Vittorio Klostermann, 1983, (hereafter GA29/30) p. 320. 
34. Remi Brague, Aristote et ]a question du monde, Paris, Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1988, (hereafter AQM) p. 474. 
35.1 have used Bernasconi's translation of this passage 1FDP 116, 
HDP 1371 since it emphasises the philosophical issues more clearly 
than the standard published translations. In addition to questions of 
clarity, however, there is disagreement amongst translators over the 
sense of an important phrase. Rackhams's translation for the Loeb 
edition has: "the act of making is not an end in itself" in place of 
"that which is made is not an end in itself. " The disagreement 
surrounds the interpretation of the Greek T6 -noiq%6v, which in 
Rackham's view refers here to the process rather than the result. In 
opting for this alternative, he follows the example set by Burnet, 
who claims that the phrase T6 noi9T6v "is used in the same way as -X6 
71p(x)c, r6v and means the thing done, not the thing made, 
the building 
and not the house" Ep. 2561. Yet the example of E6 Tip(xx-E6v may 
be 
misleading, since in the case of np&t1q, the distinction 
in question 
here does not arise: T6 np(YxT6v is not identified with 
the thing done 
as opposed to the thing made, since the category of artefact 
is 
inappropriate to np&tiq. Thomson, in his translation 
for the Penguin 
edition, takes the opposite view to Burnet and Rackham, 
identifying 
'c6 noiryu6v with the result of making. This view 
is also taken by 
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Joachim (The Micomachean Ethics ed. DA Rees, Oxford, Clarendon, 
19511, p-109), Engberg-Pederson [ATM 291, and of course Bernsconi. 
Surprisingly, perhaps, Gauthier and Jolif do not refer to the 
passage. The general reading that I have been developing is favoured 
by the interpretation of -c6 noiryc6v adopted by Thomson, Engberg- 
Pederson and Bernasconi, since it immediately disqualifies c6 noiqT6v 
from fulfilling the role of final end. Could it be that Burnet and 
Rackham were influenced in their decision to read the second phrase 
of the second sentence as: "since the process of making is always 
relative to some further end" by the wish to preserve the possibility 
that the relation to the final end may be understood in terms of 
production? For if it is the process of making that is relative to 
some further end (in itself a trivial claim), then the further end in 
question is not necessarily relative. However, the necessity of 
associating the final end with c6 np(xx-c6v does not depend on this 
passage alone and could be upheld just as successfuly were Burnet's 
reading to be confirmed. Over and above the condition of self- 
sufficiency and the privilege accorded to Occapi(y in Book X, each of 
the following passages would be sufficient to establish the link 
between np&tiq and the final end; 1098a14,1098b15,1098bl8-20, 
1098b2O-22. 
36. It is by no means clear that Aristotle's text employs this 
concept as such and one should be wary of taking its legitimacy for 
granted. 
37. Heidegger's view that the doctrine of the four causes has its 
source in the experience of making will be considered in Ch. 4.11. 
38. Aristotle claims that nofncriq and np&tiq are "generical ly" 
different 1140b3. Yet with the integrity of the distinction itself 
placed in question, it would be doubly difficult to maintain the 
credibility of so fundamental a difference. Cf. also Aristotle's 
definition of genus, Met. A. 28: 1024a29-10294bl 5. 
39. Cf. H Arendt, The Human Condition, Chicago & London, The 
University of Chicago Press, 1958, (hereafter HO pp. 153-158 and M 
Horkheimer, Zur Kritik der Instrumentellen Vernunft, Frankfurt am 
Main, Verlag GmbH, 1967; tr. Critique of Instrumental Reason, trans. 
MJ O'Connel and others, New York, Seabury Press, 1974, Part I. 
40. A detailed discussion of this interpretation would be premature 
at this stage: cf. Chapter Four. 
41. Cf. LHP 243,248 and 252. 
Cbapter Two 
1. Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotle and his phenomenological 
method are profoundly complementary, each serving 
to open new ways of 
reading the other. Sheehan made this point 
in his essay 'Heidegger, 
Aristotle and Phenomenology, ' but such a reading 
is given its most 
comprehensive articulation by Brague IAQMI- 
229 
2. 'Vom Wesen des Grundes' in WM (hereafter VWG-WM), tr. 'The Essence 
of Reasons' trans. T Malick, Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 
1969,155n: 81n, 162n: 97n, cf. also below, Ch. 2. IV. Departing from the 
Malick's translation, I shall refer to this essay as 'On the Essence 
of Grounds. ' 
3. The prominence accorded to the distinction between theory and 
practice ultimately detracts from G Prauss's engagement with the 
@question of activity in Heidegger; cf. Erkennen und Handeln in 
Heideggers ))Sein undZeit((, Frei burg/Muni ch, Karl Alber, 1977. 
4. As Bernasconi writes: "Simply to ignore the distinction between 
np&tir, and noirlair, is to succumb to the metaphysical dominance of 
noincTiq. But to insist on npftiq in contradistinction to nolquiq is 
still to remain in the orbit of metaphysics" 1FDP 1291. The latter 
course remains the most common amongst those addressing the question 
of npftiq, including the otherwise markedly astute Taminiaux. 
5. The importance of the term nphyguTu to Heidegger's re-examination 
of the relation between Dasein and things is further underlined in 
his 1942-43 lecture course on Parmenides, where he refers to np(xygu 
as "the originally inseparable totality of the relation between 
things and man, " cf. Parmenides, Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio 
Klostermann, 1982, (hereafter GA54) p. 124 and p. 118; Parmenides 
trans. A Schuwer and R Rojecwiez, Bloomington & Indianapolis, Indiana 
Up, 1992, p. 84 and p. 80. This description could very well have been 
applied to the concept of world in Being and Time or any of the texts 
of that period. Cf. Die Frage nach dem Ding (1936-36), Frankfurt am 
Main, Vittorio Klostermann, 1984, pp. 53-54, tr. What is a Thing? 
trans. WB Barton Jnr- &V Deutsch, South Bend, Regnery/Gateway, 
c1967, p. 70. Strangely, the later essay 'The Thing' (1950) refers to 
the word for thing in Old High German, Italian, French, English and 
Latin, but does not mention the Greek at all. 
6. E Husserl, Ideen (1913), The Hague, Martinus Niihoff, 1950j 
(hereafter ID) pp. 32-34, tr. Ideas, trans. WR Boyce Gibson, London, 
Macmillan, 1962, pp. 65-66. 
7. For our own purposes here, we might pref er to pose the converse 
question: do specif ic cases 'I ie within' the logical form? 
In other 
words, granted the distinction between genus and form, 
how are we to 
understand the sense of universality attached the latter? 
8. SZ 10-11: 30-31, GA24 112: 80; Cf. also W McNeill, 'Metaphysics, 
Fundamental Ontology, Metontology 1925-1935' Heidegger Studies Vol. 8 
1992 pp. 63-79. 
9. W McNeill 'On the Concreteness of Heidegger's Thinking' 
in 
Philosophy Today 36(l) Spring 1992 pp. 83-94. 
10. This would amount to a formal-logical 
designation of np&ýxq as 
the ontological structure of Dasein. 
Volpi touched upon such a 
possibility in the closing remarks to his 
book, where he suggests 
that our epoch is characterized less by 
the oblivion of being than by 
the atrophy of the X6yoq IHA 2171. 
By this he means that the 
different forms of 116yoq Aristotle discusses 
in NE. VI have been 
reduced to that which corresponds exclusively 
to ictXvq. Thus, he 
writes, we should consider the need 
for a recovery of the X6yoq of 
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wp&kiq,. One might object that precisely this has been the aim of the Frankfurt School and of Habermas in particular. However, in the 
context of Heidegger, it is more appropriate, at least as an initial 
5tep, to consider the importance of the X6yor, to the form of self- 
relatedness characteristic of the fundamental movement of Dasein's 
existence. 
11. In fact, Heidegger's strategy Of uncovering the unthought within 
source texts renders the designation 'original' unsatisfactory, since 
on this basis Heidegger's interpretations will be more original than 
the ostensibly 'original' sources from which they are drawn. 
12. Cf. 1096b24f, where Aristotle names utility as the 'good' of 
relation. 
13. Cf. SZ 244(n. iii): 288(n. iii), where Heidegger remarks on the 
longstanding distinction between whole and sum, oXov and n&-v, totum 
and compositurn. 
14. Could there be a trace of initiative in Dasein's relation to a 
possibility of its own being? This raises the issue of whether there 
is a residual sense in which Dasein is master over its own 
foundation, the subject of its own position. Whilst Being and Time 
presses urgently in a different direction, towards the finitude of 
thrownness, facticity and the receptivity of conscience, the 
implication of Dasein in its own ground and in the constitution of 
world cannot be ignored. Indeed, a great part of the fascination 
exerted by this text stems from its refusal to portray the order of 
grounding as simple. There are of course grave problems in deploying 
a language of activity in the ontological register - problems, 
moreover, that arise in the present case precisely from Heidegger's 
translation of the Aristotelian figure of wp&tiq and which touch on 
the central themes of possibility, actualisation and the relation 
between Dasein and being. Cf. pp. 92-94, Ch. 4. IV and Conc.. 
15. But cf. SZ 333: 381. When Dasein is immersed in its everyday 
concerns, it submits itself to the possibility Of its being for-the- 
sake-of-which it is working as much as it submits the equipment it 
handles. Although Dasein is not itself ready-to-hand, the strict 
dependence of readiness- to-hand on the being of Dasein means that it 
belongs to Dasein in some way: worldhood, like possibility, is an 
existentiale. This reflects a constant tension in Heidegger's 
characterization of Dasein as being-in-the-world between preserving 
its ontological specificity and denying its separation 
from the 
world. 
16. The same impression of an essentially generic 
form of relation 
based on utility and instrumentality is given by 
Heidegger's repeated 
use of the expression 'goes back' Egeht ... zurUck] 
to describe the 
relation of the totality of involvements with 
the being of Dasein. 
Cf. "Die Bewandntnisganzheit selbst aber geht letzlich auf ein 
Wozu 
zurUck, bei dem es keine Bewandnis mehr hat: 
But the totality of 
involvements itself goes back ultimately to a 
'towards-which' in 
which there is no further involvement" [SZ 84: 
1161. "Solches, und was 
ihm ferner zugrunde liegt, wie das Dazu, als wobei es 
die Bewandtnis 
hat, das Wörum-willen, darauf letzlich alles Wozu zurückgeht ... : 
Anything of this sort, and anything else 
that is basic for it, such 
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as the 'towards-this' as that in which there is an involvement, or such as the 'for-the-sake-of -which' to which every 'towards-which' 
ultimately goes back ... " ISZ 86: 118-1191. Does the totality 'go back' to the for-the-sake-of -which in the same way as each towards- 
which 'goes back' to the next? Heidegger writes that he has "Der 
angezeigte Zusammenhang, der von der Struktur der Bewandtnis zum Sein des Daseins selbst führt als dem eigentlichen und einzigen Worum- 
willen: indicated the interconnection by which the structure of an involvement leads to Dasein's very being as the sole authentic 'for- the-sake-of -which'" ESZ 84: 1171. One is tempted to say that whilst he 
may have indicated it, he has done little to explain it. 
17. Indeed, Macquarrie and Robinson have consistently translated 'zu' 
as 'towards' wherever it has appeared, either independently or in 
conjunction with another preposition. 
18. Indeed, by virtue of its circumscriptive sense, I UM I is 
particularly suited to expressions concerned with horizonality. Does 
the term's ambiguity between unidirectional and circumscriptive 
senses plaster over the cracks between the phenomenological notion of 
horizon and the Aristotelian sense of purposefulness? 
19. E. g. "Das wesenhafte Mbglichsein des Daseins betrifft die 
cherakterisierten Weisen des Besorgnes der' ))Welt((, der Fdrsorge far 
die anderen und in all dem und immer schon das Seink6nnen zu ihm 
selbst, umwillen seiner: The Being-possible which is essential for 
Dasein, pertains to the ways of its solicitude for Others and of its 
concern with the 'world', as we have characterized them; and in all 
these, and always, it pertains to Dasein's potential i ty-for-Being 
towards itself, for the sake of itself" ISZ 143: 183 My emphasis]. 
20. In the remainder of this note, Heidegger goes on to say that the 
account of the instrumental world and the environment is nonetheless 
an invaluable preliminary to a further consideration of the 
transcendental problem of world. Moreover, he adds that if SZ §915-18 
seemed to have passed over the theme of nature, there were good 
reasons for this. Nature is not something that we can encounter 
within the world or towards which we comport ourselves. Yet insofar 
as being in the midst of nature is a mode of Dasein's thrownness, it 
can only be approached adequately via an account of Dasein's being as 
care, such as SZ H15-18 are intended to prepare. Cf. also VWG-WM 
160(n. 59): 97(n. 59). Heidegger took up the question of nature again in 
1929/30 lectures, cf. especially GA29/30 262-263. Cf. JP Fell, 'The 
familiar and the Strange: on the Limits of Praxis in the Early 
Heidegger, ' in SJP 23-41. We refer to this theme in Ch. 3.11 below. 
21. By way of a prefatory remark, however, Heidegger's treatment of 
the transcendental problem of world, and of the place of np&tir, 
within this problematic, should be approached in the context of 
his 
concern to address the contending legacies of Aristotle and 
Kant. 
Indeed, in each of the principal accounts of transcendence and world 
da t ing f rom the Ia te 1920s and ear Iy 1930s, itis above aII 
to Kan t 
that Heidegger refers, whereas Aristotle is barely mentioned 
EGA26 
911 and 'On the Essence of Grounds' Part 11.1. 
Yet if Aristotle's 
presence in these analyses seems slight, his contribution 
is 
nonetheless decisive. For whilst remaining indebted 
to Kant's 
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transcendental philosophy, Heidegger seems to have regarded Kant's thought as marred by what one might regard as its residual Platonism 
-a condition thrown into relief by the deeply Aristotelian hue of Heidegger's own philosophical formation. We should not be surprised, therefore, if we discover the Kantian element of Heidegger's account 
of transcendence to be tempered and qualified his appropriation of Aristotle. In the present instance, this may be likened to an implicit repetition on Heidegger's part of the Aristotelian critique 
of Plato's theory of ideas and, in particular, of the inscription of 
grounds within the order of discourse (or activity) whose basis they 
provide. As we shall see, the confluence of Aristotelian and Kantian 
currents of thought contributes to a subtle and at times ambiguous treatment of the problem of, transcendence and world. 
22. "Der transzendentele Weltbegriff ist offenbar auf die übrigen in 
eigener Weise bezogen. Andererseits erschöpfte keiner der unter 1 bis 
3 genannten Begriffe, auch nicht ihre Summe, den Begriff »Welt« a1-9 
Konstitutivum der Transzendenz: The transcendental concept of world 
is evidently related, in its ownway, to the other conceptions. On the 
other hand, none of the concepts mentioned, from I to 3, nor even 
their sum, exhausts the concept 'world' as a constituent of 
transcendence" EGA26 180: 2321. The same connection had already been 
made in Being and Time, but only in @69, much later than the initial 
analyses. 
23. Cf. Walter Brogan's excellent reply to Bernasconi's paper, SJP 
149-153. 
24. EinfUhrung in die Metaphysik (1935), Tijbingen, Max Niemeyer, 
19831 (hereafter EM); tr. An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans- R 
Mannheim, New York, Anchor Books, 1961, pp. 161-162: 128. 
25. EM 161-162: 128, GA54 96 especially 131-147. Cf. also W McNeill, 
'Porosity: Violence and the Question of Politics in Heidegger's 
Introduction to Metaphysics, Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 
14(2)-15(l), 1991, pp. 183-212. 
26. Nobc. is understood here in its general sense as rational faculty; 
cf. 1139al8-20, where it is presented alongside otTaOrjat(; and Opctiq 
as constitutive elements of the soul. This sense of vol5r, should be 
contrasted with the specific sense it is given as one of the five 
intellectual virtues [1139bl5-17 and 1139b3l-114la9l. Cf. H Weiss: 
"Die Orexis fUr sich allein besteht Uberhaupt nicht, sondern ist nurs 
in Einheit mit dem Logos bezw. dem Nous. Diese Einheit von Orexis und 
Nous ist der Mensch selbst als Arche: o5pstiq never exists by itself, 
but only ever in unity with X6-yoc, i. e. with vobq. This unity of 
of opetiq and votq is man himself as &pXý, " Kausalitit und 
Zufall in der 
Philosophie des Aristoteles, Basel, Verlag Haus zum Falken, 1942, 
pp-116-117. 
27. The gesture of drawing differentiated terms back 
to a common 
source is not without precedent in Heidegger. In particular, 
Volpi 
notes the way each of the couples Befindlichkeit-Verstehen 
and 
Creworfenheit-Entwurf are drawn back to the common ground of 
Sorge, 
which Volpi regards as Heidegger's ontological 
interpretation of 
6ctir, There is good evidence for such a reading, not 
least the 
account of Sorge given in Prologomena Zur Creschichte 
des 
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Zeitsbegriffs (1925), Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann, 1988, 
(hereafter GA20); tr. 7he History of the Concept of Time, trans. T 
Kisiel, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1985, where its 
characterization in terms of Hang Eurgel and Drang [propensity] 
echoes Aristotle's description of Opetiq as quyý [flight] and Sfokiq 
[pursuit]. Cf. 1139a22f, GA20 295-297, Volpi ECP 244-246 and DAP 107- 
114. 
28. The notion of &pXý will be subject to this radicalization no less 
than those of np&Zic. and the union of votc, and 5pcttq. Without 
anticipating the analyses that are to follow in Ch. 3, regarding the 
present topic, it may be helpful to point out that the &pXý of a 
movement is shown to be dynamic in itself. As Heidegger remarks, "Das 
&pXA-Sein, Ausgangsein für... meint eben nicht gleichsam ein Ding 
oder ein Eigenschaft, davon etwas ausgeht, sondern das Ausgangsein 
für etwas anderes ist in sich ein Ausgehen zum Anderen: Being-an- 
&pXý, being-an-opening-for .... does not really mean a thing or a 
property from which something sets out, as it were. Rather, being-an- 
opening-for something else is in itself a setting out towards other 
things" EGA33 101). This will be important in considering the extent 
to which Heidegger's thought of transcendence, as a radicalization of 
the &pXfl of nP&tLr., should or should not be differentiated from 
nP&t1q- 
29. Elsewhere, Aristotle refers to 'brutishness' [Oqpi6, rnql as a 
"state of moral character" ENE. VII: 1145al5-181. He goes on to say 
that this condition is commonest amongst the non-Greek races, 
although some Greek examples are also to be found amongst the 
diseased, the educationally subnormal and the excessively violent. In 
other words, those who are to a greater or lesser degree beyond the 
educative and socialising power of the political community. 
30. Strictly speaking, the 'appetitive part of the soul' does not 
translate an expression with 1O"pct-tq, ' but Aristotle clearly places 
them together ENE-1: 1102b30-311. 
31. This conception of an intermediate faculty between the rational 
and desiderative sides of the soul, a development from the Platonic 
sense of spirit, may remind us of Heidegger's account of conscience 
in Being and Time r357, where "the call of conscience" is said 
to come 
"from me and yet from beyond me" [SZ 275.3201. Cf. also 
Conc. - 
32. Moreover, the two aspects of virtue are by no means isloated 
from 
one another, but are at least partially inter-linked 
in a relation of 
Chapter Three 
1. Cf . PIA, 
GA61 especially Part 111; M 
Heidegger, Ontologie 
(Hermeneutik der Faktizitdt) (1923), Vittorio Klostermann, 
Frankfurt 
am Main, 1988, (hereafter GA63), especially 
§§16-26. 
2. "Eine eigentliche Interpretation mit 
der zentralen Fundierung in 
der, exponierten philosophischen Grundproblematik 
der Faktizitgt fehlt 
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V61lig: an authentic interpretation grounded centrally in the 
expressed fundamental philosophical problematic of facticity is 
entirely lacking" EPIA 250). 
3. Similarly, Heidegger writes elsewhere that: "Die Tradition der 
philosophischen Fragen muO bis zu den Sachquellen zurtickverfoigt 
werden. Die Tradition mup abgebaut werden: The tradition of 
philosophical questioning must be traced back to its sources. The 
tradition must be de-constructed" IGA63 751. 
4. Cf. Heidegger's subsequent comment that: "Diese AufSabe ist nur zu bewerkstelligen, wenn eine vom Faktizit&tsproblem, das heipt einer 
redikelen ph4gnomenologischen Anthropologie, her orienterte konkrete 
Interpretation der aristotelischen Philosophie verfOgbar gemacht ist: 
This task can only be accomplished, if one can engage in a concrete 
interpretation of Aristotle with regard to the problem of facticity, 
that is, a radical phenomenological anthropology" [PTA 2511. In 
addition to Heidegger's well known interest in the Nicomachean 
Ethics, cf. also his description of Aristotle's Rhetoric as "die 
erste systematische Hermeneutik der Ailtdglichkeit des 
Mi teinanderseins: the f irst systematic hermeneutic of the 
everydayness of Being with one another" ISZ 138: 178). Not only did 
Heidegger regard this work as the first of its kind, but "die 
grundsdtzliche ontologische Interpretation des Affektiven dberhaupt 
seit Aristoteles kaum einen nennenswerten Schritt vorwdrts hat zu tun 
k6nnen: the basic ontological Interpretation of the affective life in 
general has been able to make scarcely one forward step worthy of 
mention since Aristotle" [SZ 139: 1781. 
5. Note all except citXvrj includes 'sehen' , thereby suggesting the 
primacy of sight: despite a common belief that Heidegger displaced 
the primacy of vision in favour of language, there is no doubt that 
vision played a fundamental role in his conception of disclosure and 
truth. Cf. for example, Platon: Sophistes (1924/5), Frankfurt am 
Main, Vittorio Klostermann, 1992 (hereafter GA19) §11a. 
6. Amongst those that share Heidegger's view that there are but two 
intellectual virtues, cf. Gauthier and J01if [ENT 450-4521 and 
Joachim, The Nicomachean Ethics, pp. 172-173 and pp. 190-215. Strong 
textual support for such a reading is found at 1143bl5-17. Of course, 
each faculty is made up of more than one disposition: the scientific 
faculty comprises both croq>foc and inicyxýýLn, and the calculative 
faculty comprises both irp&tiq and c9Xvn. This is decidedly not 
to 
say, however, that qýp6vqaiq is the virtue of TtXvq, as the 
division 
might suggest. We shall comment on the implications of 
this matter 
during the remainder of this section. Cf also Bernasconi, 
HDP 136 and 
Brogan's response, SJP 151-153; cf. also Heidegger, 
Platon: Sophistes 
(1924/5), Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann, 
1992, (hereafter 
GA19) 95 and §8c. 
7. (bp6vna-Lc,, therefore, is not a purely rational disposition 
[4c'cdf 
X6-yov g6vov, 1140b281, but is, in Heidegger's words, 
"in der Wp&tjq 
noch mehr als in X6yoq: is in updýiq even more 
than irj '16yor, " EGA19 
1391. 
8. The description of qp6vnair, as a Cestelltsein of 
Dasein seems odd, 
given that 'stellen' and 'Gestell' later 
became central to 
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Heidegger's thinking of TEXvn; cf. 'Die Frage nach der Technik' (1955) and 'Die Kehre' in VOrtr4ge und Aufsdtze, Pfulligen, Gunther Neske, 1954, (hereafter VA); 'The Question Concerning Technology' and 'The Turning' in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, trans. W Lovitt, New York, Harper Torchbooks, 1977, (hereafter QCT). However, one might also remember the passage at SZ 333: 381 (cited 
above in Ch. 2. n. 15) where Dasein is said to submit itself to the 
possibility of being for-the-sake-of-which it is working at any moment. 
9. "Die (pp6vrjaiq macht die Lage des HandeIns 1196y2glich irn Festhalten 
des ou C"vex(x: IOp6vrj(7ir, makes the site of activity accessible by 
holding fast the ou' CVEx(x" IPIA p. 2591. We shall consider Heidegger'5 
vocabulary of holding and having in more detail later [Ch. 4.111-IVI. 
Cf. NENI, 1143a35f and 1142a25f. With respect to Heidegger's use of 'seeing' here, cf. his description of the vision constitutive of 
q)p6vrjcriqq as an "Augenblick, " IGA19 163-165 and SZ §68al. 
10. "Die Ausarbeitung der konkreten Lage zielt..., die rechte 
Entschlossenheit als Durchsichtigkeit der Handlung verfügbar zu 
machen. Und sofern diese Entschlossenheit in der Tat angeeignet und 
vollzogen ist, sofern ich also entschlossen bin, ist die Handlung in 
ihrer Nupersten Mdglichkeit da: the elaboration of the concrete 
situation aims to make genuine resoluteness accessible as 
transparency of the activity. And insofar as this resoluteness is in 
fact appropriated and accomplished, insofar as I am thereby resolved, 
the activity is there in its most extreme possibility" IGA19 150 My 
emphasis]. 
11. "The wise man therefore must not only know the conclusions that 
follow from his first principles, but also have a true conception of 
those principles themselves" 11141al8l. It is interesting to note 
that Aristotle says the same thing about q)p6vqcriq 1114lbl4,114lb221, 
although the status of the first principles themselves is different 
in each case. Aristotle's brief history of aoq)f(x finds its Platonic 
counterpart at Apology 2lb-22e. For a comprehensive genealogy of the 
term aoq)((x, cf. ENT 481-489. 
12. Not for the last time, we are reminded of Heidegger's account in 
Being and Time of how the theoretical attitude, apprehending beings 
as present-at-hand, arises out of circumspective concern ISZ 73- 
74: 102-104,569b]. 
13. Met. A. 10: 1075al3. 
14. For Heidegger's interpretation of the &cf O'v, cf. WM 267: 244-245. 
15. In simple terms, presenting the problem as an opposition between 
humanist and theocentric anthropologies fails to acknowledge 
that 
what is most human may be precisely an ability to transcend our 
condition via a relation to some form of divinity. Both 
Christian and 
Judaic views of human being clearly share such a view, 
however 
differently it may be articulated in each case. 
16. "Die cyo(plo( hat den Vorrang in bezug auf 
das Seiende an ihm 
selbst, insofern das Seiende, auf das sie geht, griechisch seinsmäßig 
den Vorrang hat. Das Seiende kommt in den Blick aus dem her, was es 
an ihm selbst, immer schon ist: lo(pt(x has priority 
in relation to the 
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being itself, insofar as the being with which it is concerned has 
priority with regard to being for the Greeks. The being comes into 
view from that which in itself always already is', IGA19 1371. On this basis, Heidegger elicits and apparently endorses several further 
criteria for the priority of cro(picf, of which I shall mention two. 1. 
(bp6vqcTxq consists in the apprehension of the 6ryxe6v nporxt6v, yet Aristotle declares that the good only appears as such to one who is 
already good 11144a331: in short, (pp6vqatq cannot make us any better than we already are. As Heidegger puts it: i1wir werden dadurch nicht dazu gebracht, sittlich besser zu handeln, sofern wir nicht schon gut 
sind: we do not thereby come to act better ethically, except insofar 
as we were already good" EGA19 1671. In this way, the accomplishment 
of (pp6vqaiq depends upon a certain form of existence. Aristotle goes 
so far as to question the advantage to be gained from Tp6vrjaiq: "but 
what do we need it for? seeing that it studies that which is noble 
and good for man, but these are the things that a good man does by 
nature. Knowing about them does not make us any more capable of doing 
them, since the virtues are qualities of character" 11143b2Of]- First 
of all, we might remark that Aristotle is conflating the acquisition 
of (pp6vqaiq with its study. If we recall, in Book I he declared the 
purpose of the treatise to consist not in learning about being in 
good, but rather in actually becoming good 11095a5l. To this end, the 
account Aristotle presents in NE. VI is indeed quite irrelevant. But 
this passage also raises the issue of the distinction between natural 
virtue E&pcTý (puaixý] and virtue in some stronger sense [&pcTý xupial 
11144bl5f]. Natural virtue inheres in the character traits that could 
loosely be called ours from birth, whereas virtue in the stronger 
sense is associated specifically with the cultivation or modification 
of those traits in later life. cDp6v9aiq marks the transition from the 
former to the latter, although it cannot be said to 'cause' or bring 
about that transition for the reasons mentioned. Nonetheless, to 
dispense with (pp6vncTiq would rob the distinction of sense altogether, 
which Aristotle would presumably have found disagreeable. In short, 
(pp6vrjcYir, cannot make us any better than we already were, but it can 
cement a changed relation to one's existence as a whole insofar as 
the (pp6vigoq acts deliberately in view of the good. As this 
represents the difference between voluntary and involuntary action 
11109b30ffl, (pp6vnair, could therefore be linked to an Aristotelian 
conception of freedom. Underlining the significance of this twist, 
Heidegger writes: "Sofern die (pp6vrjaic. hinsichtlich der Mdglichkeit 
ihres rechten Vollzugs darauf angewiesen bleibt, daß sie von einem 
&W06g vollzogen wird, ist sie selbst nicht eigenständig. 
Damit ist 
der' Vorrang der ý-vep-Veia erschüttert, ob sie sich zwar auf 
das 
menschliche Dasein bezieht: Insofar as the possibility of the correct 
accomplishment of q)p6v9cYir, continues to depend on the 
fact that it is 
accomplished by an 6ryot06q, it is itself not independent. 
The priority 
of (pp6vTjaiq is thereby overturned, even though it 
is indeed related 
to human Da-sein" IGA19 1671. By contrast, croq)f(x is said 
to be 
independent inasmuch as it deals with the &6 
5v, that is, with what 
above all else does not proceed from Dasein and 
therefore is not 
contingent upon a specific form of its existence. 
The fact that it is 
clearly linked to a specific form of activity 
EOEG)PETv] is treated as 
irrelevant here, apparently because the accomplishment 
of 1PP6vW1r, 
depends upon a certain formation of character and 
an orientation 
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towards a certain way of life, whereas the accomplishment of aopj(x demands a detachment from precisely those mundane interests that throw our existence into relief. (Such indifference corresponds to the character of the first principles themselves when viewed as such 
and not in the light of particular pursuits). 2. Heidegger notes that 
our activity is for the most part episodic, broken up by the demands 
of the changing situation [1177a2l, GA19 1741. Following Aristotle, 
he contrasts the inconstancy of even the least venturesome of lives 
with the invariance of contemplation; "W4hrend das Seiende der np&kiq 
je anders sein kann und jeweils einen Entsch1up im Augenblick 
verlan9t, verharrt das reine Betrachten des Immerseienden gleichsam 
in einem dauernden Jetzt: Whereas the being of np&tir, can always be 
other than it is and in each case requires a resolution in the 
present moment, the pure observation of the perpetual being persists 
as though in a lasting now" IGA19 1741. 
17. One must not forget the intimacy with which the problem of the 
orya06v is linked to that of being. Gauthier and Jolif clearly take 
this view when, with regard to the passage at 1096b34 quoted above, 
they propose that the "practicable good" be the object of Ociaptor no 
less than of woinaiq or irp6ttiq. As they point out, for Aristotle; "Ce 
qui est Pobjet aussi bien de ]a contemplation que de Paction, ce 
n'est pas le concept, c'est PCýtre en qui il se r6alise: The object 
of contemplation, as of action, is not the concept, it is being, as 
it is realized' I ENT 47 My emphasis]. Just as being is not 
immediately accessible because it is noXXo(X&Sq XcV6gcvov, so the 
intangibility of the 6ry(x96v itself may be attributed to its 
intrinsically manifold character. Accordingly, as we have already 
noted, the o'rV(x96v in an absolute sense is not isolable in a region of 
its own. 
18. Cf. GA24 26-27: 19-20, GA26 11-18: 9-18, SZ 11-15: 32-35, Kant und 
das Problem der Metaphysik (1929), Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio 
Klostermann, 1991, pp. 3-9; tr. Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 
trans. J Churchill, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1962, and 
Bernasconi, 'The Double Concept of Philosophy' in Research in 
Phenomenology Vol. XVIII 1988, pp. 41-57. 
19. Although articulated differently, such finitude was already 
evident in the relation between ontology and theology in Aristotelian 
philosophy, as readings such as those offered by Heidegger and 
Aubenque demonstrate. On a different note, it may be objected 
that a 
central plank of the thesis I am defending (that 
Heidegger's 
radicalization of np&tiq challenges the conceptual 
hegemony of 
nofn(Yiq and thereby allows for the articulation of np6tir, as a 
determination of Dasein) is at odds with the 
description we have 
given here of Heidegger's response to this notion of 
finitude; if a 
language appropriate to np&tiq were to become available, 
it would no 
longer be encountered as a limit and the 
incorporation of this 
experience of finitude into the structure and practice 
of philosophy 
would become reduntant. We shall see, however, 
that this is not the 
case and that the two lines of address are, on 
the contrary, 
intimately linked Epp. 132-1351. 
q 
qcwpcc1xoq, engulfs 20. Cf. Taminiaux's remarks on the way the 
pior 
RP&tiq ELOF 1751 and the ensuing reservations over 
the priority 
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accorded to cro(PI(Y. Cf- also, Brogan's remark that Heidegger's 
interest in aoq)f(x reflects a desire to preserve a relation between 
Dasein and something that exceeds its own existence ISJP 1521. 
21. Cf. GA29/30 Ch. 6. The problematic of nature gradually evolved into that of (pf)air, as it emerges above all in VWB- For a sense of this transformation, cf. EM Ch. l. 
22. The only conspicuous discontinuity between (Yo9i(x and the question 
of beings as a whole as it is raised here lies in the absence of any 
reference to X6-yoq, which previously structured the sense of totality 
associated with ao(pi(x. 
23. Gauthier and Jolif relate the wide variety of readings given to 
these lines by various commentators. For their part, they distinguish 
the following senses that may be attributed to the term voi5(; [ENT 
5371: 
FA CUL TE: (1) Intellect 
FONCTION: (2) Intellect sp6culatif 
(3) Intellect pratique 
QUALITt: (4) Intelligence des principes 
(5) Intelligence des valeurs morales concr6tes 
The qualities represent the istsic. 1qualit6es ou 6tats habituelles) of 
the functions. Most of the ancient commentators and a number of the 
moderns (of which Trendelenburg and Teich-MOIler are singled out) are 
said to have drawn no distinction between the functions and qualities 
of voiSq. By contrast, J Walter, in his study Die Lehre von der 
prektischen Vernunft in der greichischen Philosophie, Jena, 1874, 
(pp. 313-335) is said to have distinguished between the functions and 
qualities of vobq only to confound senses (4) and (5), reading vol5c, 
in the passage above as intelligence des principes. Gauthier and 
Jolif detect the influence of Walter's reading in many subsequent 
commentators, including Ross. 
24. Heidegger is probably thinking here of Aristotle's conjecture in 
De Anima that thinking is like perceiving. Pursuing the analogy, 
Aristotle adds that "Mind E .... I must 
be related to what is 
thinkable, as sense is to what is sensible" IDA-111: 429al7l. 
One 
could also point to the remark in the final chapter of 
Met. E) that 
"blindness is akin to a total absence of the faculty of 
thinking" 
[Met. E). 10: 1052a3, cf. also p-250(nl)]. Heidegger makes essentially 
the same point in the 1922 'Introduction'; 
" Des genuin 
Gegenstdndliche des votc, ist das, was er 66(vet) X61YOU ohne 
die Weise 
des Ansprechens auf etwas auf seine hAls-Was-BestimmungenO 
(oi) 'Ei 
X(rc& -civoc, DA 430b28) vernimrnt: die 6'(Si(xfPEVX, was an 
ihm selbst 
nicht auseinandernehmbar', nicht weiter explikabel 
ist: the genuine 
objectiveness of vobr, is that which it perceives 0-rvcu 
X6you, without 
addressing its 'determination-as-something': 
the &SI(xiPcTa, that 
which in itself cannot be contrasted, is no 
longer explicable" [PIA 
258, cf. also GA33 2041. 
25. We shall have occasion later to consider 
Heidegger's vocabulary 
of holding and having. Cf. NE. VI: 1143a35f, 
1142a25f. 
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26. Cf. 1177a12-25,1178a9f and 1179a25-27. However, the point is moot, for elsewhere Aristotle describes voj$q as what is most human 1178a6. Cf. also PIA 263. 
27. To be sure, this is not the only influence on Heidegger's 
conception of anxiety. As a conjuntion of hermitic revelation and 
abysmal dissolution, it amounts to a radicalization of a 'Cartesian' 
tendency that may itself be rooted in the same notion of purity 
attached to the Greek experience of eccapfof. In addition, one might 
also think of Kierkegaard's description of the self as "the relation that relates itself to its own self, " 'The Sickness unto Death' in 
Fear and Trembling and The Sickness Unto Death, trans W Lowrie, New 
Jersey, Princeton U P, 1961, p. 146. 
28. Although it seems that the analysis of movement gave way to that 
of temporality as to a more fundamental or profound formulation of 
the problem, it is worth noting that the latter problematic was only 
possible in the wake of the advances made by the former. Indeed, even 
when one considers the exceptional interpretation Heidegger gave of 
Aristotle's treatment of time in Physics IV 10-14, it is still 
tempting to suppose that Aristotle's discussions of movement and 
change offered Heidegger more fruitful reading, insofar a5 they 
impinged directly on the themes of 8bvcYgiq, Cv9pVci(x and thereby the 
Aristotelian conception of both life and divine being. 
29. This is the sense in which Heidegger is interested above all, cf. 
GA33 especially 57; for the source of this reading in Aristotle, cf. 
Met. E. 2: 1026bl. 
30. Aristotle's Physics, ed. with commentary WD Ross (1936), Oxford, 
Clarendon, 1960, p. 537. 
31. Because Sibvoegir is seen as a state from which one must move, 
rather than as a state of having the power to move: as with movement, 
the Megarics tend to view 8bvcxgtq as a being, rather than as a manner 
of being. Cf. Heidegger's reading of Met. 8.3 and Ch. 4.1V below. 
32. Heidegger offers the following translations ofev9pycia: Am-Werke- 
sein, Sich-ans-Werk-machen, -ins-Zeug-legen IGA33 2201, Im-Werk- 
stehen 1VWB-WM 282: 2561. Cf. also p. 257(n47). 
33. &tp-ye-Lcy is said to be complete, whereas xivqatc, is incomplete 
16f'CCXtq1 11048bl8-35). 
34. Significantly, this critique, moved by Aubenque in the passage 
quoted above, is also at the basis of Heidegger's reading of 
Aristotle's account of time. Moreover, the interpretation 
he offers 
of the now as transition is intended to win access 
to movement as 
movement precisely what is at issue here. 




1. Heidegger attached great importance to this chapter, seeing it as the clearest expression in Aristotle of the conception of truth as unconcealment. Cf. Vom Wesen der' Menschlichen Freiheit (1930), Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann, 1982,59, Logik: die Frase 
nach der Wahrheit (1925/26), Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann, 1976,913c, and Volpi, HA 172-182. 
2. As we have noted already, the tendency towards a theological 
resolution of the problems of ontology is intrinsic to Aristotle's 
philosophy and in may some respects be taken as a mark of its distinction. If any doubt remains, we are not arguing that it is 
mistaken as such, but rather that it is inadequately thought through, 
above all by Aristotle's successors. For whilst the complexity and 
ambiguity of Aristotle's own text testifies to his awareness of the 
problems involved, the impulse to elevate ivtpyciof beyond change 
sanctions the reductive interpretations of Aristotle that are the 
real target of Heidegger's reading. 
3. For an excellent reading of this passage, cf. Pierre Rodrigo, 
'Heidegger lecteur d'Aristote: Dynamis et 66nergeia sous le regard 
ph6nom6nologique' in Les ttudes Philosophiques, Juillet-septembre 
1990, pp. 353-372. 
4. The Greek in question is: Xit-ye-con gt: v IL&Xiacof xupfwc, --. In its 
adverbial form, xupiwq is indeed generally taken to narrow the sense 
of the verb to its primary or most essential meaning. Thus, Liddell 
and Scott refer to its use in the context of language as indicating 
"in the proper sense-" However, as an adjective, xuptoq may be 
applied to persons "having power or authority. " It may be that 
Heidegger draws on this element of its meaning, transfering the 
connotation of 'holding sway' to suggest that the sense in question 
is merely the most common or prevalent, but not necessarily the most 
proper or correct. Cf. A Greek Lexicon, HG Liddell &R Scott, 
Oxford, Clarendon, 1951 (ninth edition). 
5. Heidegger translates the Greek o16 lig: v Xprlafgrl as "wahrlich nicht 
brauchbar. " If the selection of this particular -sense of 
brauchbar 
seems a somewhat arbitrary basis on which to construct an opposition 
to 'usef uI' (wh i ch is also amongst the senses of brauchbar), 
Heidegger also offers verwendber [applicable] as a possible 
alternative and expressly rejects terms such as ndtzlich [useful- 
serviceable] and dienlich [useful -sui table]. On the contrary, he 
claims that the enquiry into this first sense is precisely ndtzlich 
and dienlich for what follows. Ross's commentary to the 1924 edition 
chooses "not the most suitable" in preference to "not the most 
useful, " thereby going some way towards mitigating the problem 
in the 
same fashion as Heidegger. 
6. Heidegger is not consistent in his translation of Sbv(xýLiq. 
As the 
subtitle of the course indicates, he generally opts 
for Kraft 
(power], but also uses the more usual Verni6ýgen [potentiality). 
one 
suspects that the choice of Kraft over Vernp6gen reflects a wish 
to 
distance the account from a residual passive or secondary character 
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associated with the term potentiality -a character that may derive in part from the privilege given to actuality as a determination of what is 'genuinely real. ' Ultimately, Heidegger will develop his 
interpretation further in the company of Nietzsche. However, that the 
orientation of such a reading was already decided is evident from the 
account of Leibniz in GA26, esp. 95. Whatever the broader strategic 
significance of Heidegger's choice of terms, his distinction between 
Kraft and Verm6gen does not seem to have arisen directly from his 
interpretation of Aristotle's Metaphysics, as he often uses the two 
terms in conjunction with one another or as interchangeable, e. g. GA33 167,209. 
7. "Die Si6vulicir, xorc& -xivr1criv sind die vorhandenen Kr4fte, von denen 
wir sprechen wenn uns Bewegtes irgendwelcher Art begegnet: the 
86vulisir, xuiý& xfvncriv are the present-at-hand powers that we speak of 
when we encounter any kind of thing in movement" [GA33 55-561. 
Aristotle himself warns against this mistake, pointing to the way 
that movement had consistently been described in negative terms 
(otherwiseness, unequalness, non-existence) as evidence that it is 
neither a thing nor a quality nor indeed anything such as would fall 
under any other category 120lb2O-301. 
8. The expression x(xxdf xivýacoar ., 
does not appear in Met. 8 as such and 
is essentially Heidegger's way of introducing the ontological 
difference into Aristotle's account of movement. However, it echoes 
the determination of Sbv(ygir as the &pXý xivýcrstjr. (1019al5l, thereby 
linking this shift in perspective to the account of Sbvagiq that is 
to follow. Moreover, it is by no means without basis. In Physics 
111.1-2 Aristotle is clearly frustrated by the inability of the 
categories at his disposal to grasp movement as such and Heidegger's 
use of the genitive does point to a trajectory of questioning that 
Aristotle may have welcomed. Ultimately, however, the introduction of 
the genitive form stands or falls by the sense it enables one to make 
of the problems at issue in Metaphysics E). 
9. By way of illustration, in Heidegger's 1939 paper on Aristotle's 
Phys i cs, u'Xrl and jlop(pti are presented as essentially dynamic 
significations of ways of being. The possibility of such an 
ontological reading rests on the intepretation of 86vagic, and 
iv9PYCI(x ini nXgov in terms of movement that Heidegger sets out 
here. 
10. "Es bleibt die Mglichkeit, dap der Gang in folgenden Abschnitten 
geht: Ausgang von der 8bv(xjiiq xa-c& x! vrj(T-Lv, Fortgang zur 
ivtpyciot 
xOfT6f xivnaiv, libergang zur : iv9p-Veicx xotT& xivtlacwq 
Ausgang zur 86vagic, 
'X(xTdf xivýcrccaq: There remains the possibility that 
the path is divided 
into the following stages: outset f rom a bvag Iq xocxdf xivnaiv, 
development to ivtp-Vcjo( xofT6f xfvqc7iv, transition 
to ivitp-yetof x(X'E& 
xIvtlaE(jq, conclusion to 9,6vcxgtq x(xTdf xtvtlG6wq 
IGA33 551. 
, I. Ross, f01 lowing Bonitz, suggests that Aristotle 
lapses, 
introducing the later definition of Sbvofglq (which 
Ross calls 
Potentiality) into the account of the earlier sense 
(which he calls 
Power) IACM 2411. Significantly, the point at which 
he believes this 
to have happened [1047a241 is precisely the point 
that Heidegger 
Picks out as the pinnacle of Aristotle's achievement: 
"Mit ihm 
Idiesem Satz] ist die grdflte philosophische 
Erkenntnis der Antike 
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aushresprochen, eine Erkenntnis, die bis heute in der Philosophie unausgewertet und unverstanden gebleiben ist: it [this proposition] gives voice to the greatest knowledge of Ancient times, knowledge that philosophy to this day has neither evaluated nor understood" [GA33 2191. 
12. Cf. above all I Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1781), Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1992; tr. Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N Kemp Smith, London, Macmillan, 1983, A204 B249. 
13. Discussing the alteration in meaning undergone by the term Epyov 
on being translated into Latin, Heidegger later notes that it came to be understood as a result. "Das Ergebnis ist das, was aus einer und auf einer actio folgt: der Erfolg. Das Wirkliche ist jetzt das Erfolgte. Der Erfolg wird durch einer Sache erbracht, die ihm 
voraufgeht, durch die Ursache (causa). Das Wirkliche ercheint jetzt im Lichte der Kausalit. 4t der causa efficiens. A result is that which follows out of and follows upon an actio: the consequence, the 
outcome [Erfolg] The rea I is now that which has followed as 
consequence. The consequence is brought about by the circumstance 
[Sachel that precedes it, i. e. by the cause [Ursachel (causa). The 
real appears now in the light of the causality of the causa 
efficiens. " 'Wissenschnaft und Besinnung' in VA, p. 50, 'Science and 
Reflection' in QCT, p. 161. 
14. As regards ontology, the question of grounds is transformed into 
a search for the first link in the causal chain -a modern version of 
an ancient tale, as Heidegger points out in Being and Time: "Der 
erste philosophische Schritt im Verstdndnis des Seinsproblems besteht 
darin, nicht gb66v Tivof SiqysTafti, hkeine Geschichte erz9hieng, d. h. 
Seiendes als Seiendes nicht durch RUckfuhrung auf ein anderes 
Seiendes in seiner Herkunft zu bestimmen, gleich als h9tte Sein den 
Charakter eines m6glichen Seienden: If we are to understand the 
problem of Being, our first philosophical step consists in not gbMv 
, tiv(x SinyeTa0on, in not 'telling a story' - that is to say, in not 
defining entities as entities by tracing them back in their origin to 
some other entities, as if Being had the character of some possible 
entity" ESZ 6: 261. The citation is from Plato, Sophist 242c, cf. also 
Fhaedo 98c-99c. Presumably, Heidegger would see in big bang theory 
and the efforts of contemporary cosmology to reconstruct the events 
of the earliest universe a sign of both the power of science and its 
philosophical poverty. 
15. The examples used by Aristotle to illustrate his account of the 
four causes are predominantly those of building and of 5culpture. 
The 
notable exception is that of paternity in the case of the efficient 
cause, though even here, Aristotle adds "or in general the maker a 
cause of the thing made" 11013a3l], suggesting that this remains 
the 
model even for paternity. Nonetheless, it is far from clear 
that the 
relation of father to child is compatible with the general 
tenor of 
Aristotle's account. On a more contemporary note, 
Derrida's essay 
'L'invention de J'autre' prefaces a consideration of 
the possibility 
Of inventing something radically new with the question 
"Invente-t-on 
un enfant?: Does one invent a child? " PsychL6, 
Paris, Galil6e, 1987, 
P-14. Derrida raises this as an example that might precisely 
escape 
or exceed the schema of production, insofar as 
the end is not sighted 
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in advance. In this way, the future opened by act is not one's own and there is a sense of discontinuity not found in production. Derrida's interest emerges as more than a passing coincidence, if one sees in Derrida's essay an implicit interrogation of the limits of the language of potentiality and actuality, an interrogation that, though this is rarely ackowledged, also characterizes Heidegger's 'on the Origin of the Work of Art. ' 
16. Regarding Sbv(xgic, and material causality, VWB-WM 271-289: 248-261. 
17. Heidegger raises these questions and others in his 1926 course, GA22 13. 
18. Cf - Jean-Frangois Mattei, 'L'C-toile et le sillon: L'interpr6tation heideggerienne de I '6tre et de la nature chez Platon 
et Aristote, ' in Heidegger et I 'id6e de ]a ph6nomenologie, ed. F Volpi, pp. 43-66. 
19. Ertragsamkeit is cognate with ertragen (to endure, tolerate) and 
ertrdglich (endurable, tolerable). The root Ertrag denotes yield or 
output, thereby linking Ertragsamkeit to the experience of 
production. 
20. Heidegger quotes from Leibniz's writing on dynamics: "Quando 
agere est character substantiarum, extensioque nil aliud quam jam 
praesuuppositae nitentis renitentisque id est resistentis substantiae 
continuationem sive diffusionem dicit, tantum abest, ut ipsammet 
substantiam, facere possit. Since activity is the characteristic mark 
of substances, extension on the contrary, affirms nothing other than 
the continual reiteration or propagation of an already preusposed 
effort and counter-effort, that is, resistant substance, and 
therefore cannot possibly constitute substance itself. " 'Specimen 
Dynamicum' in Leibniz: Selections ed. PP Wiener, New York, Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1951, pp. 119-136; cf. p. 120 and GA33 96. The 
introduction of the concept of striving [Streben] to that of 
resistance is also the basis for an attack on the Cartesian view of 
the natural world as an aggregate of inert and extended matter. In 
connection with the concept of resistance, this means replacing 
extensiowith agere. The fact that a heavy body halts the movement of 
a smaller body an not vice versa would be inexplicable in terms of 
extension alone, argues Heidegger. In this way, as in his analysis of 
worldhood of the world in Being and Time [SZ 5§19-211, Heidegger 
exposes the indifference of Cartesian metaphysics to a more original 
determination on which it in fact depends. 
21. Heidegger speaks there of the essence of science as 
"holding 
one's ground in the midst of the uncertainty of the totality of what 
is" RR 12: 473. 
22. All further passages from Met. 6-1-3 quoted 
in the context of 
Heidegger's intepretation of them will be reproduced 
in Heidegger's 
own translation followed by my rendition of that translation. 
23. Fertigkeit could be translated as accomplishment 
or skill, 
thereby relating it to the foregoing description of potentiality. 
Indeed, Heidegger later offers Fer-tiSkeit as a 
translation of TEXV(l 
(P-1871. However, Fertig can mean ready or prepared 
and thus 
Fertigkeit could be taken as readiness. 
I have chosen to use this 
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sense in the translation in view of Heidegger's use of Fertigwerden 
later in this passage. Cf. also Heidegger's use of Fertigkeit in his 
definition of cvTeX6Xciot at the end of GA33 §22, p. 249(n. 46). 
24. Zielstrebigkeit could be taken simply as 'singlemindedness' or 
even 'resoluteness. ' However, in the context of this discussion, it 
seems that Heidegger wishes to distance himself from the sense of $movement towards what lies ahead' that is conveyed by the 
conjunction of Ziel [goal] with the stem of Streben. Accordingly, I 
have translated Zielstrebegkeit as 'purposefulness' in the hope of 
preserving the sense of having a goal 'in one's sights. ' 
25. Cf. the iep-yov argument, pp. 46-52. 
26. This is a typically Heideggerian gesture. The difference in 
approach between Ross and Heidegger on this point is brought into 
relief by Ross's reference to De Anima 425b25-426a3O. Aristotle 
begins: "The activity of the sensible object and that of the 
percipient sense is one and the same activity and yet the distinction 
between their being remains. " Heidegger's reading of this passage 
would surely focus on their unity, his interpretation of truth as 
unconcealment providing the ground for the subjective and objective 
limbs of the event as it is described here. By contrast, Ross sees 
this passage, and the discussion that follows it, as evidence of how 
two fundamentally distinct phenomena can appear as one. 
27. The expression x(xcdf x1vnaiv is no longer said to designate that 
potentiality which is apprehended in the observation of a moving 
thing. "Sondern die Sibv(xgir, xotT6( x1vr10'1v ist diejenige, deren 
Wesenbau in dem Grundph9nomen der gcTo(poXý, eben in dem Wechselbezug 
5h von 8()vcxgiq 'cob nOISIv und cob lt&aXeiv mitgegeben ist, von oIc er 
Bewegung her - auf solche Bewegung hin verstanden ist: Rather, 
8 f)v(xli Ic structure is given with , X(xc& xfvrlc)riv 
is that whose essential 
the fundamental phenomenon of 9CWPOXý, precisely in the inter- 
relation of Sf)v(xRlq Tof) noleiv and Tob 716(aXeIv; it is understood from 
such movement and in view of such movement" [GA33 1151. 
28. Entzug can mean 'privation, ' but also simply 'withdrawal. 
' 
Heidegger often plays on the kinetic character of the latter, which 
also preserves the positive significance of what has been withdrawn 
better than the more plainly negative 'privation. 
' That said, 
Heidegger's interpretation of (y. Cj: pncr1r, would not disqualify the use 
of 'privation. ' For a more detailed treatment of aTtpnaiq 
by 
Heidegger cf. VWB-WM, esp. 294-301: 264-269; cf. also 
Aubenque PEA 
425,431-438. 
29. Heidegger twice picks out what he regards as 
the key phrase from 
1046a28f, translating it slightly differently on each occasion: 
"In 
Bezug auf dasselbe und in Gemaßheit desselben 
ist jegliche Kr-aft 
Unkraft: In relation to and in conformity with 
the same thing each 
iality" EGA33 1101, , _Tede 
Krgft ist Unkraft 
potentiality is a-potent 
desselben: Every power is un-power in in Bezug auf dasselbe und geM60 This is true not 
relation to and according to itself" EGA33 
III]- 
only of specific powers but of the essence of power 
itself. 
30. Of course, the complete picture will also 
involve ivtPYcla, as we 
shall see in Section IV. However, what we 
have already discovered 
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regarding &6v(xgiq will prove vital for the hermeneutics of facticity (our primary concern here). 
31. "[ýInicrrýgrj: sich verstehen auf etwas, etwas kennen und erkannt haben; Xoyicrg6q: umsichtige Berechnung, liberlegung und damit bezogen 
auf Wahl und Entscheidung: [Elniaýgq: to understand oneself with 
regard to something, to know and have discerned something; loytag6q: 
circumpsective taking account, deliberation and thereby relation to 
choice and decision" IGA33 1281. 
32. Cf. GA33 138-148, GA24 149-154: 106-109. 
33. DA. 3: 4323b28f, NE. VI. ii. 2: 1139a21. "[Dlie Bewegung immer ist die 
eines Fliehenden oder Verfolgenden (9u*yfi bzw. Stwttc, ), das aber 
bedeutet; sich in Schutz bringen vor etwas bzw. sich in Besitz 
bringen vor etwas: Movement is always flight or pursuit (q)uyý or 
Slwtiq), which means; bring oneself to safety before something or 
bring oneself into possession before something" [GA33 1501. Cf. the 
many references to fleeing and avoidance that occur throughout Being 
and Time, particularly with regard to disposition [Befindlichkeit) 
and being-towards-death. In turn, these cases are generally 
counterposed to a 'coming before something' associated with the 
modification to authenticity [Eigentlichkeit]. 
34. The impetus for pursuit or avoidance does not come from the mind 
as such, for "even when the mind does command and thought bids us 
pursue or avoid something, sometimes no movement is produced; we act 
in accordance with desire" 1433al-21. Human being, as one who 
chooses, is described as either opexrix6r, vol5c, or opcýtq Siofvorycixý 
11139b5l. 
35. This is an important theme in Being and Time, where Dasein is 
often absorbed in a non-thematic circumspective relation to the 
equipmental totality. "In dieser Vertrautheit kannn sich das Dasein 
an das innerweltlich Begegnende verlieren und von ihm bennomen sein: 
In this familiarity Dasein can lose itself in what it encounters 
within-the-world and be fascinated with it" ISZ 76: 1071. Aside from 
the fact that Dasein can also 'lose itself' in the they, the notion 
of fascination [Benommenheit] by which Heidegger characterizes the 
absorbtion of the self in world of its concern plays an interestingly 
equivocal role in his determination of Dasein vis-A-vis the animal. 
Whereas it is presented as characteristic of Dasein in the passage 
quoted above, in the 1929/30 lectures, it becomes a feature of animal 
life that distinguishes it from Dasein EGA29/30 §§58-601. Cf. also 
Derrida's remarks on this matter in De Vesprit, 
Heidegger et ]a 
question, Paris, Galil6e, 1987, pp. 75-90, esp. p. 85. 
'Of Spirit, 
Heidegger and the Question, trans. G Bennington and 
R Bowlby, 
Chicago, London, University of Chicago Press, 1989. Note also 
the way 
that ao(pi(y requires that one cease to be preoccupied with 
what is 
most immediate Ep. 1161. 
36. The conception of the self implicit in 
this account, and above 
all its association with the reserve constitutive of 
authenticity, is 
clearly a topic that invites further comment. 
Regrettably, a full 
critical consideration is beyond the bounds of 
the present work. 
However, the themes of having, appropriation, and 
accordingly those 
Of authenticity and selfhood, continue to play 
a large part in the 
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remainder of the thesis. Whilst they are not explicitly Placed in question, the philosophical sources from which Heidegger developed these concepts are in some measure brought to light, thereby 
preparing the ground for such critique. 
37. With this explanation we turn back on ourselves and rejoin the discussion at the point where Heidegger was concerned to establish the possibility of discrimination that belongs to 6bv(xg1q gcT& X6you [cf. pp. 188-1901. 
38. Cf. Section IV below. This is premissed on Aristotle's view of the physical world as essentially determined by movement. By 
contrast, geometrical figures cannot move, whereby it makes no sense to speak of them as at rest either. 
39. Cf. Met., &. 20: 1022b3-10. There are several points in the present 
study at which this passage assumes considerable importance, inasmuch 
as, although not cited by Heidegger, it articulates an ambiguity that 
Heidegger explores in his treatment of Dasein; cf. 92-93,205-206, 
Conc. and p. 258(nl), where the passage is quoted in full. 
40. Note Heidegger's questions over the order of the account. Cf. 
pp. 166-167, GA33 55. 
41. "Das Ausschlaggebende und für das Verständnis und die Auslegung 
des ganzen Kapitels Leitende ist die Übersetzung des energe. ývcpicTv 
heißt: am Werke sein (nicht einfach: wirklich sein). Wenn ein 
Vermögen zu etwas 'am Werke ist', d. h. bei der Herstellung dessen, 
wozu es Vermögen ist, beschäftigt, denn, sagen wir kurz, 
'verwirklicht' sich das, was vor dem nur etwas Mögliches war: 
Decisive as a guide in the understanding and interpretation of the 
whole chapter is the translation of energe. ývcpycTv means: being at 
work (not simply being actual). If a potentiality for something is 
I at work, ' i. e. is engaged in the production of that for which it is 
a potentiality, then we say that what was previously only something 
possible 'actualizes itself'" [GA33 1671. 
42. Note that the account of the essence of 86vo%Liq concerned 
primarily 3f)v(Y1itq gcx& X&Vou, the form of 86vugic, pertaining to 
beings with souls. Consequently that account should be read as an 
account of the essence of human being as the C(pov X6yov c-Xov. 
43. Physics V-VI, IA Kosman, 'Aristotle's Definition of Motion' in 
Phronesis Vol. XIV 1969 pp. 40-62, esp. p. 45. 
44. This is problematic passage to translate and the version offered 
here should be taken only as a rough indication. In particular, 
the 
expression Im-Stand-sein-zu, translated as being-in-place-to, also 
conveys the idea of being in condition for something. 
The sense of 
concerted effort this implies is reflected in 
the phrase Sich-ins- 
Zeug-legen by which Heidegger translates energeia and which 
I have 
rendered as 5etting-to-work. In so doing, I 
have taken advantage of 
Heidegger's own conjunction of work Eer-gon, 
Werk] and tool lZeU91- 
45. The Ross edition runs: "And a thing is capable of 
doing something 
if there is nothing impossible in its having 
the actuality of that of 
which it is said to have the capacity" [AMC 
2411. Heidegger praises 
this definition as a high point in Ancient philosophy 
that has 
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remained unsurpassed and even misunderstood throughout the whole of the history of metaphysics 'EGA33 2191. By contrast it is in this 
passage that Ross identifies a failure to maintain distinct senses of 86v(xRiq. Cf. AMC 241 and p. 243(nll). 
46. Heidegger also offers 'Am-Werke-sein' and 'Sich-ins-Werke-machen' 
[GA33 2201, 'in der Werkhaftigkeit sich halten' and 'Sich-in-der- 
Hergestell theit-und-Dastehendheit-Hal ten' in GA31 69. Cf. p. 249(n32). 
47. Heidegger recognizes it as essentially equivalent to ývtpyctcx. it 
is worth noting that, Heidegger's translation of ivccXtxci(Y in GA33 
is 'Sich-in-Fertigkeit-halten. ' The preference for Fertigkeit 
[readiness) over Ende lend] more fully reflects the term's link with 
sbv(xg Iq- 
48. Indeed, one could instructively compare Heidegger's determination 
of ývxcXtXci(x with that of the now in GA24 §19. Here too there is a 
move from a sense of full presence to one of transition, that is, 
gcxofpoXý or, in Heidegger's translation, Umschlag. 
49. Thus the 'as such' 1ý xoioiSTov] is intended to pick out movement T1 
as the actuality of potentiality (as opposed to the actuality of what 
the potentiality is capable of accomplishing), but not necessarily in 
the way most commentators believe. Whereas it might be thought to 
indicate that movement is the ivEsXtXei(x of the potentiality of x to 
do y or to become z, it may be understood more fundamentally as an 
insistence that it is potentiality as such that is at issue and not 
simply the specific the potentiality of x to.... This would lead to a 
formal definition of movement focussed on the event of change itself 
that would correspond to the perspective that we have already seen 
him describe as x(rcdc xtvý(Tctjr, [p. 1441. 
Conclusion 
1. Aristotle, Met. A. 20.1022b6-10: "'Having' ['stiq] means (1) a kind 
of activity of the haver and of what he has - something 
like an 
action or movement. For when one thing makes and one is made, 
between 
them there is a making: so too between him who has a garment and 
the 
garment which he has there is a having. This sort of 
having, then, 
evidently we cannot have; for the process will go on 
to infinity, if 
it is to be possible to have the having of what we 
have. " 
2. Cf. p. 6, p. 63, Pp. 205-206. 
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